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PANAMA 



THE ISTHMUS AND THE CANAL 



FORBES- LINDSAY " .a.rJu^VWvCxr 

AUTHOR OF 

"India, Past and Present," "The Philippines, Under Spanish 

and American Rules," "America's Insular 

Possessions," etc. 



REVISED EDITION 

WITH NEW ILLUSTRATIONS 



PHILADELPHIA 

THE JOHN C. WINSTON CO. 
1912 






Copyright, 1912, by 

The John C. Winston Co. 

All rights reserved. 



Copyright, 1906, 1911, by 

The John C. Winston Co, 

All rights reserved. 



/5'^^3<^> 



€Ci.A332359 



Zo tbe 

MEN ON THE ISTHMUS, 

WHO AMIDST DIFFICULTIES AND DISCOMFOBTS 

AEE DEVOTING THE BEST THAT'S IN THEM 

TO THEIR COUNTEY's WORK. 



Affected dispatch is one of the most dangerous 
things to business that can be: it is like that which the 
physicians call predigestion, or hasty digestion, which 
ijS sure to fill the body full of crudities, and secret 
seeds of disease: therefore measure not dispatch by 
the time of sitting, but by the advancement of the 
business; and, as in races, it is not the long stride, or 
high lift, that makes the speed; so in business, the 
keeping close to the matter, and not taking of it too 
much at once, procureth dispatch. It is the care of 
some only to com,e off speedily for the time, or to con- 
trive some false periods of business, because they may 
seem men of dispatch; but it is one thing to abbrevi- 
ate by contracting, another by cutting off. . - . 
The ripeness or unripeness of the occasion must be 
well weighed; and generally it is good to commit the 
beginnings of all great actions to Argus with his hun- 
dred eyes, and the ends to Briai'eus with his hundred 
hands; first to watch and then to speed. 

— Bacon. 



PKEFACE T@ THE KEVISED EDITION. 

Since the first edition of this volume left the press, 
the writer has made two visits to the scene of the 
Canal operations. 

The lengthy chapter which is now added, brings 
the account of the work down to the close of the year 
1912, and includes a prospective view of its comple- 
tion. This is rendered possible by the fact that all the 
essential features of the Canal are now fixed beyond 
possibility of change. Anything further that may be 
written about the operation can deal only with pro- 
gress and the perfection of details. 

It was expected from the first, and it may be pre- 
dicated of the future, that such accidents as are in- 
separable from a task of this character will occur 
from time to time, until the locks are thrown open to 
the first vessel which may pass through the water- 
way. It is unlikely, however, that such natural inci- 
dents as the settling of fills and the sliding of cuts will 
again afford sufficient foundation for public agitation. 

The construction of the Canal is assured. The date 
of its opening is approximately calculable. It will 
be a work as nearly perfect as the intelligence and 
resources of the present age can command. 

FoEBES Lindsay. 
December i, IQ12. 



PEErACE. 

In the following pages I have endeavored to relate 
the story of the Canal from the earliest explorations 
to the present time, with as much avoidance as possi- 
ble of technics and in a manner that shall be compre- 
hensible to the general reader. A certain degree oi 
familiarity with the scene of the operation on the 
Isthmus and a somewhat close study of the subject 
may have enabled me to achieve my purpose. 

At the time of going to press with the book the ulti- 
mate form of the Canal has not been decided upon, 
but, since it is reasonably certain that the multi-lock 
plan recommended by the minority of the Consulting 
Engineers will be adopted, that plan has been most 
extensively treated, and selected for map-illustration, 
although the sea-level project of the Board is also de- 
scribed. 

For my information I am largely indebted to offi- 
cial sources, supplemented and corroborated by relia- 
ble observations of men who have recently been in tbe 
Canal Zone. All the available data at the command 
of the Commission has been at my disposal and I 
take this opportunity to acknowledge my appreciation 
of the prompt and courteous response with which my 
many enquiries and requests have been met. 

Philadei^phia, April, 1906. 



CONTENTS. 

I PAGE 

The Ameeican Isthmus Ujvdek Spain 11 

II 
Canal Exploration 31 

ni 

The Panama Railroad 55 

IV 
The Isthmian Country 79 

V 
Colon and Panama 103 

VI 
The Panama Canal Company 125 

VII 
The New Panama Canal Company 153 

VIII 

The American Enterprise 181 

IX 
The Plan of the Canal 201 

X 

Various Aspects of the Canal 240 

XI 
Preparatory Work on the Isthmus 266 

XII 
The Last Stage 294 

APPENDIX 

Great Canals of the World 317 

(vii) 



ILLUSTRATIONS. 

PAGE 

CtTLEBBA Cut in 1910, Looking North Frontispiece "^ 

Pedro Miguel Lock, Looking South v «"' 

Gatun Spillway, Looking North 12 ^ 

Gatun Lock Site, Looking North from East Wall .... 16 '^'^ 

Residence Street in Cristobal 40 '^ 

View of La Boca, Panama Bay 56 l^ 

The Chagres River and Labor Camp 72 '^ 

Ruins of St. Augustine, Old Panama 104 '' 

Ferdinand de Lesseps 136 

Portion of the Old French Cut 181 V 

Hotel foe Employees 248 '^^ 

Buildings of the Ancon Hospital 266 ^ 

Fumigating Brigade in Panama 280 ' 

Bird's-Eye View of Pedro Miguel Locks 294 ^ 

Gates of the Upper Looks at Gatun 300 

/ 
Completed Lock Chamber at Mikaflores 306 ^ 



(is) 



PANAMA. 

THE AMERICAN ISTHMUS UNDER SPAIN. 

Early Settlements on the Spanish Main — Preparations for Ex- 
ploring the Pacific Coast — The Search for a Strait Through 
the Isthmus — The Establishment of Overland Communica- 
tion — The First Survey of the Isthmus of Panama — The 
ni-fated Darien Expedition — Cortes Establishes a Trans- 
continental Route — Investigation of the Nicaragua Route 
— Disintegration of Spain's American Colonies. 

On the early morning of the twenty-fifth of Sep- 
tember, in 1513, a small party of men made their 
laborious way up the densely covered face of a steep 
ridge. One, keen of eye and with determined coun- 
tenance, pressed forward eagerly ahead of his com- 
panions. When, at length, he reached the summit, 
a vast expanse of water stretched before him on 
either hand. Balboa had discovered the Pacific 
Ocean. Vasco Nunez de Balboa was a man of ex- 
traordinary intellect, and it is not improbable that 
something of the true significance of this new knowl- 
edge dawned upon his mind even in these first mo- 
ments of discovery. Perhaps he, first of all contem- 
porary explorers, realized that the Tierra Firma of 
Columbus was not the Ultima Thule of sixteenth 

11 



12 PANAMA. 

century endeavoTj and that tlie land of mystic legend 
lay away toward tlie setting sun, beyond the spark- 
ling sea whose placid waters washed the shores of 
the bay below the height upon which he stood. It 
was an age of splendid achievements in geographical 
science. Bold and ardent adventurers were fast dis- 
persing the haze that had obscured more than half 
the earth, and disclosing new lands almost as rapidly 
as geographers could map them. In the last year of 
the fifteenth century, Vasco de Gama, returning 
home from his eventful voyage to India, re-rounded 
the cape which Bartholomew Diaz had discovered 
and which King John had named Good Hope. A 
waterway to the East was thus opened uj?. and this 
circuitous route remained the main means of direct 
ocean communication between Europe and Asia until 
the opening of the Suez Canal, nearly four hundred 
years later. Columbus, with the vaguest ideas of 
the extent of the globe, and with none but the most 
faulty charts for guide, thought to find Cipango, 
where he ran across Cuba and died without knowing 
that he had added an enormous continent to the map. 
First in the West Indies and later on the mainland 
of America he hoped to reach the capital of the 
Grand Khan, to whom he bore letters from Ferdi- 
nand of Spain.^.4Jyhen^_uppn his last disastrous voy- 
age, -Cblumbus beat down the coast from Honduras 
to Darien seeking a strait through the massive ^iSiy^^ 
It^ier that stayed his farther progress to the west, he 



EAULY SETTLEMENTS. 13 

little dreamed that at a point which he passed in his 
dish6ai't6fiTfl^"'S?5'SBP"6h "ar~catidal eut would one da-y"" 
separate "Ewb gf ear''coutlueut^'''''£Sf^"''urLite two vasHT^ 
oceans." T"*" "^ — -^"^ — ..^^.^^...^^^.■^-^^^^..■.^^i. 



EAEI.Y SETTLEMENTS OF THE SPANISH MAIN. 

Amongst the horde of adventurers who followed in 
the wake of the Great Discoverer was Kodrigo Bas- 
tides. He was in command of an expedition that, 
in 1500, coasted the Spanish Main from some point 
on the Venezuelan littoral to almost as far south as 
Porto Bello. Balboa, a lad of twenty-five, received 
his first taste of adventure upon this occasion. On 
the return voyage the weather-worn and worm-eaten 
ships of Bastides were barely able to make Hispanola 
before they sank. Balboa, who possessed little or 
no means, turned his attention to agriculture on the 
island. He had, however, neither genius nor in- 
clination for the tame pursuit of husbandry and was 
soon in difficulties. The spirit of the rover was 
strong in him and, in order to indulge his desire as 
well as to escape his creditors, he concealed himself 
in a cask and caused it to be carried on board a ship 
bound for Tierra Firma. At this time Spain had 
two sparsely settled provinces on the Isthmus of 
Darien and an important stronghold at Cartagena. 

Having landed in safety, Balboa wrote to a 
wealthy friend in Hispanola, one Bachelor Encisco, 



14 PANAMA. 

advising iiim to fit out an expedition and recom- 
mending the Indian village of Darien, on the Gulf 
of TJraba, as a favorable site for a settlement on ac- 
count of the reported presence of gold in the vicinity. 
Encisco adopted the advice of Balboa. The expedi- 
tion arrived in due course and a town was established 
on the Isthmus and named S^anta Maria de la An- 
tigua del Darien. It had the distinction of being 
the first episcopal see upon the mainland and of con- 
taining the oldest church in the American continent. 
Balboa soon rose to a position of importance 
among the colonists of Tierra Firm a./ "Re learnfed 
from the Indians that a great sea lay beyond the 
range of mountains that traversed the Isthmus, and 
Igst no time in investigating the statement.*V^ith a 
small force of Spahiards and Indian guidds Balboa 
succeeded, not without great difficulty, for the whole 
way was through dense jungle and over swamps, in 
reaching the ocean, of which he formally took pos- 
session in the name of the King of Spain. During 
this journey across the isthmus the Spaniards heard 
of a rich land to the south abounding in precious 
metals. Balboa planned the conquest of this coun- 
try, and it is more than probable that Pizarro, who 
was his companion on this occasion, shared his de- 
signs. Had the former lived to pursue his energetic 
and ambitious career Pizarro might never have 
found the heroic place which he occupies in his- 

^0^* .. . . ' 



THE AMERICAN ISTHMUSES. 



15 




16 PANAMA. 

In 1515, Balboa received the reward of his enter- 
prise in the form of the appointment of Adelantado 
of the Southern Sea, as the Pacific had been named. 

PEEPABATIONS FOR EXPLORING THE PACIFIC COAST. 

In the following year he prepared to organize an 
expedition to the south hy way of the newly discov- 
ered ocean. The problem involved in the under- 
taking was one to daunt a less bold spirit. Trees 
suitable to the construction of ships were to be found 
only upon the Atlantic side of the divide, which ne- 
cessitated the tremendous task of transporting tim- 
bers over a rout© that presented great difficulties to 
the passage of an unencumbered man. The terribly 
onerous labor of collecting the material and carrying 
it on their backs to its destination was imposed upon 
the Indians, of whom thousands were gathered to- 
gether for the purpose and impelled to the unaccus- 
tomed work by the merciless severity of their task- 
masters. Many months were consumed in this grim 
struggle for a passage of the Isthmus, which, in 
many respects, foreshadowed the endeavors of the 
modern successors of these hardy pioneers. Hun- 
dreds of the wretched aborigines. Las Oasas says 
their number fell little short of two thousand, lost 
their lives in the undertaking, but it succeeded, and 
four brigantines were carried piecemeal from sea to 
sea and put together on the Pacific coast The work 



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A SEARCH FOR THE STRAIT. H 

of fitting out the ships proceeded rapidly and Balboa 
was upon the eve of departure when his arrest was 
effected by order of the Governor. 

Pedrarias had entertained a jealous hatred of 
Balboa for years and could not endure the thought 
of his achieving the further successes that promised 
to follow his expedition to the south. The Governor 
pretended to have received information that Balboa 
purposed the creation of an independent kingdom in 
the countries that he might discover. Balboa was 
tried, condemned on evidence of an ex parte charac- 
ter, and executed. Thus fell, in the prime of life, 
the first of that trio of Spanish explorers whose 
brave deeds excite our admiration whilst we deplore 
the cruelties with which they were accompanied. 

THE SEARCH FOR A STRAIT THROUGH THE ISTHMUS. 

Three years after the death of Balboa, Magellan 
passed through the Straits of Tierra del Fuego and 
opened up a western waterway to the Orient. The at- 
tempts to find a strait through the continent were not 
abandoned, however. Charles the Fifth took a keen 
interest in the prosecution of these efforts. He in- 
structed the governors of all his American provinces 
to have the coast lines of their respective territories 
thoroughly examined and every river and inlet ex- 
plored. The orders addressed to Cortes were espe- 
cially explicit and urgent, for at this time the hope 
2 



18 PANAMA. 

began to prevail that a solution to the problem would 
be found in the territory of Mexico. It was in ac- 
cordance witb this idea that Gil Gonzales was de- 
spatched from Spain to the New World. Gonzales 
had authority to use the vessels which had been built 
by Balboa, but Pedrarias refused to deliver them to 
him. Gonzales was not to be balked by this denial, 
however. He immediately took to pieces the two 
caravels with which he had arrived and transported 
them to the Pacific coast by the route which Balboa 
had hewn out. The reconstructed ships were soon 
lost and the party built others, in which they pro- 
ceeded north in January, 1522, to Fonseca Bay. At 
this point the leader, with one hundred men, con- 
tinued the exploration by land. Lake ^Nicaragua 
was discovered and a settlement was shortly after- 
wards made upon its shore, the Indians having been 
subjected. The new discovery awakened fresh ideas 
and projects relating to the much desired interocean 
route. It was at first reported that an opening ex- 
isted from the lake to the South Sea, but an immedi- 
ate examination failed to reveal any water connec- 
tion. ; In 1529, Diee:o Machuca, in command of a 
considerable force, carefully explored. Lake Nic- 

aragua and its eastern outlet., /He found the naviga- 
:j^^*.Q^*;,,^^,,:,^^^«gp|^>«4'?^ ^j^^^ ^-j^g called 

the Desagiiadero, extremely difficult, but eventu- 
ally emerged from its moutb with his ships and 
continued down the coast to Nombre de Dios. At a 



OVERLAND COMMUNICATION. 19 

later period an important commerce was conducted 
over this route bj vessels making ports in Spain, the 
West Indies and South America. Thomas Gage, the 
English priest who visited IsTicaragua in 1637, men- 
tions this traffic as in existence at that time. 

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OVEKLAND COMMUNICATION". 

Pending the discovery of a maritime channel be- 
tween the two oceans, the Spanish authorities had 
decided to establish permanent land communication 
across the Isthmus of Darien/sC^nder Charles the 
Fifth a line of posts was maintained from coast to 
coast. iN^oml)re cle Dios was made the Atiantic port 
and the Pacific terminus was located at old Panama, 
vwhich was created a city in 1521.^'\|^A road was at 
once constructed between these two points, vwhich, 
crpssed.jfee Cb agres at La s Cruces.sJ^reat difficulties 
were surmounted in building this ^highway. Much 
of the route lay over swamps that had to be filled in. 
Several streams were spanned by bridges and vast 
masses of rock were removed to facilitate the passage 
over the mountains. The way was paved and, ac- 
cording to Peter Martyr, was wide enough to accom- 
modate two carts abreast. 

About ten years after the establishment of this 
route a modification of it came into use. Light draft 
vessels began to sail from ISTombre de Dios along the 
coast and up the Chagres as far as Oruses, where the 



'■■.'vW 



20 PANAMA. 

road met tiie stream, and thence tlie journey was 
completed by land. In the closing years of the six- 
/' teenth century/ Nombre de Diogj^^jwhi^^ had been 
'^* '^repeatedly condemned in memorials to the Crown, as 
" the sepulcher of Spaniards," ^Mi^bandone d in 
favor of Porto Bello, with a location and other nat- 
ural advantages decidedly superior to those of the 
former terminuste^^C, 

EAELY TEADE OF PANAMA. 

This interoceanic communication was of the ut- 
most value to the Spanish Crown after the conquest 
of Peru, and the isthmian territory grew in impor- 
tance year by year. The vast treasure that was ex- 
tracted from the mines of the south came to Panama 
in the first stage of transit to the Royal Treasury. 
From the Pacific port it was carried to Porto Bello 
on pack-horses, and thence was shipped to Spain. 
Upon the arrival of vessels from the mother country, 
fairs were held at Cartagena and Porto Bello. 
Thither came merchants from far and near and cara- 
vans from Panama. An extensive trade was con- 
ducted at these periodical marts and the goods 
brought from Spain found their way through Pan- 
ama to South and Central America and even to the 
mainland and islands of Asia. Thus was demon- 
strated at an early date the logical trend of trade and 
the great advantages of a trans-isthmian route. 



FIRST SURVEY OF ISTHMUS. 21 

The idea of an artificial passage had already been 
mooted.vJit is said that Charles the Fifth, in 152Q,^ 
ordered 'the Isthmus of Darien, or Panama, to be 
'"surveyed with a view to ascertaining the practica 
billty of a cana% -There is no record of this survey 
nor any evidence that it was ever made. Fourteen 
years later the matter was revived. The local au- 
thorities were instructed to employ able men to 
closely examine the country lying between the 
ChagTes River and the Pacific with a view to deter- 
mining the most feasible method of effecting a junc- 
tion and creating a through waterway for ocean- 
going ships. The instructions were carried out but 
the report of Governor Andagoya was so extremely 
discouraging that the Emperor abandoned the proj- 
ect 

A CHECK TO CANAL PROJECTS. 

The policy of Philip the Second with regard to the 
American possessions was very different from that 
of his father. The former was averse to the expan- 
sion of his empire in the IN'ew World and distinctly 
antagonistic to the plans for an isthmian canal. He 
reasoned with astuteness that the existence of a water 
route through the continent of America would give 
easy access to his new possessions on the part of 
other nations and in time of war might be of greater 
advantage to his enemies than to himself. The pol- 



•i£aV 



22 PANAMA. 

icy of Philip was maintained for two centuries after 
his death by succeeding rulers, but maritime com- 
munication continued to be the subject of much 
thought and speculation. 

During this period of quiescent policy on the part 
of Spain the most notable event in the history of the 
Isthmus was furnished by the disastrous attempt of 
William Paterson to establish a colony in the prov- 
ince of D'arien. In 1695 the Scotch Parliament, 
with the approval of William the Third, authorized 
the formation of a company to plant colonies in Asia, 
Africa and America and to carry on trade between 
those continents and Scotland. 

THE ILL-FATED DAEIEN EXPEBITIOI?". 

Paterson cherished a scheme of stupendous colo- 
nial commerce, the Darien Expedition being but the 
initial step in the enterprise. Toward the close of 
the year 1698, five vessels having on board twelve 
hundred Scottish settlers anchored in a bight which 
they called Caledonia Bay, a name it retains at this 
day. The colonists were received in friendliness by 
the Indians and purchased from them the land upon 
which the settlement of 'New Edinburgh was made. 
It was Paterson's design, based upon sound enough 
reasoning and knowledge previously acquired from 
the buccaneers of the West Indies, to extend his 
posts to the Pacific Ocean and open up a trade with 



ILL-FATED BARIEN EXPEDITION. 23 

the countries of the South Sea and Asia, in the man- 
ner which had been so profitable to Spain. He had 
not, however, anticipated the effect of the climate 
upon his northern-bred emigrants. Before any steps 
could be taken towards the contemplated extension of 
the operations, the colony was decimated by disease. 
The misery of the settlers was increased by the 
loss of the supply-ship on which they had depended 
for fresh provisions, and eight months after the 
landing a pitiful remnant of the original expedi- 
tion abandoned the settlement and returned to Scot- 
land. But before this disaster had become known at 
home other vessels with additional emigrants were 
despatched to the new colony. These made an effort 
to revive and maintain the settlement, but with no 
better results than those which had befallen their 
predecessors. The numbers of the later comers had 
become sadly reduced when they were attacked by 
the Spaniards. After a feeble resistance they capit- 
ulated. So weak were the survivors that they could 
not reach their ships without the aid of their ene- 
mies. 

Thus ended the D'arien Expedition with the loss 
of more than two thousand lives and the expenditure 
of vast sums of money. 

In this section of the country the Spaniards com- 
pletely failed to secure the friendship of the Indians 
or to effect their subjection. Their amicable recep- 
tion of the Scotch immigrants and their invariable 



24 PANAMA. 

readiness to assist the buccaneers in their incursions 
against the Spanish settlements indicated the per- 
sistent hatred with which they regarded the first in- 
vaders of their land. The D'arien region was wild 
in the extreme and abounded in secret passes and 
safe retreats. From their fastnesses the Indians 
made frequent raids upon the Spanish posts and 
retired by trails which were known only to them- 



In the latter half of the eighteenth century, during 
the governorship of Andres de Ariza, a determined 
effort was made to establish permanent communica- 
tion between the coasts at this part of the Isthmus. 
Plans were laid for a line of military posts to be 
connected by a road which should run from a point 
on Caledonia Bay to a terminus on the Pacific 
Ocean. The project was put into operation, but met 
with such formidable resistance on the part of the 
inhabitants that the Spanish authorities became con- 
vinced of the futility of their endeavors. In 1790 
they entered into a treaty with the Indians, agreeing 
to disband the garrisons and withdraw from the 
country. 

COETES ESTABLISHES A TEANSCONTINENTAL ROUTE. 

It will be remembered that in the first quarter of 
the sixteenth centuiy Cortes received implicit in- 
structions from the Crown to use every resource at 



TRANSCONTINENTAL ROUTE. 25 

his command in a search for the longed-for strait. 
In pursuit of this object the coast of Mexico was 
carefully examined and the Coatzacoalcos River ex- 
plored. Montezuma afforded valuable assistance in 
this investigation by furnishing descriptions and 
maps of certain portions of the country. Whilst 
these efforts failed of their principal object, they had 
important results. Cortes established a transconti- 
nental route along the course of the Coatzacoalcos, 
over the divide, and down the Pacific slope to Te- 
huantepec. This line of communication soon gave 
birth to an extensive trade between Spain and her 
provinces on both coasts of America as well as some 
parts of Asia. The Ead's ship-railway of modern 
days was planned to follow practically the same line 
as this early route of Cortes. 

Towards the end of the eighteenth century there 
were discovered at Vera Cruz some cannon of ancient 
date which bore the mark of the old Manila foundry. 
This discoveiy aroused speculation as to how the 
pieces of artillery had been brought to the Atlantic 
coast of Mexico. It seemed improbable that they 
had been transported around the continent, especially 
when it was remembered that the only commercial 
intercourse with the Philippines had been through 
the Pacific port of Tehuantepec and over the route 
established by Cortes, This trade-way had long 
since been abandoned, but interest in it was at once 
revived by the incident which has been recited, and 



26 PANAMA. 

a remembrance of its former importance prompted 
the viceroy of Mexico to institute an investigation. 

Bj this time it had become an accepted idea that 
maritime communication between the oceans could 
only be secured by the creation of artificial water- 
ways. Two engineers were directed to explore the 
country from the mouth of the Cbatzacoalcos to Te- 
huantepec with a view to ascertaining the practica- 
bility of a waterway from ocean to ocean. This 
was the first canal project entertained for this re- 
gion. 

HfVESTIGATION OF THE NICAEAGUA ROUTE. 

The report on this exploration, which included a 
cursory survey, was not such as to encourage the in- 
stitution of operations. It had the eifect., however, 
of stimulating the interest in the subject and in 1779 
the feasibility of connecting the J^icaragua lakes 
with the sea was investigated by royal command. 
Manuel Galisteo, to whom the task had been in- 
trusted, passed an opinion unfavorable to the proj- 
ect. ^Nevertheless, a company was formed in Spain, 
with the patronage of the Crown, to carry out the 
undertaking, but nothing effective ever came of it. 

Galisteo's expedition had been accompanied by the 
British agents at Belize in a private capacity. Upon 
their return they made highly favorable representa- 
tions to their Government, stating that the project 



INVESTIGATION OF THE NICARAGUA ROUTE. 27 

was entirely feasible and not accompanied by any 
difSciilties that the engineering capabilities of the 
day need fear to encounter. This report made a 
deep impression in England and when, in the follow- 
ing year, war broke out between that country and 
Spain an effort was made to gain possession of the 
Nicaragua country. In 1780, an invading force was 
organized at Jamaica. Captain Horatio Nelson was 
in command of the naval contingent, and in his 
despatches stated the general purpose of the expedi- 
tion as follows : " In order to give facility to the 
great object of the government I intend to possess the 
Lake of Nicaragua, which for the present may be 
looked upon as the inland Gibraltar of Spanish 
America. As it commands the only water pass be- 
tween the oceans, its situation must ever render it a 
principal post to insure passage to the Southern 
Ocean, and by our possession of it Spanish America 
is divided in two." The English were successful in 
their encounters with the Spaniards, but in the cli- 
mate they found an irresistible enemy that forced 
them to abandon the enterprise. Of the crew of Nel- 
son's ship, the Hinchinhrooh, numbering two hun- 
dred, more than eighty fell sick in one night, and 
only ten survived the return of the expedition to 
Jamaica. The hero of Trafalgar barely escaped 
with his life after a long illness. 

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Spain 
retained possession of the entire territory embraced 



28 PANAMA. 

in the question of inter ocean communication, but 
she had made no practical progress towards its set- 
tlement. JSTeither had she added materially to the 
available knowledge of the world on the subject, 
for the results of Spanish exploration and survey 
in this direction have never been made public. With 
the exception of the re-opened communication by 
way of Tehuantepec the old Spanish overland routes 
had all fallen into disuse, and traffic between the 
mother country and the possessions on the w^est coast 
of America and in the Pacific Ocean was maintained 
by vessels sailing round Cape Horn and the Cape of 
Good Hope. Humboldt visited Mexico at about this 
time and recorded the ignorance that prevailed 
amongst the local authorities regarding the interior 
of the country. He stated that there was not a 
single mountain, plain, or city from Granada to 
Mexico of which the elevation above the sea was 
known. 

DISINTEGRATION" OF SPAIn's AMEEICAN COLONIES. 

Ere this the entire civilized world had become 
keenly interested in the question of an interoceanic 
canal, and the investigations of Humboldt com- 
manded wide attention. Amongst other effects, they 
. aroused the Spanish Government to action in the 
matter. \^In_ 1814.,, t;he,,.Cortes passed an act author- 
; ;zing the construction of a canal tliroiii^b Uic l^lhyiiis. 



SPAIN'S LOST OPPORTUNITY. 29 

and pro viding for the organization of a company to 
carry ouiTIKe enterprise. \, Before anything of im- 
portance Had been accomplished under this legisla-^" ' 
tion the revolutions occurred which wrested frorfi^:;;^"-^ 
Spain her provinces in South and Central America, j^ 
With the loss of territory went the opportunity fdf 
profit and glory by cohnecting the oceans. . :^^^\^<0.Mi^t-^^ 

In 1819, the states of ISTew Granada, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela united in forming the Republic of Co- 
lumbia, under Simon Bolivar; in 1831 they sepa- 
rated into three independent republics. In 1823 the 
Federal Republic of the United Provinces of Cen- 
tral America was formed by the union of Guatemala, 
San Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa 
Rica. These political changes, in what may be 
termed the canal region, opened up new possibilities 
in connection with the much-mooted question of a 
waterway and claimed the attention of capitalists 
and statesmen of all the commercial nations. From 
this time the matter is taken up with definiteness of 
purpose and never allowed to rest. Plans and nego- 
tiations of various kinds involving all the possible 
routes follow fast upon each other until we arrive at 
the inception of the work by the United States Gov- 
ernment and the assurance of its accomplishment. 



30 



PANAMA 






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'^♦^5>* 



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<j»2W w rHiufPutn M/ii sun cmi Aim f.ooon 
lomii n nmiL^ m niiinH» cm/il about /f.i>Mn 

c 



SHORTER COURSES OF TRANSPORTATION. 



Some of the immense advantages to be conferred on 
the world by the Panama Canal can be seen by a glance 
at the map. 



II. 

PANAMA. 

CANAL EXPLORATION. 

Concession to an American from Nicaragua — Baily's Explora- 
tion of the Nicaragua Region — The First Survey of the 
Panama Line — Development of the United States as a 
Factor in the Canal Question — The Vanderbilt Company 
in Nicaragua — An Able Survey of the Nicaragua Route — 
The Construction of the Panama Railroad — An Important 
Senate Investigation — Establishment of the Interoceanic 
Canal Commission — Report of the Interoceanic Canal 
Commission — Various Ship Railway Projects. 

Early in 1825/ the Republic of Central America, 
tlirough its representative at Washington, conveyed 
to Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, a desire for 
" the co-operation of the American people in the 
construction of a canal of communication through 
Nicaragua, so that they might share, not only in the 
merit of the enterprise, but also in the great advan- 
tages which it would produce." Clay was fully 
alive to the importance of the project, the execution 
of which, he said, " will form a great epoch in the 
commercial affairs of the whole world." He re- 
turned a favorable answer to the proposition and 
promised an investigation on the part of the United 

?A 



32 PANAMA. 

States of the claims advanced in favor of the Nic- 
aragua route. 

CONCESSION' TO AN AMEEICAN FEOM NICARAGUA. 

In 1826, the Republic of Central America, having 
grown , impatient of the delaj on the part of the 
United States, entered into a contract with Aaron 
H. Palmer of New York for the construction of a 
canal capable of accommodating the largest vessels 
afloat. The work was to be started within a year 
from the date of the agreement. The contract was 
to remain in force as long as might be necessary for 
the reimbursement of the capitalists engaged, in the 
amount of the money invested, together with ten per 
cent per annum, and for seven years after such re- 
imbursement the company was to receive one-half of 
the net proceeds of the canal. At the expiration of 
the seven years in question the property was to be 
transferred to the Republic. It was expressly stipu- 
lated in this contract that the passage should at all 
times be open to the ships of friendly and neutral 
nations without favor or distinction. 

Having secured his concession. Palmer endeavored 
to organize a construction company with a capital of 
five million dollars. The utter inadequacy of this 
amount is illustrative of the lack of explicit informa- 
tion which characterised all similar enterprises until 
quite recent times. Palmer failed both in America 



BAILY'S EXPLORATION. H3 

and in England to enlist the necessary financial aid 
and the contract was never acted upon.* 

After an abortive attempt to complete arrange- 
ments with a Dutch company, the Central American 
Republic again addressed the Government of the 
United States with an offer to grant to it the right to 
construct a canal. In response to a recommendation 
of the Senate growing out of these overtures, Presi- 
dent Jackson commissioned Charles Biddle to visit 
Nicaragua and Panama, with instructions to examine 
the different routes that had been contemplated and 
to gather all the information and documents pro- 
curable bearing upon the matters in in^ ,x'est. No 
satisfactory results followed this mission. A mes- 
sage was sent to the Senate to the effect that it was 
not expedient at that time to enter into negotiations 
with foreign goveniments with reference to a tram 
isthmian connection. The truth is that the Govern- 
ment and its agents were not sufficiently assured as 
to the stability of the new republics and feared to 
create relations that might lead to political embroil- 
ment. 

BAILy's EXPLOEATION of the NICARAGUA EEOION. 

Meanwhile the active interest in the canal question 
was not confined to the United States. In 1826 an 



* House Report No. 145, 30th Cong., 2nd session. 

3 



34 PANAMA. 

English corporation sent Jolin Baily to Nicaragua 
for the purpose of securing a concession. In this 
object Baily was forestalled by the American, 
Palmer, but he remained in the country, and about 
ten years later was employed by President Morazin 
to determine the most favorable location for a cut- 
ting. 

Baily threw valuable light upon the Nicaragua 
route and made a very able report. He recommended 
a route from Greytown to Lake JSTicaragua, across 
the lake to the Lajas, and thence to San Juan del Sur 
on the Pacific coast. With the termini he expressed 
himself as well satisfied. He proposed to utilize the 
entire length of the San Juan, which would necessi- 
tate blasting the rocks at the rapids, diverting the 
Colorado into the S'an Juan and deepening the latter 
river. Pie found the four principal rapids within, 
a stretch of twelve miles, formed by transverse rocks, 
with a passage on either side affording a depth of 
from three to six fathoms. The river was navigated 
at the time by piraguas., large flat-bottomed boats of 
as much as eight tons burden, which passed the rap- 
ids without serious hazard. 

Baily's line from the mouth of the Lajas, which 
he proposed to use for three miles of its leng'th, was 
seventeen miles. This he thought might be reduced 
to about fifteen and a half miles. His summit level 
was 48Y feet above the lake and the canal was to 
accommodate ships of twelve hundred tons with a 



FIRST SURVEYS OF PANAMA ROUTE. 35 

depth of eighteen feet. He offered an alternativo 
plan which would reduce the summit level to 122 feet 
above the lake but would necessitate the connection 
of two of his stations bj a tunnel over two miles in 
length. The report frankly estimated the difficulties 
involved in the undertaking, and closed with, the 
statement that although he could not speak confi- 
dently as to the feasibility of the route, which had 
never been surveyed, he believed that a continuation 
through the Tipitapa into Lake Managua and thence 
to the port of Realejo was worthy of serious consid- 
eration. Whilst these investigations were proceed- 
ing in the north, examination of other probable routes 
was being made. In 1827 President Bolivar com- 
missioned J. A. Lloyd to survey the Isthmus of Pan- 
ama vsdth special regard to the possibilities of rail 
and water communication. Despite the fact that 
this was the first transcontinental route, the scientific 
laiowledge of the territory was most insignificant. 
The geography of the strip was imperfectly known 
and the relative heights of the oceans or the altitude 
of the mountains separating them had never been 
ascertained. 

THE FIRST SURVEYS OF THE PANAMA LINE. 

Lloyd made a careful survey from Panama to a 
point within a few miles of the mouth of the 
Chagres. He seems to have considered plans for a 



36 PANA1MA. 

canal premature, but said that should tlie time ar- 
rive when such a mode of communication might b© 
favorably entertained the route of the Trinidad 
River would probably prove the most desirable. He 
recommended for immediate purposes a combination 
rail and water route to take the place of the roads 
then in use from Chagres and Porto Bello to Pana- 
ma. His plan contemplated a short canal from a 
point on the Bay of Limon to the Chagres, the use 
of that river along its tributary, the Trinidad, to a 
favorable spot for a junction, and thence a railroad 
to the coast. As to the terminus he was divided in 
opinion on the relative advantages of Cherrera and 
Panama. The former had the merit of shortening 
the distance, whilst the latter was the capital and an 
already well-established port. 

The Eepublic of Colombia was disrupted in the 
year 1831 and the Panama region became a part of 
JSTew Granada. In 1838, that Eepublic granted a 
concession to a French company authorizing the con- 
struction of highways, railroads, or canals from Pan- 
ama to any desired point on the Atlantic coast. This 
company spent several years in making surveys and 
forming plans. The results were submitted to the 
French Government with a view to enlisting its aid 
in carrying out the undertaking. The project was 
presented in an extremely optimistic light and as one 
comparatively easy of accomplishment. The conces- 
sionnaires claimed to have discovered a depression 



FIRST SURVEYS OF PANAMA ROUTE. 37 

in the mountain range wliicli would permit of a pas- 
sage at no gi'eater height above the average level of 
the Pacific than thirtj-seven feet. The company's 
statements excited extraordinary interest, and in 
1843 Guizot, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, in- 
structed N^apolean Garella to proceed to Panama, to 
investigate the company's statements, and to make 
an independent examination of the entire situation. 
Garella's report,* which was an able treatment of 
the subject, heavily discounted the claims of the Sal- 
omon company and led to its failure. An inter- 
oceanic canal was recommended as the only means 
of communication that could adequately meet the 
future demands of commerce. Garella agreed with 
Lloyd that the Atlantic terminus should be in the Bay 
of Limon rather than at the mouth of the Chagres. 
That river would be met by his canal near its junc- 
tion with the Gatun. The reported low depression 
which had raised hopes of the practicability of a 
sea-level canal at a reasonable cost, could not be 
found. Garella suggested the passage of the di- 
vide by means of a tunnel more than three miles in 
length. The floor of this tunnel was to be 325 feet 
below the summit, 134 feet above the ocean, and the 
water level 158 feet above extreme high tide at Pan- 
ama. The canal was to have a guard lock at each 
entrance and the summit level was to be reached 



* Reprinted in House Report No. 322, 25th Cong. 3d session. 



38 PANAMA. 

by eighteen locks on the Atlantic slope and sixteen 
on the Pacific. The water supply was to be de- 
rived from the Chagres through two feed-canals. 
The Pacific terminus was placed at Vaca de Monte, 
about twelve miles south of Panama. Garella esti- 
mated the cost of a canal on these lines at about 
twenty-five million dollars. At the cost of an addi- 
tional thi'ee millions he calculated that a cut might 
be made in place of the tunnel. 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AS A FACTOK 
IN THE CANAL QUESTION. 

" About the middle of the centuiy a succession of 
great, events vastly increased the importance of a 
maritime connection between the two oceans to the 
United States. The dispute with Great Britain as 
to the boundary line west of the Rocky Mountains 
was settled by the Buchanan-Packenham Treaty in 
1846, and in August, 1848, an act of Congress was 
passed under which Oregon became an organized 
territory. The war with Mexico was commenced 
early in 1846, and by the terms of the Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo Treaty, which closed it in 1848, California 
was ceded to the United States. Before the treaty 
had been ratified gold was discovered there, and in a 
few months many thousands from the eastern part 
of the country were seeking a way to the mining 
regions. To avoid the hardships and delays of the 



UNITED STATES AND CANAL QUESTION. .'!9 

journey across the plains or tlie voyage around the 
continent, lines of steamers and packets were estab- 
lished from New York to Chagi*es and San Juan del 
I^orte and from Panama to San Francisco, some of 
the latter touching at the Pacific ports in Nicaragua. 
For a while those travelling by these routes had to 
make arrangements for crossing the isthmus after 
their arrival there, and were often subjected to seri- 
ous personal inconveniences and suffering as well as 
to exorbitant charges. 

THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTES NEGOTIATIONS FOR A 
RIGHT OF WAT. 

" The requirements of travel and commerce de- 
manded better methods of transportation between 
the Eastern States and the Pacific coast, but there 
were other reasons of a more public character for 
bringing these sections into closer communication. 
The establishment and maintenance of army posts 
and naval stations in the newly acquired and settled 
regions in the Far West, the extension of mail facil- 
ities to the inhabitants, and the discharge of other 
governmental functions, all required a connection 
in the shortest time and at the least distance that 
was possible and practicable. The importance of 
this connection was so manifest that the Government 
was aroused to action before all the enumerated 
causes had come into operation, and negotiations 



40 PANAMA. 

were entered into with the Republic of ISTew Gra- 
nada to secure a right of transit across the Isthmus 
of Panama." * This object was effected by a treaty 
that was ratified in June, 1848, 

In the following year, Elijah Hise, the representa- 
tive of the United States in Nicaragua, negotiated a 
treaty with that republic. By its terms ISTicaragua 
undertook to confer upon the Government of the 
United St<ates, or a corporation composed of its 
citizeaas, the exclusive right to construct and operate 
roads, railways, or canals, or any other medium of 
communication by means of ships or vehicles, be- 
tween the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean and 
through the territory of the former state. The con- 
cessions made by this treaty were extremely liberal, 
but in consideration of them it was required that the 
United States should pledge itself to the protection of 
Nicaragua and should hold its army and navy and 
any other effective resources it might be able to com- 
mand available for the defense of the Latin-Amer- 
ican republic against foreign aggression. Nicara- 
gua was prompted in this negotiation by the desire 
for aid in withstanding the policy of Great Britain, 
which at that time appeared to be directed toward 
extending her control of the Mosquito coast to the 
lower waters of the San Juan. 



* Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission. Washington, 
1899-190L 



VANDERBILT COMPANY IN NICARAGUA. (1 

The United States Government was not prepared 
to assume the responsibility involved in this treaty, 
in making which Hise had exceeded his authority, 
and it was not ratified. Another convention was 
formulated with the object of furthering the plans 
of The American, Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal 
Company, composed of Cornelius Vanderbilt and 
others. Although this fell through, its purpose was 
effected by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. 

THE VANDERBILT COMPANY IN NICARAGUA. 

This agreement required the contracting parties to 
support such individuals or corporation as should 
first commence a canal through I^Ticaragua. It 
practically insured the interests of the company in 
whose behalf the negotiations of the year before had 
been conducted. The Republic granted to the Van- 
derbilt company the exclusive right, for a period of 
eighty-five years, to make a ship canal from any 
point of the Atlantic coast to any point on the Pa- 
cific coast of [N^icaragua, and by any route. The 
contract also gave to the company the exclusive right 
to construct rail or carriage roads and bridges and 
to establish steamboats and other vessels on the 
rivers and lakes of the territory as accessories to its 
enterprise. It was also provided that in case the 
canal or any part of it should be found to be im- 
practicable, then the company should be privileged 



42 PANAMA. 

to substitute a railroad or other means o£ communi- 
cation subject to the same conditions. In order to 
facilitate the operations, tlie company was incor- 
porated by the Kepublic of Nicaragua in March^ 
1850. In the following year the arrangement was 
modified for the convenience of the company, by the 
granting of a new charter to enable the subsidiary 
operations on the inland waters to be separated from 
those connected with the canal proper. Under this 
charter the Accessory Transit Company immedi- 
ately established a transportation line from Grey- 
town up the San Juan and across Lake Nicaragua, 
by steamboats, to Virgin Bay on the western shore 
of the lake, and thence by stage coaches, over thir- 
teen, miles of good road, to San Juan del Sur. In 
connection with this route regular steamship com- 
munication was maintained with New York on one 
side and San Francisco on the other. This line 
proved a boon to the gold-seekers and was traveled 
by thousands on their way to and from California. 
It was obliged to close, owing to the disturbed condi- 
tion created by the Walker expeditions, but at a 
later date was reopened under a new charter by an- 
other company. 

The American, Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal 
Company did not deem any of the surveys or re- 
ports that had previously been made of the Nica- 
ragua country sufficiently reliable to determine 
their route upon, and Colonel Orville Childs 



SURVEY OF NICARAGUA ROUTE. 43 

of Philadelphia was engaged to direct a thorough 
instrumental survey of the entire region. 

AN ABLE SURVEY OF THE NICARAGUA ROUTE. 

Colonel Childs' report, was submitted to President 
Pilmore in March, 1852, and by him to two United 
States army engineers, by whom the plan was pro- 
nounced as entirely practicable, although they rec- 
ommended some modification of its details. In 
view of the fact that the British Government was 
jointly pledg'ed with the United States to protect 
the enterprise, the plans were subjected to examina- 
tion by English experts. These concurred in the 
opinion of the American engineers. 

l^othing further was done by the Vanderbilt com- 
pany towards the construction of a canal, but the 
Childs' report has always been of great value to 
later investigators in an examination of the subject. 
In 1856, Nicaragua declaring that the company had 
failed in the performance of certain clauses of the 
contract, revoked the concession, annulled the char- 
ters, and abolished the corporation. The company 
disputed the right of the Republic to take this action 
and made several futile attempts to re-establish its 
status. 

In 1858, despite the continued protest of the for- 
mer concessionaries, the Government of Nicaragua 
considered itself free to enter into a new contract. 



44 PANAMA. 

This it did jointly with Costa Rica, The grantee 
in this case was Felix Belly, a citizen of France. 
The rights and privileges accorded to him under 
this agreement were very similar to those which had 
been enjoyed by the Vanderbilt company, and the 
organization which he proposed to create for the 
purpose of accomplishing the work was to be sim- 
ilarly protected by the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty. But the contract with Belly contained a 
clause insuring to the French Government the right 
to keep two ships of war in Lake IsTicaragua as long 
as tlie canal remained in operation. This novel fea- 
ture in the agreement no sooner came to the knowl- 
edge of the United States than that country lodged 
an emphatic protest with the Governments of Nic- 
aragua and Costa Rica. The proposed arrangement 
was characterised as obnoxious. It was pointed out 
that " the neutrality and security of these inter- 
oceanic routes constitute a great portion of their 
value to the world, and that the exclusive right to 
any one nation to exercise armed intervention would 
be just ground for dissatisfaction on the part of all 
others." 'No attempt was made to enforce the of- 
fensive clause and, as the company failed to put its 
project into execution, the grant was cancelled. More 
than once negotiations have been blocked by political 
obstructions and for many years American statesmen 
have been averse to the idea of a waterway across th© 
American Isthmus under foreign control. 



CONSTRUCTION OF THE RAILROAD. 45 

In the meantime the demand for transcontinental 
transportation created by the discovery of the gold- 
fields of California led to the building of the rail- 
road across the Isthmus of Panama. This line was 
opened early in 1855 and, whilst it afforded very 
valuable service^ it stimulated rather than satisfied 
the desire for a ship canal. Exploration and survey 
were actively prosecuted in the Darien region by the 
governments and private citizens of the United 
States, Great Britain and France. By this time 
precise information was available as to the condi- 
tions obtaining along the Nicaragua and Panama 
routes, but the interior of the eastern section of the 
Isthmus was still unknown except to the Indians, 
although it had often been traversed by Spaniards. 

EXPLORATIONS IN THE DARIEN REGION. 

This region had the obvious advantage of short dis- 
tances between the oceans and there were good 
harbors available on either coast. So, when the diflfi- 
culties of the tested routes had been proved, atten- 
tion turned to the southern extreme of, what may be 
called, the canal area, in the hope that the physical 
features of that region might present difficulties of 
less magnitude than those existing in the sections 
already surveyed. This hope found justification in 
the common report that the mountains of the in- 
terior offered a low depression which had long been 



46 TANAMA, 

used by the Indians as a portage for their canoes 
when traveling from one ocean to the other. In- 
deed, there was a tradition of a long-existing unin- 
terrupted waterway from coast to coast which was 
said to have been effected by cutting a short' canal 
from the upper reaches of the Atrato to a small 
stream, the San Juan, emptying into the Pacific. 

In the examination of this region three general 
lines were followed — ■ those of San Bias, Caledonia 
Bay, and the Atrato River. Each of these names 
indicates the Atlantic terminus of the route, but 
there were many variations in the courses followed 
and the contemplated points of termination at the 
Pacific ranged over three hundred miles of coast. 
These investigations, in which the United States 
freely lent its assistance to private endeavors, had 
good results in the extension of topographic and 
geographic knowledge of the country and seemed to 
warrant further efforts in the same direction.* 

AN IMPOETAJSTT SEKATB USTVESTIGATIGN". 

In the year 1866, the Senate, with a view to de- 
termining the scope and direction of further investi- 
gation of the interoceanic canal question, requested 
the Secretary of the ISTavy to furnish all the avail- 



* Details of these expeditions in the Darien district may be 
found in Senate Ex. Doc. No. 1, 33rd Cong., 2nd session, and 
House Ex. Doc. No. 107, 47th Cong., 2nd session. 



IMPORTANT SENATE INVESTIGATION. 47 

able information pertaining to the subject and to 
ascertain whether the Isthmus of Darien had been 
sufficiently explored. 

Secretary Welles responded, in the following year, 
with a voluminous report * by Admiral Charles H. 
Davis. This document enumerates nineteen canal 
and seven railroad projects in the isthmian country 
extending from Tehuantepec to the Atrato. It ex- 
cludes from consideration the plans relating to Te- 
huantepec and Honduras as being infeasible and 
meritless. 

With reference to the eight proposed routes 
through Nicaragua, Admiral Davis says : " It may 
safely be asserted that no enterprise, presenting such 
formidable difficulties, will ever be undertaken with 
even our present knowledge of the American isth- 
muses. Still less is it likely to be entered upon 
while such strong and well-founded hopes are en- 
tertained by the promoters of the union of the At- 
lantic and Pacific oceans of finding elsewhere a 
very much easier, cheaper, and more practicable 
route for a canal in every way suited to the present 
demands of commerce and navigation." 

He condemns a project that had strong advocates 
at the time, with these words : " The examination 
of the headwaters of the Atrato, of the intervening 
watershed, and of the headwaters of the San Juan, 



Senate Ex. Doe. No, 62, 39th Cong., 1st session. 



48 JE»ANAMA. 

satisfactorily proved that nature forbids ua alto- 
gether to entertain an idea of a union of the two 
oceans in this direction," The Admiral gives a gen- 
eral description of the other lines in Panama, Da- 
rien, and the Atrato valley. He states that " the 
Isthmus of Darien * has not been satisfactorily ex- 
plored " and that " it is to the Isthmus of Darien 
that we are first to look for the solution of the great 
problem of an interoceanic canal. For these rea- 
sons and because " there does not exist in the libra- 
ries of the world the means of determining, even 
approximately, the most practicable route for a ship 
canal across the isthmus," he recommends the fur- 
ther investigation of the subject in this region. 

ESTABLISHMENT OP THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL 
COMMISSION. 

President Grant, in his first message to Congress, 
recommended an American canal. That body 
promptly adopted a joint resolution providing for 
more extensive exploration by officers of the Navy, 
and the chief of the Bureau of ISTavigation was au- 
thorized to organize and send out expeditions for 



* Until quite recently the words Darien and Panama were 
used interchangeably with reference to the strip of land now 
more generally designated as the Isthmus of Panama. It is 
in this broader sense that Admiral Davis uses the term 
" Isthmus of Darien." 



INTEROCEANIC CANAL COMMISSION. 49 

this purpose. In 1872 the Interoceanic Canal Com- 
mission was established. Its members were Gen- 
eral A. A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, United 
States Army; C. P. Patterson, Superintendent of 
the Coast Survey; and Commodore Daniel Ammen, 
Chief of the Bureau of l^avigation of the IsTavy. 
Under the directions of this commission explorations 
were conducted in various parts of the isthmian ter- 
ritory. 

The Tehuantepec route was surveyed by a party 
of which. Captain Shufeldt had charge. It was 
found that under the most favorable conditions a 
canal along the Tehuantepec line would be more 
than one hundred miles in length, with, a summit 
level at least 732 feet above the sea and requiring 
one hundred and forty locks. This report^ confirm- 
ing as it did the conclusions of Admiral Davis and 
other experts, put the Tehuantepec route out of the 
question for all future time. 

At about the same time (1872), an expedition 
under Commander Edward P. Lull, assisted by 
A. G. Menocal, as chief civil engineer, surveyed the 
entire ISTicaragua route, following the line taken by 
Childs, except for a slight deviation in the passage 
of the divide beyond the lake. Commander Lull's 
report was favorable. It included a detailed plan 
for a canal at an estimated cost of $65,722,137. 

Whilst this work was progressing m the north, 

Commander Selfridge and other officers of the 
4 



50 PANAMA. 

United States 'Na.vj were engaged in surveying the 
most promising lines in the Darien region. In 1875 
the Panama route was minutely surveyed by Lull 
and Menocal. They reported in favor of a course 
41.7 miles from the Bay of Limon to the Chagres, 
ascending its valley and that of the Obispo to the 
divide, and descending the Pacific slope by the val- 
ley of the Rio Grande to the Bay of Panama. The 
line as marked out in this report has been followed 
in general in subsequent plans. 

REPORT OF THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL, COMMISSION. 

The Interoeeanic Commission now had before it 
the reports of the expeditions which have been men- 
tioned and, in addition, plans and surveys relating 
to every route in any degree practicable from one 
end to the other of the canal country. Its report,* 
which was unanimous, was returned in February, 
1876, and embodied the following conclusion: 
" That the route known as the Nicaragua route, be- 
ginning on the Atlantic side at or near Greytown; 
running by canal to the San Juan Eiver, thence 
. . . to . . . Lake JSTicaragnia ; from thence 
across the lake and through the valleys of the Eio 
del Medio and the Rio Grande to . . . Brito, 
on the Pacific coast, possesses, both for the construc- 
tion and maintenance of a canal, greater advantages 



* Senate Ex. Doc. No. 15, 46th Cong., 1st session. 



VARIOUS SHIP RAILWAY PROJECTS. ni 

aiid fewer difficulties from engineering, commercial, 
and economic points of view than any one of the 
other routes shown to be practicable bj surveys suf- 
ficient in detail to enable a judgment to he formed 
of their respective merits." 

Meanwhile Lieutenant L. 'N. B. Wyse, as the rep- 
resentative of a French syndicate, was negotiating 
with the Colombian Government for a concession, 
which he secured in 1878. An account of this im- 
portant contract and of the Panama Canal Com- 
pany, which operated under it, will be given in a 
later chapter. 

VARIOUS SHIP RAILWAY PROJECTS. 

Whilst the report of the Interoceanic Commission 
was generally accepted with regard to the infeasi- 
bility of the Tehuantepec route for a ship canal, it 
appeared to James B. Eads to offer special advan- 
tages for a ship railway, and in 1881 he secured a 
charter from the Mexican Government conveying to 
him authority to utilize it for that purpose. Eads' 
plan was entirely feasible and no doubt would have 
been carried to a successful conclusion had he lived, 
but with his death in 1887 the project was aban- 
doned. 

In 1860 Sir James Brunless and E. C. Webb 
proposed to JSTajwleon the Third a ship railway 
across the Suez Isthmus instead of the projected 



52 PANAMA. 

canal, but the proposition was rejected by de Les- 
seps. The same engineers prepared plans for the 
Government of Honduras, in 1872, for a similar 
transportation line from Pureto Caballos to Eon- 
seca Bay, to carry ships of twelve hundred tons. 
The Republic failed to obtain the money necessary 
to carry out the plans. 

The year after Eads' death the celebrated Chig- 
necto Ship-railway was commenced, after years of 
preparation. It is now in successful operation over 
seventeen miles between the Bay of Fundy and the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence. The projected Hurontario 
Railway, of a similar character, will be sixty-six 
miles in length. Mere distance, however, whilst it 
enhances the cost of such an undertaking, does not 
necessarily increase the difficulty of it. 

Eads' proposed line adhered in general to the 
course mapped for a canal. The length of the rail- 
way was to have been 134 miles. The summit of 
736 feet is reached by easy grades, the heaviest be- 
ing less than fifty-three feet in the mile. The rail- 
way was designed to carry vessels up to seven 
thousand tons, and the total cost of the line, lifting- 
docks, harbors, stations, shops, machinery and all 
other equipment was estimated at less than fifty 
millions. 

In 1884 a treaty had been negotiated between the 
United States and Nicaragua for the construction 
of a canal by the former, to be owned by the two 



VARIOUS SHIP RAILWAY PROJECTS. 53 

states jointly. Whilst it was under consideration 
in the Senate the treaty was withdrawn by the Presi- 
dent for the reason that it proposed a perpetual 
alliance with ISTicaragua and, like the Hise treaty, 
imposed obligations on the United States for the 
protection of the former country which it was inad- 
visable to assume. 

In April, 1887, Nicaragua granted a concession 
to A. G. Menocal for the construction of a ship canal 
from Greytown to Brito. Thus far the story has 
been a recital of plans, projects, and theories. 
When we take up the thread of it in a later chapter 
it will be to recount active operations. 



S4 



PANAMA. 







RAILROAD AND CANAL. 



The dotted line across the isthmus indicates the 
present course of the railroad; the heavy line shows the 
course of the Canal. 



III. 

PANAMA. 

THE PANAMA RAILROAD. 

The Terms of the Concession — The Great Difficulties of the 
Undertaking — Some Features of the Construction — The [ 
Course of the Line From Coast to Coast — Extraordinary' 
Labor Difficulties — The Canal Company Secures the Rail- 
road — A Monopolistic Agreement — The Assets of the Rail- 
road and Their Value — Suggested Railroad and Steamship 
Traffic Reforms — A New Application of Our Protective 
Policy. 

The great migration to the Pacific coast following 
the discovery of gold in " Forty-nine " acted as a 
strong incentive to the immediate establishment of 
an isthmian route by which the long and hazardous 
journey across the western territories of the United 
States might be avoided. In the last chapter a brief 
account was given of the enterprise conducted by the 
American, Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Com- 
pany, which, although it never effected its original 
purpose of opening a waterway, afforded valuable 
service to the gold-seekers in the early fifties by 
maintaining a transportation line across ISTicaragua. 

At the outset of the gold movement thousands 
made their way to California by way of the Isthmus 

55 



56 PANAMA. 

of Panama. Steamsliips carried tkeni from New 
York to the mouth of the Chagres. The journey 
thence to the Pacific coast, although no more than 
fifty miles by the trail, occupied from five to ten days 
and was accompanied by almost as much hardship 
and danger as in the days of Balboa. The emigrants 
were rowed or towed up the river by natives to a 
point near Cruces. The rest of the way to Panama 
was covered on foot or on mules. Women, when 
means would permit, were carried by selleros. 
These were native Indian porters, with a kind of 
chair strapped to their backs. There was, at that 
time, no regular steamship line between California 
and Panama. The travelers were often subjected 
to long and wearisome waits in the city. The old 
battery and the adjacent ramparts were favorite re- 
sorts of impatient watchers for a vessel from 'San 
Prancisco, and their names and initials are cut in 
the stones by hundreds. On more than one occasion 
epidemic made serious inroads among them. Gen- 
eral Grant, in his memoirs, tells us that he was with 
the Seventh United States Infantry at Panama in 
1852, en route to California, when cholera broke 
out. Fifteen per cent of the regiment succumbed 
to the disease and more than five hundred emigrants 
died of it. Cholera is not one of the prevalent dis- 
eases of the Isthmus. An influx of foreigners to 
Panama has always been accompanied by an outbreak 
of yellow fever, to which the natives are immune^ 



w 




TERMS OF THE CONCESSION. 57 

Tliis transflux of travelers determined certain 
American capitalists to undertake the construction 
of a railroad across the Isthmus. A grant for the 
purpose had been made by the Government of New 
Granada to Mateo Kline, on behalf of a rrench syn- 
dicate, in 1847, but it had expired by default in 
1848. In the following year, William Henry As- 
pinwall, John Lloyd Stephens, Henry Chauncy, of 
New York, and their associates incorporated under 
the name of the Pauama Railroad Company. 

THE TERMS OF THE CONCESSION. 

Having declared all former similar concessions 
null and void, the Government of New Granada ex- 
tended to this company the exclusive privilege of 
building a road and of operating it for a period of 
forty-nine years from the date of completion, which 
was to be not later than six years after the signing 
of the contract. 

Subsequently this agreement was modified in im- 
portant particulars, and in its present form entitles 
the company to " the use and possession of the rail- 
road, the telegraph between Colon and Panama, the 
building's, warehouses, and wharves belonging to the 
road, and in general all the dependencies and other 
works now in its possession necessary to the service 
and development of the enterprise for a period of 
ninety-nine years from the 16th day of August, 



58 PANAMA, 

186Y. At the expiration of this term the Govern* 
ment is to be substituted in all the righte of the com- 
pany and is entitled to the immediate p"Ssession of 
the entire property. The Republic h bound to 
grant no privilege during this term ■■.» any other 
company or person to open any other railroad on the 
isthmus, nor without the consent of the company to 
open or work any maritime canal there to the west 
of a line drawn from Cape Tiburon, on the Atlantic, 
to Point Garachine, on the Pacific; nor to establish 
any such communication itself. But the company 
can not oppose the construction of a canal except 
directly along the route of its road, and the consent 
required is only to enable it to exact an equitable 
price for the privilege and as indemnification for 
tlie damages it may suffer by the competition of the 
canal. It is also stipulated that the company shall 
forfeit its privilege should it cede or transfer its 
rights to any foreign government. '* 

THE GREAT DirFICTJLTIES OF THE UNDERTAKING. 

When the Republic of Colombia superseded the 
Government of New Granada (1867), new require- 
ments were imposed upon the Railroad Company. 
It was compelled to pay to Colombia a quarter of a 
million dollars annually and to " transport- free of 
charge tlie troops, chiefs, and officers, and their 
equipage, ammunition, amiament, clothing, and all 



DIFFICULTIES OF THE UNDERTAKING. 59 

similar effects that maj belong to, are or may be 
destined for the immediate service of the Govern- 
ment of the Eepublic or the State of Panama, as 
also their officials in service or in commission, and 
those individuals who, with their families and bag- 
gage, may come to the country in the character of 
emigrants, and of new settlers with the permanent 
character of such, for account of the Government up 
to the number of 2,000 annually." This agreement 
was worked by the Colombian Government to the 
utmost, and the tremendous amount of " deadhead- 
ing " with which the company was forced to put up 
cut into its profits seriously. Some idea of the ex- 
tent to which this abuse was carried may be inferred 
from the fact that during the year 1903 the Com- 
pany carried 4,663 first-class passengers who paid 
their fares and 11,098 passengers and 6,601 troops 
free. In addition a considerable amount of freight 
was transported gratis under the agreement. 

The Panama Railroad Company, with characteris- 
tic American energy, attacked the difficult undertak- 
ing without delay. The engineering staff was on the 
ground in the autumn of 1849. " Their quarters 
were on board a sailing ship. They worked by day, 
waist deep in mud and slime, making surveys and cut- 
ting a trail, and slept at night on their floating home. 
Nothing but the indomitable will and push for 
which Americans are justly praised could have over- 
come the terrible difficulties that met them at every 



^0 PANAMA. 

step. Tlie country was a howling wilderness, pesti- 
lential and death-dealing; the forests teemed with 
poisonous snakes and other equally unpleasant in- 
habitants; night was made hideous by the large, 
broad-chested, active mosquitoes of that part of the 
coast, who bite through clothing most successfully ; 
the country produced absolutely nothing, and every 
mouthful 01 looc had to come from New' York. De- 
spite these obstacles, that brave little band worked 
ahead, and kept on with their surveys. At the very 
outset they encountered the difficulty of finding a 
suitable location for the line traversing the quick- 
sands and swamps between Colon of to-day and 
Gatun. It is reported that in some of the swamps 
the engineers under the late Colonel George M. Tot- 
ten, and Mr. Trautwine, failed to find bottom at 180 
feet. An embankment was created for the road by 
throwing in hundreds of cords of wood, rock, and 
more wood. This causeway, as it may be called, 
cost a fabulous sum of money ; but at last it was 
completed and they floated their tracks, so to speak, 
over the swamps." * 

Despite its ample resources and the unflagging 
application of its representatives in the field, the 
Company at the end of two years had completed only 
abouu onc-haii of the permanent way, or, to be more 



* Five Years in Panama. Wolfred Nelson, M.D., New York, 
1889. 



SOME FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTION. 61 

exact the twenty-tliree miles between Colon and 
Barbacoas. The transportation of passengers and 
baggage across the Isthmus was, however, in opera- 
tion. The railway line was used as far as it was 
completed; canoes were employed upon the Chagres 
to Gorgona or Cmces; and the remainder of the 
journey was performed by road. 

SOME FEATURES OF THE CONSTEUCTION. 

At Paraiso, thirty-eight miles from the Atlantic, 
the line attains its greatest elevation, being 263 feet 
above the mean level of the ocean. Upon the west- 
em side of the divide the maximum grade is one in 
ninety; upon the Pacific slope it is a little more. 
Twenty-three miles of the road are level and twenty- 
five straight, but there are sharp curves in places. 
There are no fewer than one hundred and thirty- 
four culverts, drains, and bridges of ten feet and 
less, and as many as one hundred and seventy 
bridges from a twelve-foot span to the length of the 
Barbacoas. The line is a single one with five sid- 
ings, but it is the intention of the Canal Commis- 
sion to convert it into a double-track road at an early 
date. The railroad is paralleled by a telegraph line. 
Of this, Pirn, in his " Gateway to the Pacific," says : 
" There are twenty-six posts to the mile, constructed 
in the following manner: A scantling four inches 
square, of pitch-pine, is encased in cement, molded 



62 PANAMA. 

in a cylindrical form, tapering toward the top, and 
sunk four feet in the ground. I was assured that 
when once dry these posts would last for ages. The 
cost of each was five dollars. They have the ap- 
pearance of hewn stone and are quite an ornament 
along the line." 

At the close of the year 1854 the construction 
had arrived at the divide. The Culebra pass af- 
forded the greatest depression but it was practically 
two hundred and forty feet above sea level. The 
rails were carried over at this point and down the 
Pacific slope to Panama. On the 27th day of Jan- 
uary, 1855, Colonel Totten went over the line upon 
the first locomotive to cross the American continent 
from ocean to ocean. 

The utmost credit is due to the promoters of this 
great enterprise and to those who executed it. Aside 
from the important services the road has rendered 
to commerce during the past fifty years, its efficacy 
as a pioneer movement has been inestimable. The 
railroad opened the way over the Isthmus, stimu- 
lated the desire for a canal, and affords indispensable 
facilities for its consummation. 

The cost of the road was considerably in exces*of 
the original estimate. After its opening to through 
traffic, many improvements were carried out, includ- 
ing the expensive bridge at Barbacoas, and it is 
probable that the outlay in establishing the route 
exceeded eight million dollars. 



COURSE OF LINE FROM COAST TO COAST. (]?, 

From. Colon the road runs almost due south, by 
west for more than seven miles until it meets the 
Chagres at Gatun. Its general direction thereafter 
is south-easterly, along the valley of the river as far 
as San Pablo, the half-way point between the oceans. 

THE FINE BRIDGE ACROSS THE CHAGEJIS. 

Here the Chagres is spanned by the splendid Bar- 
bacoas, which word itself, in the native language, 
signifies a bridge. It is an iron structure over six 
hundred feet long, resting upon stone piers. It 
cost upwards of half a million dollars. During the 
dry season the river dwindles to a shallow, almost 
sluggish, stream, perhaps less than two hundred feet 
in width, but in the rains it becomes a torrent, some- 
times far exceeding its normal bounds. Thus in 
1878 the Chagres flooded its valley and rose to a 
height of fifteen feet over the railway. The earth- 
quake of 1882 threw the bridge slightly out of align- 
ment but apparently without seriously damaging it. 
From San Pablo the road hugs the left bank of the 
river to Obispo, where it turns off suddenly at right 
angles to the stream.xy in the -v ici nity of jQbispo is 
Cerro Giga nte.. the hVA from v/hosd summit BallDoa 



r-is said^in bavp o-ainp.d Tiia fir.cff, yjew of the P acific. 

^ffhegg^.is no historic evidence on^ this point;^,, and ic 

^.seems more probable that if thejeJSajsL^pol; could be 

ascertained it would he on one or the other of the 



.fff 



64 PANAMA. 

liei^hts_JhaLiiaaLj^£..Ci^ Paraiso, on 

the Pacific slope, the company's ^glneers had an 
experience that is inseparable from excavation works 
in this part of the world. A cut had been made 
forty feet in depth and the rails laid along its bot- 
tom, when the torrential rain swept the earth back 
and covered the track at a depth of twenty feet, A 
similar occurrence befell the Panama Canal Com- 
pany more than once, affording a warning to the 
American engineers which they have carefully 
heeded. 

EXTEAOKDINABT LABOR DIFFICULTIES. 

• Reference has been made to some of the difii- 
culties which were encountered in what Tomes 
("Panama in 1885") characterises as the "almost 
superhuman " task of building the railroad across 
the Isthmus of Panama. Not the least of these were 
involved in the efforts to secure an adequate supply 
of labor. It was soon found that the natives could 
not be counted upon to any extent. The company 
concluded to import Chinamen and a ship landed 
eight hundred of them at Panama. They imme- 
diately began to fall sick and in a week's time up- 
ward of a hundred were prostrated. The interpre- 
ters attributed this to the deprivation of their ac- 1 
customed opium. A quantity of the drug was dis- 1 
tributed to them and had a marked effect for the I 



EXTRAORDINARY LABOR DIFFICULTIES. 0") 

better, but, to quote Tomes, " a Maine opium law 
was soon promulgated on the score of tbe immorali- 
ty of administering to so pernicious a habit, and 
without regard, it is hoped, to the expense, which, 
however was no inconsiderable item, since the 
daily quota of each Chinese amounted to fifteen 
grains, at a cost of at least fifteen cents." Deprived 
of what from long habit had become a necessary- 
stimulant and subjected to the depressing effect of 
the unaccustomed climate, the coolies lost all vigor 
and courage. In less than two months after their 
arrival there was hardly one of the original number 
fit to yield a pick or shovel. They gave themselves 
up to despair and sought death by whatever means 
came nearest to hand. Some sat on the shore and 
stoically awaited the rising tide, nor did they stir 
until the sea swallowed them. Some hanged them- 
selves by their queues or used those appendages to 
strangle themselves. By various methods hundreds 
put an end to the misery of their existence. The 
remnant, fewer than two hundred, sick and useless, 
were shipped to Jamaica. 

The next experiment of the Railroad Company 
was hardly less disastrous, A number of Irish 
laborers were imported at considerable expense, but, 
although the mortality amongst them was not so 
great as that experienced from the Chinese, it is 
said that the company failed to secure a single good 
day's labor from one of them. A great number 
5 



ee PANAMA. 

were buried on tiie Isthmus and the remainder were 
sent to New York, where most of them died from 
the effects of the fever contracted in the south.* 

The road was finally completed with the labor of 
some three thousand men of mixed races, but chiefly 
negroes from Jamaica and East Indian coolies. 

THE CANAL COMPANY SECUEES THE RAILKOAD. 

The Panama Canal Company learned at an early 
stage in its operations that control of the railroad 
was essential to the success of its project. In the 
fall of 1879 the stock was offered to de Lesseps 
for $14,000,000, being at the rate of $200 each for 
70,000 shares. This would appear to have been a 
very fair price when the worth of the line to the 
canal company is considered and the fact that its 
extremely profitable business, which had returned 
profits ranging from twelve to twenty-two per cent 



* It should be stated that the late Colonel George M. Totten, 
chief engineer of the road, threw discredit upon these state- 
ments of excessive mortality which, however, have emanated 
from several apparently reliable authorities. Colonel Totten 
repeatedly stated that the number of men employed in the con- 
struction of the railroad at no time exceeded 7,000 and that 
the total deaths among the laborers during the five years of 
the operation were not in excess of 1,200. If we assume an 
average of 5,000 laborers per annum, probably an underesti- 
mate, we have a mortality of 48 per thousand, an incredibly 
low figure, when the conditions under which the road was built 
and the later experience of the French are considered. 



CANAL COMPANY SECURES RAILROAD. 67 

per annum, was in prospect of practical annihilation 
on the completion of the waterway. De Lesseps^ 
however, perhaps hoping to secure better terms, de- 
clined the proposition. The construction of the 
canal was commenced early in the following year 
but the operations were obstructed at every step by 
the Railroad Company, which instituted a system- 
atic scheme of delay in the delivery of goods to the 
Canal Company. At length it was forced upon de 
Lesseps that the American corporation commanded 
the situation, and he decided to buy the company's 
shares. But in the meanwhile they had been stead- 
ily advancing, and when the transfer was effected 
the price had risen to $250 a share. Six-sevenths of 
the entire stock was sold to the Panama Canal Com- 
pany,* the remainder being retained in American 
hands for the purpose of keeping the charter alive. 

With the opening of the railroad a large traflSc 
across the Isthmus sprang into existence and grew 
rapidly with the advance of time. The products of 
Asia and the countries upon the Pacific coast of 
America were carried from Panama to Colon, there 
to be distributed amongst steamships making the 
ports of Europe, Canada, the United States and the 
West Indies. Moving in the reverse direction, 



* The company has been generally known in America by this 
name, but its corporate title was **La Compagnie Universell* 
du Canal Interoceanique de Panama." 



68 PANAMA. 

goods from these countries reached, by the same 
transisthmian route, South and Central America 
and San Francisco. From the last named port re- 
shipment was made to the Pacific islands and points 
on the Asian mainland. A number of steamship 
lines made regular calls at the terminal ports of the 
railroad. The line occupied a commanding position 
as the essential link in this chain of traffic, and took 
full advantage of the fact. Its charges were exor- 
bitant and its profits enormous for many years. Its 
rates were based on, in general, fifty per cent of the 
through tariff. For instance, of the total cost of 
shipping goods from New York to Valparaiso, one 
half represented the charge of the Railroad Com- 
pany for its share of the carriage. In some in- 
stances this policy of mulcting the shipper excess- 
ively resulted in loss of business. For many years 
the road carried enormous quantities of coffee to 
Europe. The through rate was about thirty dollars 
per ton. The Railroad Company received fifteen 
dollars and the two steamship companies that han- 
dled the goods divided a similar sum. In the early 
eighties a German line commenced to run to South 
and Central American ports by way of the Straits 
of Magellan. In a very short while this line had 
secured all the coffee shipments and much other 
freight that had previously been sent across the 
Isthmus. 

However, the Railroad Company was not seri- 



A MONOPOLISTIC AGREEMENT. 69 

ously affected by these diversions, and in the course 
of time it entered into an agreement with the Pacific 
Steamship Company which created a condition in 
the nature of a monopoly, to which reference will be 
had again. 

THE LONG CALMS ON" THE PACIFIC COAST. 

Tramp steamers often make the ports on either side 
of the Isthmus, and many sailing vessels put in at 
Colon. The latter are less frequent visitors at Pan- 
ama on account of the calm that prevails on that 
coast. Such craft have been known to leave the 
latter port and return for fresh supplies after lying 
in the doldrums for weeks without being able to get 
away. There was the case of the British bark 
Straudfi, which cleared from Panama in May of the 
year 1884. After getting out of the Gulf she beat 
about between latitudes four and six for months and 
finally put back to port after being out one hundred 
and five days. 

When the United States Government purchased 
the property of the Panama Canal Company it ac- 
quired 68,887 of the 70,000 shares of the Railroad 
Company. Since then the Isthmian Canal Commis- 
sion has bought a few more shares in the open mar- 
ket, and stands ready to pay par for the remainder. 
The offer is a fair one, considering that with the 
completion of the canal the property will deteriorate 



70 PANAMA. 

greatly in value. The holders of the minority stock 
do not, however, evince any eagerness to part with 
their holdings. They know that the Government is 
anxious to secure entire possession, and moreover 
the business of the line has increased and will con- 
tinue to do so during the canal operations. The 
situation places the Government in something of a 
dilemma. So long as any stock is outstanding in 
the hands of private individuals the Commission 
may not neglect the interests of the minority share- 
holders and must conduct the line on strictly busi- 
ness principles and hold commercial considerations 
paramount to the convenience of the canal construc- 
tion. Secretary Taft, in his letter of transmission 
to the President, accompanying the annual report of 
the Isthmian Canal Commission for 1904, suggests 
two ways of solving the difficulty and securing the 
desideratum of having the road " wholly under the 
control and use of the Government of the United 
States." The first suggestion is to condemn the 
stock and pay a reasonable price to the holders. 
The Secretary thinks " this method is a possible one 
and that the condemnation proceedings under a stat- 
ute of the United States might be pursued in the 
State of !N^ew York, which incorporated the com- 
pany and where its chief office now is. It would 
require special legislation by Congress." The sec- 
ond means suggested is " to use the power that the 
United States has " (by reason of its majority in- 



ASSETS OF RAILROAD. 71 

terest) " to elect directors who will lease the rail- 
road to the Isthmian Canal Commission at a rental 
which will involve the payment of the fixed charges 
upon the railroad and a reasonable dividend upon 
all the stock. Of course the dividend earned upon 
the stock belonging to the United States need not be 
paid. In this way the Isthmian Canal Company 
will become the lessee of the railroad, and, provided 
it does not injure the property and discharges the 
obligations of the original company under its fran- 
chise, can use the railroad for the purposes of con- 
structing the canal without embaiTassment." * 

THE ASSETS OF THE RAILEOAD AND THEIE VAX.TJE. 

The property of the Railroad Company transferred 
to the United States Government consists of about 
forty-eight miles of single track with twenty-six 
miles of sidings ; thirty-five locomotives, thirty pas- 
senger cars, more than nine hundred freight cars 
and a quantity of miscellaneous rolling stock. The 
equipment, like everything else that came from the 
hands of the French company, was in a condition of 
unnecessary deterioration. The railroad company 
owns repair shops, wharves and buildings at both 
Panama and Colon, and almost the entire island of 
Manzanillo, upon which the latter city stands, is its 



*The United States Government now owns all the stock of 
the Panama Railroad. The bonds are mostly held by private 
individuals. 



72 PANAMA. 

property. It holds large parcels of real estate along 
tiie line, aside from the land actually occupied by 
the road, and has, with the Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company, an undivided half interest in the islands of 
!N^aos, Culebra, Perico, and Flamenco, all in Panama 
Bay. It is also the proprietor of three steamships 
having an average tonnage of about twenty-seven 
thousand. The entire property, " cost of road, real 
estate, and equipment," including the steamships, 
tugs, lighters, etc., is carried on the books at what 
would seem to be the conservative valuation of a little 
over twelve millions and a half. The company's bal- 
ances have not varied greatly in the past ten years, 
and the figures for 1903 are very near an average. 
The gross receipts were: railroad, $1,743,636; 
steamers, $920,414; total, $2,644,051. Operating 
expenses, railroad, $886,482 ; steamers, $873,885 ; 
total, $1,760,337. Earnings over expenses, $903,- 
713. 

As soon as the Government assumed charge of 
the railroad, complaints of the traffic monopoly were 
made by shippers who had been without means of 
redress under the old conditions. The justice of 
these complaints was fully recognized by the au- 
thorities. General Davis, the first governor of the 
Canal Zone, severely criticised the management of 
the road, and Secretary Taft, in the report to which 
reference has already been made, says: "... 
Whatever may have justified the rates charged by 



n 

K 
> 



•po 



o 

> 




SUGGESTED TRAFFIC REFORM. 73 

the railroad company, the salaries paid by it, and 
the character of its corporate organization, and the 
expenses of the office in New York, certainly for the 
purposes and under the control of the United States, 
radical changes must be made." 

SUGGESTED EATLBQAD AND STEAMSHIP TRAFFIC 
REFOKMS. 

A contract existed between the railroad company 
and the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, which 
secured to the latter concern the exclusive privilege 
of issuing through bills of lading on freight from 
San Francisco to New York. Mr. Taft expressed 
the opinion that this contract was " invalid under 
the laws of Colombia and the laws of Panama." 
The Panama Railroad Company ran three cargo 
steamers on the Atlantic side, between New York 
and Colon, and would recognize no through bills of 
lading except those issued from its office in New 
York. Goods shipped across the Isthmus by any 
other line were charged the heavy local freight rates 
in force between Panama and Colon. This arrange- 
ment, together with its control of the docking facil- 
ities at Colon, most effectually enabled the company 
to shut out any competition in the Atlantic carrying 
trade. 

Early in 1905, Joseph W. Bristow was commis- 
sioned to investigate the situation under considera- 
tion. After an examination extending over several 



74 PANAMA. 

montiLS he substantiated the foregoing facts and 
made the following recommendations: That the 
road should be continued as a commercial line, that 
it should be double-tracked, equipped with modern 
rolling stock, and supplied with additional wharves 
and other improvements ; that the rates for through 
freight should be made as low as the cost of the 
service and provision for a fair dividend will per- 
mit; that the steamship line maintained by the road 
between Colon and New York should be continued 
by the Government; that the exclusive contracts 
with the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and the 
two South American west coast lines should be can- 
celled " and the ports of Colon and Panama be 
opened to the use of all steamship lines on equal 
terms ; " that in case a new steamship line be not 
established within reasonable time by private capital 
between Colon and the Gulf ports, the Railroad Com- 
pany should establish and maintain such a line (It 
is cheaper and more convenient to move the products 
of the Mississippi Valley by way of these ports than 
through ISTew York) ; that in the event of the Pacific 
Mail Steamship Company discontinuing its service 
between San Francisco and Panama some other pri- 
vate corporation should be encouraged to take its 
place, but failing this, the Panama Railroad Com- 
pany should iim a line of steamers over the route. 

It will be seen that the report contemplates a con- 
siderable extension of the Government's commercial 



PURCHASE OF SUPPLIES. 75 

operations, but only as alternative measures to be 
resorted to in case the desired objects can not be 
attained through private enterprise. Mr. Bristow 
recommends favoring American ships in traffic re- 
lations as far as may be consistent with treaty obli- 
gations, but, upon the theory that the railroad is 
performing the functions of a canal, he does not 
deem it practicable to discriminate to the advantage 
of American bottoms at the ports of Panama and 
Colon. 

The report met with the approval of the Govern- 
ment, and its recommendations in general will be 
carried out. As a first step in that direction the 
exclusive contract with the Pacific Mail Company 
was cancelled, June the 12th, 1905. 

A NEW APPMCATIOlSr OF OUE PROTECTIVE POLICY. 

At the outset of the Government's operations in 
connection with the railroad and canal a serious 
question arose which will demand the attention of 
the next Congress and may have an important bear- 
ing upon general tariff legislation. When the Com- 
mission was called upon to purchase supplies, the 
engineers in charge of the works drew its attention 
to the fact a great deal of the necessary material could 
be bought in foreign markets at a substantially lower 
figure than the lowest quotations of American bid- 
ders. The significant point was that these varia- 



V6 PANAMA. 

tions obtained where American-manufactured goods 
only were under consideration. For instance, steel 
rails were needed for the railroad. The fixed price 
of these rails in the United States was $28 per ton 
at the rolling mill. Freight charges to the Isthmus 
would increase the figures to $33. At the same time 
the Steel Trust was selling identically similar goods 
in foreign countries all over the world at $20 and $22 
and paying the freight, amounting to as much as $8 
per ton in some cases. In other words, a Mexican 
railroad might secure for $16 rails that the Panama 
Railroad, simply because it was an American cor- 
poration, was required to pay $33 for. It was found 
that from 30 to 40 per cent excess over foreign prices 
must be paid for the steel cars used in excavating. 
Two ships were required, and inquiry established the 
fact that one-half of the outlay involved, ($750,000), 
could be saved by purchasing from British owners. 
Many other requisitions could only be filled at the 
price of an exorbitant profit to different trusts. 

President Roosevelt, who has been invested by 
Congress with full authority for the construction of 
the canal, and upon whom full responsibility must 
necessarily fall, feels bound to conduct the operation 
with all reasonable economy, particularly at a time 
when the Government's expenditures are so largely 
in excess of its revenues as to suggest the imposition 
of additional taxes upon the people. The President 
prefers that the material used in the construction of 



THE FUTURE RAILROAD. 77 

the canal should be purchased from American man- 
ufacturers, but he insists that the United States 
Government should not be required to pay higher 
prices than those at which the same manufacturers 
are glad to sell the same goods to foreign buyers. 
Mr. Roosevelt's decision that the Panama Canal 
Commission shall buy material and supplies where 
they can be obtained at the lowest price is likely to 
have far-reaching effect. It will lead to a discus- 
sion of the tariff by Congress, which, unless their 
supporters in the Senate prove strong enough to 
withstand it, will probably result in legislation ad- 
verse to the trusts. 

It is hardly necessary to state that as an adjunct to 
the canal operation the railroad is of the highest 
importance — indeed, it is a sine qua non. With 
the completion of the waterway, the road will lapse 
into the condition of a mere local line between Colon 
and Panama. It should, nevertheless, continue to 
be a valuable property in the hands of either the 
Government or a private corporation. As a means 
of transporting men and material employed in the 
operation of the completed canal it will always be of 
service. It is probable that a considerable amount of 
freight will be reshipped even after the canal is 
opened. Many voyagers will leave vessels at the 
point of entering the canal in order to avoid what will 
generally be an unpleasant passage and secure the op- 
portunity of spending a few hours in Panama by 



78 PANAMA. 

making the transit by rail. Both the terminal ports, 
but especially Panama, must grow rapidly under the 
influences of future traffic and the local business o£ 
the railroad will be proportionately increased. 



IV. 

PANAMA. 

THE ISTHMIAN COUNTRY. 

Political Changes in Panama and Columbia — The Recent Rev- 
olution in Panama — A Comic Opera Coup d' €tat — The 
American Part in the Affair — United States Marines Are 
Landed — Nerve a More Potent Factor than Numbers — 
The President's Denial of Official Complicity — Columbia's 
Tardy Appreciation of Her Interests — The Ancient Graves 
of Chiriqui — Curious Ornaments of a By-gone Race — The 
Mystic Frog of the Early Indians — The Mineral Resources 
of Panama — The Famous Pearl Islands of Panama Bay — 
Climatic Conditions on the Isthmus. 

During recent years the ribbon of land that joins 
the continents of JS'orth and South America has 
loomed large in the public eye. 

Since the days of Greece's glory no such small 
strip of soil as the Isthmus of Panama has gained 
equal distinction. It has been the scene of stirring 
adventure and the site of the wealthiest city in the 
world. It has been the subject of epoch-making dip- 
lomacy and a sphere for political disturbances. It is 
the seat of the greatest engineering enterprise in his- 
tory; an enterprise which is destined to largely revo- 
lutionize the commerce of the earth and, more than 

79 



80 PANAMA. 

any other modern factor, to influence the fortunes of 
nations. 

In tlie second decade of the sixteenth century 
Angel Saavedra mooted the idea of a canal through 
this narrow neck of inter-ocean terxitority. Since 
that time the thought could not be banished from 
the minds of men though a King of Spain decreed 
death to any who should voice it. IFor two hun- 
dred years and more plans and projects for the 
great waterway have been advanced. The first at- 
tempt to construct it ended in a cataclysmal failure. 
In these early years of the twentieth century the 
opening of a passage is at length assured and it 
will be available to the traffic of the world almost, 
perhaps exactly, four hundred years from the dis- 
covery of the Pacific. 

THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA. 

The neck of land separating the two great oceans 
of the globe, which is called the Isthmus of Panama, 
forms the southern termination of the great Ameri- 
can isthmus extending north to Mexicorj^'^his strip 
of land curving about four hundred and seventv 
mile& . from west to east has commonly been styled 
|,,,J]a««-"'&tlmius of Darien, but that name is more 
properly applied to the section of country between 
t|ia-flulfs.,of. Uraba and San Miguelrjf"^he Isthmus 
of Panama is traversed along its entire length by the 



;-Tf<> 



i 



THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA. 81 

Cordillera de Baudo, separated from the Andes by 
the Valley of the Atrato which marks the northern 
limit of South America. Erroneous impressions are 
apt to be created by the usual practice of studying 
geography with the aid of the ordinary flat maps, 
which have the effect of exaggerating the size of 
countries in high latitudes and diminishing the equa- 
torial areas. One thousand miles in latitude 60 de- 
grees occupies upon the ordinary map twice as much 
space as does one thousand miles along the equator. 
Jt is a revelation, to many a well-informed person 
to learn that South America is very nearly as large 
^as"17o^Er America. jFor the study of th^e Panama 
Canal in its relations to the rest of the world the use 
of a globe, or a map on the poly conic projection is 
recommended. Another point worth noticing in this 
connection is that the most pronounced diversion 
from the general north and south trend of the Ameri- 
cas is found in the Isthmus of Panama, which takes a 
lateral direction east and west and throws the south- 
ern continent, so to speak, to the east of the northern, 
so that a line dropt due south from New York would 
pass through the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Chile. 
In looking at a map of the western hemisphere 
we are accustomed to finding the Atlantic Ocean to 
the east or on the right hand. For this reason a 
sectional map of the Canal region is likely to be a 
little confusing at first glance. It will show the 
Pacific on the right and the Atlantic on the opposite 
h 



82 PANAMA. 

side of the page. This is due to the fact that the 
Isthmus makes a northerly loop in the portion con- 
taining the Canal Zone, and I^anajna is actually east 
,Qf_Qalim» from which^ort the Canal wjlLii^kfe,^ 
south-eastferly direction to its Pacific terminus:is^. A 
line from Buffalo continued south would bisect the 
Canal and leave Panama on the right and Colon on 
the left. 

The writer finds an excuse for these explanations 
in the knowledge that many intelligent persons have 
been puzzled by the unfamiliar geographical condi- 
tions involved in an examination of the Canal project 
and related subjects. 

POLITICAL CHANGES IN PANAMA AND COLUMBIA. 

Having secured their independence from Spain, 
the provinces of Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, and 
Panama formed a republican federation. Subse- 
quently, the two first-named seceded, and Panama 
with Colombia established the United Sovereign 
States of ITew Granada. Although each of the states 
combined in this political union exercised sovereign 
powers, the paramount authority in the territory be- 
came gradually centralized at Bogota. In 1861, 
against the wishes of the leading citizens of Panama, 
the United States of Colombia were organized with 
a new constitution conferring greater powers on the 
government at Bogota. Twenty-five years later, after 



RECENT REVOLUTION IN PANAMA. 83 

a civil war in wkich many lives were lost, Colombia 
succeeded in establishing the republic which took her 
name. By this measure Panama lapsed to the con- 
dition of a mere department with a governor ap- 
pointed by the Colombian president and vested with 
little independent authority. The Panamans, whilst 
forced to submit to this degradation, have always 
protested against it and have consistently declared 
their right to the position of a constitutional state. 
The government of Panama by the corrupt Colom- 
bian politicians had always been bad, and the people 
of the Isthmus had entertained the design of inde- 
pendence for years before America opened negotia- 
tions for the Canal and, indeed, had enjoyed it for 
three years following 1857. 

THE KKCENT BEVOLTJTION IN" PAITAMA. 

Panama threw off the yoke of Colombia at an 
extremely opportune time as regards the plans of the 
United States for the construction of the Isthmian 
Canal. The coincidence of the event was the only 
basis for the utter nonsense written in this country 
upon the subject at the time. Even recently certain 
papers have published a silly story by a syndicate 
writer which purports to give the " inside " history 
of the rebellion. There is absolutely no ground for 
the accusation that the American authorities insti- 
gated the coup which gave independence to the Isth- 



84 PANAMA. ' 

mus, but, on the contrary, sufficient evidence that, 
although they may have had some inkling of the at- 
tempt before its occurrence, they were entirely free 
from participation in it. The suspected representa- 
tives of our Government have denied that any Amer- 
ican official instigated or assisted in the revolt. In 
this they are borne out by the statements of the lead- 
ing Panaman revolutionists and by Doctor Herran, 
the Colombian Minister to Washington at the time. 
The Hay-Herran Treaty was negotiated at Wash- 
ington in 1903 between the representatives of the 
Governments of the United States and the Eepublic 
of Colombia. Its purpose was to secure to the form- 
er state the privilege of making a canal through the 
Isthmus of Panama, and amongst its provisions was 
one guaranteeing to Colombia the payment of ten 
millions of dollars upon the completion of the con- 
vention. The national legislature of the latter coun- 
try, moved it is believed by the hope of inducing us 
to pay a higher price, failed to ratify the treaty. 

A COMIC 0PE3JA COUP D^ETAT. 

The Panamans are much more astute tlian is gen- 
erally supposed. They had realized fully the enor- 
mous advantages that would accrue to their country 
from tlie operation of the Canal by America, and 
when the opportunity seemed to be in danger of de- 
struction by the action of the Colombian politicians 



COMIC OPERA COUP D'fiTAT. 85 

the leading men in Panama who, as has been said, 
have harbored thoughts of independence for years, 
determined to take matters into their own hands. 
'No doubt they calculated, as they reasonably might, 
upon the United States acknowledging them as soon 
as they had knocked off the shackles. The revolution 
was bloodless and savoured of opera bouffe in the 
absurdity of its details. The Government of Bogota 
learned of the plot before it was put into execution 
and despatched several hundreds of the ragamuffins 
that composed its " army " to Panama under Gen- 
erals Tobal and Amaya, with orders to arrest the 
conspirators and carry them to the capital. When 
the detachment arrived at Colon the generals hur- 
ried forward over the railroad with their warrants 
and were promptly placed in confinement by the rev- 
olutionary leaders. 

Meanwhile, Colonel Shaler, the Superintendent of 
the Panama Railroad, unquestionably placed imped- 
iments in the way of the further progress of the 
troops. It must be remembered, however, that Col- 
onel Shaler, although an American, was not an offi- 
cial and acted as the representative of the corporation 
which was interested in the sale of the canal property 
to the United States, for the Panama Canal Company 
owned the railway. 

The sympathy of the American Government and 
people was unquestionably with the Panamans, but 
they received no official aid from this country. 



86 PANAMA. 

Marines were landed from an American gunboat 
and two days later the Colombian troops took ship 
for Cartagena. Panama immediately declared itself 
an independent republic and was recognized by tbe 
United States without delay. 

THE AMEKICAN PAST IN THE AFFAIR. 

There is reason to believe that the Colombian sol- 
diers were bribed — at the rate of about five dollars 
apiece — by friends of Panama, but the statement 
that the money was distributed or handled by an 
officer of the American Navy is a gross and stupid 
libel. The presence of the marines was without 
doubt a decisive factor in the accomplishment of the 
revolution, but that it was not premeditated and had 
no other purpose than the protection of American 
lives is proved by the following official report of the 
officer commanding the Nashville: 

" U. S. S. Nashville, Third Eate. 
" Colon, U. S. Colombia, November 5, 1903. 
" Sir : Pending a complete report of the occur^ 
rences of the last three days in Colon, Colombia, I 
most respectfully invite the Department's attention 
to those of the date of Wednesday, November 4, 
which amounted to practically the making of war 
against the United States by the officer in command 
of the Colombian troops in Colon. At 1 o'clock p. m. 



UNITED STATES MARINES LANDED. 87 

on that date I was summoned on shore by a precon- 
certed signal, and on landing met the United States 
consul, vice-consul, and Colonel Shaler, the general 
superintendent of the Panama Railroad. 

" The consul informed me that he had received 
notice from the officer commanding the Colom- 
bian troops. Colonel Torres, through the prefect of 
Colon, to the effect that if the Colombian officers, 
Generals Tobal and Amaya, who had been seized in 
Panama on the evening of l^ovember 3, by the inde- 
pendents, and held as prisoners, were not released by 
2 o'clock p. m,, he, Torres, would open fire on the 
town of Colon and kill every United States citizen 
in the place, and my advice and action were re- 
quested. I advised that all the United States citi- 
zens should take refuge in the shed of the Panama 
Railroad Company, a stone building susceptible of 
being put into good state for defense, and that I 
would immediately land such body of men, with ex- 
tra arms for arming the citizens, as the complement 
of the ship would permit. 

UNITED STATES MARINES ABE LANDED. 

" This was agreed to, and I immediately returned 
on board, arriving at 1 :15 p. m. The order for land- 
ing was immediately given, and at 1 :30 p. m, the 
boats left the ship with a party of forty-two men 
under the command of Lieutenant-Commander H. 



88 PANAMA. 

M. Witzel, with Midshipman J. P. Jackson as sec- 
ond in command. Time being pressing, I gave ver- 
bal orders to Mr. Witzel to take the building referred 
to above, to put it into the best state of defense pos- 
sible, and protect the lives of the citizens assembled 
there — not firing unless fired upon. The women 
and children took refuge on the German steamer 
Marcomania and the Panama Railroad steamer City 
of Washington, both ready to haul out from dock if 
necessary. 

" The Nashville got under way and patrolled along 
the water-front close in and ready to use either 
small arm or shrapnel fire. The Colombians sur- 
rounded the building of the railroad company al- 
most immediately after we had taken possession, and 
for about one and a half hours their attitude was 
most threatening, it being seemingly their purpose 
to provoke an attack. Happily our men were cool 
and steady, and while the tension was very great no 
shot was fired. 

" At about 3 :15 p. m. Colonel Torres came into 
the building for an interview and expressed himself 
as most friendly to the Americans, claiming that the 
whole affair was a misapprehension, and that he 
would like to send the alcalde of Colon to Panama 
to see General Tobal and have him direct the dis- 
continuance of the show of force. A special train 
was furnished and safe conduct guaranteed. At 
about 5 ;30 p. m. Colonel Torres made the proposi- 



NERVE MORE POTENT THAN NUMBERS. 89 

tion of witlidrawing his troops to Monkey Hill if I 
would withdraw the Nashville's force and leave the 
town in possession of the police until the return of 
the alcalde on the morning of the 5 th. 

THE NERVE OF AMERICAN MARINES PREVENTS A CON- 
FLICT WITH COLOMBIA. 

" After an interview with the United States con- 
sul and Colonel Shaler as to the probability of good 
faith in the matter, I decided to accept the proposi- 
tion and brought my men on board, the disparity in 
numbers between my force and that of the Colom- 
bians — ■ nearly ten to one — making me desirous of 
avoiding a conflict so long as the object in view — 
the protection of American citizens — was not im- 
periled. 

" I am positive that the determined attitude of 
our men, their coolness and evident intention of 
standing their ground, had a most salutary and de- 
cisive effect on the immediate situation, and was the 
initial step in the ultimate abandoning of Colon by 
these troops and their return to Cartagena the fol- 
lowing day. Lieutenant-Commander Witzel is enti- 
tled to much praise for his admirable work in com- 
mand on the spot. 

" I feel that I can not sufficiently represent to the 
Department the grossness of this outrage and the 



90 PANAMA. 

insult to our dignity, even apart from the savagery 
of the threat. 

" Very respectfully, 

" JOHW HUBBAED, 

" Commander, United States ISTavy, Commanding. 
" The Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, 
Washington, D. C." 

In his more detailed report Commander Hubbard 
stated : " I beg to assure the Department that I had 
no part whatever in the negotiations that were car- 
ried on between Colonel Torres and the representa- 
tives of the provisional government; that I landed 
an armed force only when the lives of American 
citizens were threatened, and withdrew this force as 
soon as there seemed to be no grounds for further 
apprehension of injury to American lives or prop- 
erty ; tliat I relanded an armed force because of the 
failure of Colonel Torres to carry out his agreement 
to withdraw and announced intention of returning; 
and that my attitude throughout was strictly neutral 
as between the two parties, my only purpose being 
to protect the lives and property of American citi- 
zens and tiO presei've the free and uninterrupted 
transit of the isthmus." 

THE PRBSIDEJNI't's DENIAL OF OFFICIAL COMPLICITY. 

President R-oosevelt, referring to the foregoing re- 
ports, says : " This plain official account of the oc- 



DENIAL OF OFFICIAL COMPLICITY. 01 

currences of J^Toveniber 4 shows that instead of there 
having been too much prevision by the American. 
Government for the maintenance of order and the 
protection of life and propertj on the isthmus, the 
orders for the movement of the American warships 
had been too long delayed: so long, in fact, that 
there were but forty-two marines and sailors avail- 
able to land and protect the lives of American men 
and women. ... At Panama, when the revo- 
lution broke out, there was no American man-of-war 
and no American troops or sailors. At Colon Com- 
mander Hubbard acted witb entire impartiality 
toward both sides, preventing any movement, whether 
by the Colombians or the Panamanians, which would 
tend to produce bloodshed. On ISTovember 9 he pre^- 
vented a body of the revolutionists from landing at 
Colon." 

In his message to Congress the President made the 
following reference to the treaty and the complica- 
tions which grew out of it: " During all the years 
of negotiation and discussion that preceded the con- 
clusion of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never 
intimated that the requirement by the United States 
of control over the canal strip would render unat- 
tainable tbe construction of a canal by way of the 
Istlimus of Panama ; nor were we advised, during 
the months when legislation of 1902 was pending 
before the Congress, that the terms which it em- 
bodied would render negotiations with Colombia im- 



92 PANAMA. 

practicable. It is plain tliat no nation could con- 
struct and guarantee the neutrality of tiie c^nal with 
a less degree of control than was stipulated for in 
the Haj-Herran treaty. A refusal to grant such 
degree of control was necessarily a refusal to make 
any practicable treaty at all. Such refusal there- 
fore squarely raised the question whether Colombia 
was entitled to bar the transit of the world's traffic 
across the isthmus. . . . Colombia, after having 
rejected the treaty in spite of our protests and warn- 
ings when it was in her power to accept it, has since 
shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty 
if only the status quo could be restored. One of the 
men standing highest in the official circles of Colom- 
bia on E^ovember 6 addressed the American minister 
at Bogota, saying that if the Government of the 
United States would land troops to preserve Colom- 
bian sovereignty and the transit, the Colombian GoV' 
emment would ' declare martial law, and, by virtue 
of vested constitutional authority, when public order 
is disturbed, (would) approve by decree the ratifi- 
cation of the canal treaty as signed ; or, if the Gov- 
ernment of the United States prefers, (would) call 
an extra session of the Congress — witb new and 
friendly members — ' next May to approve the treaty.' 
" Having these facts in view, there is no shadow 
of a question that the Government of the United 
States proposed a treaty that was not only just, but 



COLOMBIA'S TARDY APPRECIATION. 03 

generous to Colombia, which our people regarded as 
erring, if at all, on the side of overgenerosity, which 
was hailed with delight by the people of the imme- 
diate locality tlirough which the canal was to pass, 
who were most concerned as to the new order of 
thing's, and which the Colombian authorities now 
recognize as being so good that they are willing to 
promise its unconditional ratification if only we will 
desert those who have shown themselves our friends 
and restore to those who have shown themselves un- 
friendly the power to undo what they did. I pass 
by the question as to what assurance we have that 
they would now keep their pledge and not again re- 
fuse to ratify the treaty if they had the power ; for, 
of course, I will not for one moment discuss the pos- 
sibility of the United States committing an act of 
such baseness as to abandon the new Republic of 
Panama." 

DESCRIPTION OF THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA. 

The recognition of the independence of Panama 
by the United States was followed by a treaty l^e- 
tween the two countries which will be referred t9 in 
a succeeding chapter. 

The physical features of the Isthmus of Panama 
are very diversified. The center of the cpuntiy is 
occupied by mountains and hills. In some parts 
these elevations extend to the coast, but usually they 



94 



PANAMA. 



are flanked by alluvial plains or gently rolling coun- 
try. This again is fringed by a strip of costal 
swamp covered with mangroves. Heavy forest and 
dense jungle clothe the mountain districts. The 
growth is so strong and rapid that the railroad com- 
pany has to maintain a constant fight against its 
inroads. If not checked it would in six months bury 
the line. The Chagres is the principal river in every 
respect, but there are a number of smaller streams. 
The territory of the Republic of Panama is di- 
vided into provinces and these into municipal dis- 
tricts. The canal route traverses two of these prov- 
inces — those of Colon and Panama. Their 
prosperity is assured by the American enterprise now 
in process of development. 

THE IlSrHOSPITABLH SAN BLAS COUNTRY. 

The province of Darien is not a promising region. 
It is largely made up of mountainous wilderness and 
impassable swamps. Rumor has persistently cred- 
ited the San Bias district with rich gold deposits, 
but verification is rendered difiicult by the unfriendly 
attitude of the Indians there, who have always dis- 
played an unconquerable objection to the presence 
of white men. The San Bias Indians occasionally 
visit Panama on trading or marketing excursions, 
but they are reticent about their country and their 
affairs and decidedly averse to any but the most tem- 



THE ANCIENT GRAVE6 OF CHIRIQUI. 07) 

porary relations with foreigners. The provinces of 
Chiriqui and Veragua support industries of consider- 
able importance and appear to be capable of much 
greater development under favorable conditions. 
David, the capital of Chiriqui, occupies an extremely 
picturesque site upon a well-wooded coast. Behind 
the town stretches a fertile savanna backed by a range 
of mountains from two to three thousand feet in 
height. It is one of those quaint old settlements with 
which the traveler in Spanish-America becomes fa- 
miliar, but he never tires of the air of restful sim- 
plicity that pervades them. The houses, generally 
one story in height, are square whitewashed struc- 
tures with roofs of red tile and front verandahs. 
The inhabitants are hospitable, contented and in- 
clined to take life easily. Several of them are well- 
to-do and not a few highly cultured. 

THE ANCIENT GRAVES OF CHIRIQUI. 

Chiriqui became suddenly famous several years 
ago on account of the interesting relics that were 
unearthed there from the guanas, or graves, of the 
ancient inhabitants. A great number of these treas- 
ures were found in the district of David. " History 
is silent about the people who are buried in thou- 
sands there. The discovery of these old cemeteries 
came about in this wise : Many, many years ago in 
cutting a trench through a peaceful forest to drain 



96 PANAMA. 

off water, the Indian diggers came across an image 
of gold. Great was their surprise and the execrable 
sedd'ore, or ' the cursed thirst of gold,' settled upon 
that primitive people like a nightmare. They kept 
on digging, and unearthed quantities of golden orna- 
ments and images of various kinds. Soon hundreds 
were digging in the forest, and it has been estimated 
that gold ornaments were uncovered to a value ex- 
ceeding $400,000 in a space of five or six years. 
They were sold for their weight, or value in coin, 
and went into the melting pot. Later, some archaeol- 
ogists took an interest in the matter, and some sys- 
tematic work was done, they directing and the 
natives doing the digging. It would seem that in 
the majority of cases the graves first were dug, their 
sides lined with pieces of stone, and then cross pieces 
were laid over these. Inside, the pottery was placed, 
together with ornaments of gold, cooking utensils, etc. 
The graves of the poorer class contained nothing but 
cooking utensils and no gold ornaments were found 
in them. 

A native locates a grave by tapping the earth as 
he walks along. As soon as he gets a hollow sound 
familiar to his expert ear he commences digging and 
digs down. The contents are stone implements, pot- 
tery implements, ornaments and pure gold, and orna- 
ments of gold gilt, a species of pinchbeck, called by 
the natives here tumhago. There are also ornaments 
in copper, and a few bone instruments. 



ORNAMENTS OF BY-GONE RACE. 97 

'' There are a uumber of small idols in stone, vary- 
ing from nine to eighteen inches high. There is also 
a species of grinding stone, on which they evidently 
ground their corn, or its equivalent. The better class 
of these grinding stones were from eighteen to twen- 
ty-four inches in length, and from twelve to fifteen 
inches in width. I am now speaking of some of the 
largest. They were concave on top, and in the graves 
were found stone rollers fitting the upper surface. 
Generally they were made to represent some animal. 

GtTKIOUS IMPLBMEINTS OF A BY-GONE RACE. 

There were some v^th tiger-shaped heads and four 
legs. The tail generally folded around and rested 
on tlie left hind leg. A commoner type of grinding 
stone resembled a low stool of stone without any 
ornamentation. In the graves were found an endless 
variety of stone chisels and stone hatchets. Some of 
these chisels and hatchets were beautifully propor- 
tioned, presenting various planes and surfaces for 
examination, and tiieir edges in many instances were 
sharp even after having been exposed for long cen- 
turies to the effects of that humid soil. These were 
the implements with which the people did all their 
carving. 

" In the pottery implements the variety was al- 
most endless, not oidy suggesting considerable in- 
genuity, but also some knowledge of the anatomy of 
7 



98 PANAMA. 

the human body. Between many of these pieces of 
pottery and the male angels on the doors of La Mer- 
ced, at Panama, there was a striking analogy. . . . 
Roughly classifying the potteiy utensils, they were 
of two kinds, glazed and unglazed, and many of the 
markings on them had been made bi black and red 
pigments. Many of the borders, while crude, were 
very suggestive. There was a series of gods, little 
squat figures with triangular faces ; nearly all of 
which had been glazed and were ornamental. Their 
pectoral development was remarkable. It is sup- 
posed that they were a kind of idol. . . . Then 
there were rattles of ingenious construction, with 
which they soothed the gentle baby in early days. 
There was a series of whistles (it is supposed that 
they were bird calls) producing all sorts of notes, 
from a full rich sound to a gentle twitter. . . . 

THE MYSTIC FEOG OF THE EARLY H^TDIAIfS. 

" Among the gold ornaments found in the guacas at 
Chiriqui were many frogs. The frog seems to have 
been a favorite type of ornament with those early 
races. The largest frog of pure gold uncovered there 
weighed eighteen ounces. . . . Another thing 
that seemed very strange to me was a kind of bell. 
It was of gold, and an exact counterpart of the old- 
time sleigh-bells, or those with a slot. It had a han- 
dle and within were little pieces of metal, and these 



MINERAli RESOURCES OF PANAMA. 99 

little bellsj when shaken, emitted quite a musical 
sound, o . . Among tJie tuinhago ornaments the 
majority represented birds or frogs. From a care- 
ful examination of a number of them the body 
seemed to be made of copper covered with a film of 
gold. How it was put on I am unable to say, but 
certainly gold it was. ... I saw another speci- 
men which caused me a deal of speculation. It evi- 
dently was intended for the figure of a king. It was 
in bronze, and that surprised me greatly, because the 
art of casting in bronze is deemed an art to this 
day." * 

THE MI^STEEAL RESOURCES OF PANAMA. 

It is very probable that with the exploitation that 
is likely to follow the opening of the Canal, the Isth- 
mus will prove to have rich and extensive mineral 
resources. Gold, copper, manganese, and coal are 
known to exist in different parts, but the greater 
portion of the country is yet to be subjected to geo- 
logical surveys. When the waterway comes into use 
a great market for coal will be established at Panama 
and the demand will doubtless lead to the operation 
of local mines. The island of Muerto, near David, 
is said to be almost a solid mass of coal covered with 
a stratum of clay. As early as 1851 the geologists. 
Whiting and Schuman, made a report on this deposit 



Wolfred Nelson. 



100 PANAMA. 

which was published in London. Here would seem 
to be a favorable opportunity for American capital 
and enterprise. 

There are large areas of good grazing ground in 
the western provinces, and the industry has been pur- 
sued to some extent. When the Canal is in use there 
will be a ready and profitable market for meat at 
Panama and cattle raising should become one of the 
chief industries of this section. 

The country about the Chiriqui Bay already has a 
large and flourishing fruit trade. The entire region 
in the neighborhood of the Costa Rica border is ex- 
ceeding rich — as rich as any in the tropics, perhaps. 
It might be developed with comparative ease. It 
has a pleasant and salubrious climate. The people 
are genial and hospitable; well-disposed towards 
Americans and eager for improvement. 

THE FAMOUS PEARL, ISLANDS OF PANAMA BAY. 

The famous Pearl Islands lie in the Gulf about 
forty miles oft" the city of Panama. By the Span- 
iards they were called the King's Archipelago. The 
pearl fisheries are of very ancient origin. Balboa 
secured a number of the gems from the Indians and 
was told by them that the pearl oyster had been 
sought in these waters during uncountable ages. At 
one time these fisheries were probably as rich as any 
in the world, but reckless methods injured them, and 



PEARIj islands of PANAMA BAY. 101 

whilst tliej are still worked in a desultory fashion, it 
may be said that the old beds are practically ex- 
hausted. 

The pearls of Panama have always been noted for 
their size. It is said that specimens as large as fil- 
berts have been found. They are very lustrous and 
have a silvery sheen, differing from the creamy shade 
of the pearl of Ceylon. 

The native Panamans are a more attractive people 
than one would be led to suppose from the accounts of 
travelers who have only come in contact with the 
lower classes in the city of Panama who are a 
mixed and far from representative lot. 

It has long been a practice with the well-to-do 
Creole families to send their children of both sexes to 
the best colleges of Europe and America. Conse- 
quently the upper class is distinguished by refine- 
ment and culture as well as many natural qualities 
of an admirable character. They entertain tlie 
strongest feelings of admiration and respect for the 
American people, and, if we may judge from recent 
experiences, our relations to the Panamans will con- 
tinue without diflSculty or friction. 

The disbandment of the army by President Amador 
was effected with little trouble because of the kindly 
intervention of the American minister, whose advice 
was accepted by both sides in a friendly spirit. It is 
doubtful if any other South American Republic 
could attempt the retirement of the entire military 



102 PANAMA. 

force, no matter how weak, without precipitating a 
revolution. 

The rancheros of the country districts are peace- 
fully inclined and contented with their simple pas- 
toral life. They live in huts of the simplest con- 
struction and till a few acres of ground. Their 
wants are very few and easily supplied. The con- 
dition of the peon will be improved with the general 
prosperity that is in store for the Isthmus. 

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS OUT THE ISTHMUS. 

Except upon the coasts the climate of the Isthmus 
is not worse than that of the average tropical region 
and in some parts of the territory it is quite health- 
ful and pleasant. Hundreds of Americans have been 
employed by the railroad and many of them have 
enjoyed excellent health during residences extending 
from ten to twenty years. The average temperature 
is about eighty degrees and there is generally a re- 
freshing breeze from the north. The humidity in 
the rainy season is great and its effect very enervating 
to natives of higher latitudes. There are two seasons. 
The wet season commences about the middle of April 
and lasts for eight months. The dry season from the 
middle of December is generally considered healthy 
even in the canal region. During this period the sky 
is a cloudless blue by day and at night the m^oon and 
stars are sublime. 



V. 

PANAMA. 

COLON AND PANAMA. 

Porto Bello — Colon an Unattractive City — The Departed 
Glory of Panama Viejo — Panama's Wealth Attracts the 
Buccaneers — Morgan's Expedition to Isthmus of Darien 
— The Pirates Attack the City of Panama — The City Is 
Sacked and Put to the Torch — New Panama Built With 
Regard to Defense — The Houses and Churches Convertible 
Into Forts — The Interesting Church of Modern Panama — 
The Famous Flat Arch of St. Dominic — The Dead Are 
Temporary Tenants of Their Graves — In Spanish-America 
Graft Extends to the Grave — American Authority in The 
Panaman Republic — Panama Enjoys the Boon of Good 
Water. 

n the days wlien Spain maintained a great trade 
mite across the Isthmus, tb^ Atlantic terminus was 
Por to Bello , about t'.venty miles onsr of the mouth of^ 
the Canal. A cluster of lr,(li;ni slmcks upon a low 
beachnow maffes the placo Avhero tlio Spanish cral- 
Icons were wont to land tlioir caro-oos <rf incrrhandiso 






and take on board the pearls and precious metals cor- 
simed to the kino-'s treasury. The ruins of thg.oki ^^ 
city are shut in by heavv woods and, lost in a. tang'le 
fc^ o^ ^^ense undergrowth. >-^, 

^he construction of \he railway gave "birth to tbe 
103 



104 PANAMA. 

modem port. The Americans called it Aspinwall, 
after one of the chief promoters. By the French it 
was named Colon. The city is built upon the Island 
of Manzanillo, a sand-covered coraline formation, 
three-quarters of a mile in length and not more than 
six hundred yards broad. It stands a very few feet 
above the ocean at high tide and is connected with 
the mainland by the railway embankment. The 
original town was anything but a pleasant or healthy 
place of residence. The railroad buildings, dwell- 
ings, laborers' quarters, and shops, mostly of wood, 
were scattered about without any particular system 
or order. The center of the island was occupied by 
an almost stagnant lagoon, creating a most undesir- 
able condition. 

During the disturbances incident to the revolution 
of 1885, Colon was completely destroyed by fire. It 
was reconstructed with somewhat more regard for 
convenience and sanitation, but still leaving much 
to be desired in both respects. 

C?OLON" AN UNATTRACTIVE CITY. 

The Colon of today is a straggling, unattractive city 
xvith some redeeming features, however, and a 
promise of more in the near future. The railroad 
company occupies the greater part of the water-front 
with its various buildings, including wharves and 
docks. Parallel with these is the main street, com- 



COLON AN UNSANITARY TOWN. 105 

posed almost entirely of frame buildings. There are 
some good shops and a number of conscienceless deal- 
ers in spurious curios who, together with the enter' 
prising money changers, reap a royal harvest from 
unsophisticated travelers. From the moment of 
landing the stranger is beset by a howling crowd of 
nondescripts who contend with one another for the 
privilege of fleecing him. His baggage is dis- 
tributed amongst as many different individuals as 
possible, and upon his arrival at the hotel he is called 
upon to pay each one an exorbitant fee for his serv- 
ice, although it may have consisted in carrying a 
newspaper only. Before the American advent there 
was no escape from this imposition. If a victim 
refused to be mulcted he was haled before a magis- 
trate who invariably supported the extortioners. In 
those days a man dared not ask a native the name 
of a street unless he was prepared to pay for the 
information. This system of bleeding the helpless 
foreigner is now confined within the bounds of semi- 
decency and an American, at least^ is treated with 
a show of honesty. 

COLON ALWAYS AN UNSANITARY TOWN. 

Along the beach to the east of the town is the 
foreign quarter, containing some comfortable resi- 
dences, an Episcopal church built of stone, and a 
tolerable hotel. On the west side, fronting; the 



106 PANAMA. 

ocean, stand the handsome houses of the old French 
officials. Thej are grouped in a park beautifully 
laid out and convey the impression that our predeces- 
sors of the Canal did not neglect their personal com- 
fort. The residence of de Lesseps is a particularly 
attractive structure of two stories surrounded by a 
double pier of verandahs. Back of the city upon 
the mainland is Mount Hope, or Monkey Hill, whose 
cemetery has a population greatly in excess of that 
of Colon. A small portion of the city has enjoyed 
the comparative advantage of a water supply de- 
rived through a small iron pipe from a reservoir near 
Mount Hope. The water is of indifferent quality' 
and the quantity is often insufficient even for the 
needs of officials and employees of the Panama Rail- 
road. Aside from these favored few, the inhabit- 
ants of Colon depended for their drinking water upon 
rain that was stored in iron tanks. At times in the 
dry season this was very far from fresh and the stag- 
nant water in the cisterns afforded the most perfect 
breeding places for disease-dealing mosquitoes. The 
Panama Canal Commission is eradicating this con- 
dition with as little delay as need be, but it has 
encountered serious difficulties in the matter. There 
is not anywhere in the vicinity of Colon a suitable 
and sufficient surface water supply available, but it 
is hoped that a subsurface supply may be secured 
from the deep strata of sands and gravels transversed 
by the canal line to the south of the city. 



COLON AN UNSANITARY TOWN. l**";* 

In the matter of sewerage Colon has been even 
more deficient, and the low site npon which the city 
is built renders the problem of establishing a system 
a difficult one. The Commission has decided that 
the lowest portions of the town must be elevated 
and the material excavated from the inner harbor 
will be used as filling for this purpose. In other 
places it is designed to cut channels, through which 
the tidal water may ebb and flow. The work upon 
these much-needed improvements is in active prog- 
ress and will be completed before long. Wlien 
these sanitary measures are in effect Colon should 
be a not unhealthy place. The splendid work that 
has been done by the medical corps under Colonel 
Gorgas, the redeemer of Havana, will be described 
in another place. 

A COMPAEATIVELY HEALTHY TOWN. 

Despite its known disadvantages and extremely 
forbidding aspect Colon has a record in the matters 
of health and mortality that compares favorably with 
that of Panama and belies the apparent conditions. 
Yellow fever has rarely appeared at Colon and ma- 
laria is seldom contracted there. Perhaps the city 
owes its comparative healthfulness to its situation on 
an island and the fact that a considerable portion of 
its surface is washed by sea water in which, it is said, 
mosquitos will not breed. 



108 PAl^AMA. 

/ 

F**'Tiine was when the^ word Panama suggested un- 
tQld*^ealth and v9lj^)tuoiis luxury. That was in 
the halycon days when the old city, designated the 
Key to the Pacific and the Gate of the Universe,, 
was the receiving point for the gold of Darien, the 
gearjSIof- the Gul£ i^laaids,^ .and the silver from the 
mines of South America. Fabulous treasure was 
qf^.._jtored in " Panama, the Golden," awaiting 
a favorable opportunity for carriage by the king's.^ 
horses over that splendid engineering achievement,.^ 
the paved way that crossed the Isthmus to Port^ 
Bellcv/" --..,»...- 

THH DEPAKTEI> GLORY OF PANAMA VIEJO. 

Panama Viejo was a beautiful city. On either 
side stretched a picturesque tree-lined coast. In the 
background the mountains reared their rugged heads 
and between them and the city rolled a noble savanna 
laid out in fertile fields and lovely drives. The city 
contained twelve thousand or more buildings. Many 
of the grand mansions were built of stone and others 
of aromatic cedar. There were palatial public build- 
ings; a handsome stable for the king's horses, and a 
castellated depository for the king's treasure. The 
churches were gorgeous and their plate and fittings 
world-famous. There were no fewer than eight 
monasteries and a magnificent hospital. The viceroy 
maintained a regal splendor; his suite and the many 



WEALTH ATTRACTS BUCCANEBRS. l^H 

other wealthy inhabitants lived in the greatest lux- 
ury. The natives were their slaves. Money poured 
into their coffers without any exertion on their 
part. They merely took their ease and collected 
toll of the minerals going to the east and of the 
merchandise passing through Panama on its way to 
Asia and the Pacific islands. 

pai^ama's wealth attracts the buccaneees. 

There was no wall around Old Panama; no need 
appeared to exist for any. Spain was supreme upon 
Tierra Firma, and no enemy was to be looked for 
from the Pacific side. The situation seemed secure 
and the Spaniards are to be excused for not antici- 
pating the audacious enterprise of the buccaneers. 

The wealth and prosperity of Panama was at once 
the wonder and the envy of the world. It excited the 
cupidity of the adventurous privateers whose base 
was the West Indies, and the boldest among them, 
Henry Morgan, planned an expedition against the 
golden city. 

A writer says of this extraordinary ruffian, that 
he was " brave and daring " (his sole redeeming qual- 
ities), "of a sordid and brutal character, selfish and 
cunning, and without any spark of the reckless gen- 
erosity which sometimes graced the freebooter and 
contrasted with his crimes. He was a native of 
Wales, and the son of a respectable yeoman. Early 



.110 PANAMA. 

inclination led him to the sea; and embarking for 
Barbadoes, by a fate common to all unprotected ad- 
venturers, he was sold for a term of years. After 
effecting his escape, or emancipation, Morgan joined 
the buccaneers, and in a short time saved a little 
money, with which, in concert with a few comrades, 
he equipped a bark, of which he was chosen com- 
mander." 

morgan's expedition to the isthmus. 

Having assembled nine ships and boats, with four 
hundred and sixty men of all nations, Morgan set 
out to take Porto Bello as a preliminary step to the 
greater enterprise. Porto Bello was a fortified strong- 
hold, but it was captured after a fierce fight. A 
number of nuns and friars were seized before they 
could find refuge within the walls and they were 
compelled by the buccaneers to advance before them 
and place the scaling ladders. For fifteen days the 
freebooters gave themselves up to the demoniac li- 
cense that always marked their success on such oc- 
casions. At the end of that time, having thoroughly 
pillaged and sacked the city, Morgan withdrew in his 
ships, after sending a message to the Governor of 
Panama, assuring him that he might expect a visit 
from the buccaneer chieftain at no distant date. 

Toward the close of 1670, Henry Morgan had com- 
pleted his preparations for another expedition to the 



MORGAN'S EXPEDITION, 111 

Spanish Main, with Panama as the ultimate ob- 
jective. The force under the command of the pirate 
on this occasion consisted of thirty-seven vessels, well 
armed and provisioned, and two thousand desperate 
cutthroats eager for plunder and ready to dare any 
danger. They set out witli a grim determination that 
no power on earth should stay tlieir advance on 
Panama. 

Port Bello was recaptured and the castle of 
Chagres at the mouth of that river was reduced 
with much slaughter, less than ten per cent of the 
garrison of more than three hundred being left alive. 
In starting across the Isthmus, Morgan made the 
great mistake of failing to take more than one day's 
provisions. He expected to be able to forage upon 
the country, but in this he was deceived, and the 
party was reduced to the utmost straits in the weary 
nine days' journey. " Throughout the whole track 
to Panama the Spaniards had taken care not to leave 
the smallest quantity of provisions, and any other 
soldiers than the buccaneers must have perished long- 
before even the distant view of the city was obtained, 
but their powers of endurance, from their hardy 
modes of life, were become almost superhuman. At 
nightfall, when they reached their halting place, 
happy was he who had reserved since morn any small 
piece of leather whereof to make his supper, drink- 
ing after it a good draught of water for his gi-eatest 
comfort," 



112 PANAMA. 

At length they stood upon the summit of the Pa- 
cific slope and shouted with joy at the sight that met 
their eyes. In the distance was the South Sea, and 
on its placid waters ships sailing in and out of the 
port of Panama, whose city was still hidden hy in- 
tervening elevations. In a valley below the emi- 
nence upon which they stood, herds of cattle peace- 
fully grazed. The pirates rushed among the animals 
and, slaughtering them, devoured their flesh raw. 
After this savage feast they pushed on and soon the 
plain of Panama lay before them with the city on 
the farther side. 

THE PIRATES ATTACK THE CITY OF PAJSTAMA. 

The strange battle commenced in the early morn- 
ing of the following day. The Governor of Panama, 
who commanded in person, had drawn up, on the 
savanna, a force composed of two hundred cavalry, 
four regiments of infantry and a number of Indian 
auxiliaries. The buccaneers were posted in a well- 
selected position on an eminence protected in front 
by a swamp, into which the cavalry floundered at 
the outset of the engagement. In the force of the 
freebooters were two hundred picked marksmen who 
did excellent service. At the end of two hours the 
horsemen broke and fled, followed by the infantry, 
who threw away their muskets in the panic. The 
city was yet to be taken, and, after a brief rest, the 



THE SACK OF PANAMA. 113 

buccaneers advanced to the assault in the face of 
big guns, that were posted at the main approaches. 
The fighting was desperate on both sides, and the 
slaughter terrible. Six hundred Spaniards are said 
to have fallen during the day, and the loss of the 
buccaneers could not have been less. After a savage 
struggle of three hours, maintained in the streets, 
the pirates gained completed control of the city. 

THE CITY IS SACKED AND PUT TO THE TOK.OH. 

The horrors of the sack may be left to the imagina- 
tion of the reader. The beautiful city was put to 
tlie torch and most of its finest buildings were gutted 
by the flames, whilst those of wood were entirely de- 
stroyed. The plunder secured by the pirates was 
much less than they had anticipated. Many of the 
inhabitants had concealed their valuables and the 
priests had deposited the church plate and jewels in 
places of safety. Several vessels had put to sea 
laden with property and a galleon had escaped with 
the king's treasure. 

Today one must look for the ruins of Panama 
Viejo amidst a rank growth of tropical vegetation, 
above which rears the sturdy tower of St. Augustin, 
^'VPt'whose altar Pizarro made votive supplication be- 
fore setting: out upon his iiiomentous voyage to the 
QjyLthT^j^he sudden and tragic fall of the old city, 
in the pride of its beauty and strength, had a de- 
8 



::^»m. 



114 PANAMA. 

pressing effect upon the Spaniards and left them with 
no heart to resurrect it. Thej transferred the capital 
to a site about six miles to the west, but the glory 
of " Panama the Golden " was never revived in its 
adumbrant successor. 

NEW PANAMA BUILT WITH EEGARD TO DEFENSE. 

In building the new Pacific port the Spaniards 
were not unmindful of the lesson taught by the buc- 
caneer raid. The city was laid out upon a rocky penin- 
sula, the whole of which is occupied by it. A wall, 
thirty to forty feet in height and of solid masonry, 
in places sixty feet broad, skirted the entire shore. 
Along the bay-front the outer wall was reinforced by 
another, and the intervening space formed a moat. 
This wall and its accessories cost more than eleven 
millions of dollars, despite the fact that the natives 
were forced to render almost gratuitous service in ita 
construction. Much of the wall still remains in a 
good condition of preservation. It is used as a 
promenade by the citizens and as a playground by 
their children. The moat has long been dry and 
some of the poorer dwellings have been raised within 
it. There is a story of a king of Spain who was 
noticed one day to be looking out toward the west 
from a high window of his palace. A minister, who 
remarked the strained expression of the monarch's 
eyes, ventured to enquire what might be the object 



BUILDINGS CONVERTIBLE INTO FORTS. Ijr, 

of his anxiety. " I am looking," said the king, 
" for those costly walls of Panama. They ought to 
be discernible even at this distance." 

THE HOUSES AND CHURCHES CONVERTIBLE INTO 
FORTS. 

All the old buildings of Panama were designed for 
use as forts in case of need. The houses have walls 
of stone, three feet thick, with heavy doors, often 
iron-clad, and windows only in the second story. 
Similar precautions were observed in the construc- 
tion of the churches. Their sides were made to re- 
sist the heaviest artillery of the day, and their win- 
dows stand sixteen or twenty feet above the ground. 
These defensive measures were justified by after 
events, for, although Panama the later never fell 
into the hands of an enemy during the Spanish do- 
minion, its strength alone saved it from attack on 
more than one occasion. Shortly after its founda- 
tion an unsuccessful attempt to take it was made by 
a force of buccaneers. That extraordinary man, 
Captain Dampier, took part in this enterprise. 

The substantial houses of Panama are much like 
those of the old Spanish colonies in other parts of 
the world — solid, heavy, forbidding structures, the 
upper story of which alone is occupied by the ovioi- 
ers. In Panama, as in San Juan and Manila, the 
best families are to be found living over a herd of 



116 PANAMA. 

natives, or negroes, unless tlie ground floor is given 
up to a store, or workshop. The lower portions of 
the houses seldom have any windows in front, and 
if any exist, they are strongly barred. A verandah, 
overhanging the sidewalk, is the evening resort of 
the occupants of the upper half of the dwelling. 

The streets, paved with cobble-stones, are tortuous 
and often very narrow. There is too much conges- 
tion for health, or convenience, and the proposed im- 
provements in this direction will be a boon to the in- 
habitants. It is gratifying that, unlike the people 
of other Spanish-American cities which have been 
treated to a clean-up by us, the Panamans are im- 
mediately appreciative of our efforts in their behalf. 

THE INTERESTING OHURCHES OF MODECBN PANAMA. 

The churches and ecclesiastical ruins of Panama 
present a rich field for the research of the antiquarian 
and the architect, and a capable writer might find 
material for a highly interesting volume in them. 
" The oldest church is that of San Felipe Neri, in 
the long past the parish church of the city within 
the walls. Its side is on a narrow street, and over 
the sole entrance one reads, ' San Felipe Neri, 1688,' 
cut in a shield." The early Spaniards were famous 
for making cements, both colored and uncolored. So 
hard were they that they have stood the effects of 
the heat and moisture of that destructive climate 



CHURCHES OF MODERN PANAMA. ii>j 

without damage. This old-time cement today is as 
hard as stone. Over the entrance to public build- 
ings and churches they made their inscriptions in 
these cements, in many instances filling in odd spaces 
with ornamental work made of the large pearl shells 
from the famous Islas de Perlus, or Pearl Islands, in 
the Gulf of Panama. Such designs when new must 
have been chaste and beautiful, as the smooth, mother- 
of-pearl surfaces of the large shells on a background 
of reddish cement must have made a beautiful con- 
trast, the shells reflecting the sun rays in a thousand 
directions. " This quaint and most substantial old 
edifice faces on a small street. At one time it made 
the comer of the Plaza San Francisco. The large 
door is reached by a few stone steps on either side 
of which are plain columns, while there are a few 
lancet shaped windows above. Its front is very- 
plain. The whole is surmounted by a quaint old 
tower of the true Moorish type. It is built wholly 
of stone with a rounded cupola of the same material. 
Lashed to cross-pieces are the old-time bells. The 
door is a huge affair of most substantial make, 
studded with huge brazen heads or knobs. When 
closed from within, persons in the church could stand 
a siege very successfully. The side windows of the 
church are fully twenty-five feet above the street, 
and they were purposely so made in ease of attack. 
The walls of San Felipe l^eri are nearly five feet 
thick, and the windows are so deeply recessed as to 



lig PANAMA. 

remind one of an ancient fortress or prison." A 
larger, and not less interesting chnrch is that of San 
Francisco, facing upon the square of the same name. 
It was built early in the eighteenth century. The 
interior is very imposing with its gracefully arched 
roof and fine supporting columns, dividing the en- 
tire length of the edifice. The altar is an exceed- 
ingly large and beautiful structure of carved hard- 
wood. 

THE FAMOUS FLAT ARCH OF ST. DOMIlSriC. 

A strange story attaches to the ruins of St. Domi- 
nic. When intact, it must have been an extremely 
handsome edifice, but its noble towers and grand 
facade are things of the past, and the massive re- 
mains of the old church are now overrun by vege- 
tation. The most striking portion of the building 
has survived the attacks of fire and the shocks of 
earthquake. It is one of the most peculiar arches 
in the world. It stands complete near what was 
the main entrance. It is a single span of about 
sixty feet, its chord so flattened as to be almost hori- 
zontal. Architects are puzzled to account for this 
arch standing without further support than the ter- 
minal columns. Legend has it that this curious 
structure was erected three times and each time fell. 
A fourth time it was set up and the monk who de- 
signed it stood beneath the arch and declared that 



CATHEDR.iL OF PANAMA. 119 

if it should not fall upon his head the work was 
good and would endure. 

The churches of La Merced, San Juan de Dios, 
St. Ana, and the Cathedral, deserve description if 
space pennitted. l^elson makes an interesting state- 
ment with regard to the origin of the last-named 
building : " The cathedral of Panama was built 
at the sole expense of one of the bishops of Panama, 
and was completed about 128 years ago. The 
bishop's father was a Panamanian by birth — a col- 
ored man. He made charcoal near La Boca de la 
Rio Grande, or the mouth of the Grand River, a 
stream entering the Bay of Panama some two miles 
from the Panama City of today. This colored man 
made his charcoal and brought it on his back from 
house to house to sell — a custom that obtains to this 
day. He gave his son, the future bishop, as good 
an education as was possible. In due time he be- 
came a deacon, priest, and finally bishop of Panama 
— a bishop of proud Panama, for in those days it 
was a wealthy city. He was the first colored bishop 
of Panama. This son of a charcoal burner devel- 
oped into a grand man, and in time crowned a life 
of usefulness by building the cathedral from his 
private means." Much of the stone used in its con- 
struction is from the highlands of the interior, and 
was brought many leagues on the backs of men. Af- 
ter long years the building was completed in 1760. 

The churches of Panama are both numerous and 



120 PANAMA. 

noisy, facts that are impressed upon the stranger by 
the almost incessant clanging of their bells. Panama 
has been the scene of three or four great fires, in 
which several ecclesiastical buildings were damaged 
or destroyed. 

THE DEAD ARE TEMPOEARY TENANTS OF THEIR 
GRAVES. 

Tihe city has several cemeteries, but the system 
of temporary tenancy forbids any calculation of 
the number of past occupants. When a graveyard 
becomes crowded the coffins are taken up, the 
bones shaken out in a heap, and the empty recep- 
tacles offered for sale, or hire. The same system 
of leasing space is in force in the boveda enclosures. 
A hoveda is a niche just large enough to accom- 
modate the coffin of an adult. The cemetery is 
formed of a quadrangle surrounded by three tiers 
of hovedas. These are rented for a term of eighteen 
months, and after a coffin is deposited in one, the 
opening is closed with a slab, or bricked up. Where 
the space has been permanently secured, a memorial 
tablet often seals the aperture. When the rent of 
one of these sepulchers is overdue its contents are 
thrown out in just as business-like a manner as that 
in which a harsh landlord might evict a delinquent 
tenant. Perhaps the foregoing statements ought to 
haTB been made in the past tense, for the Ganal Com- 



GRAFT IN SPANISH AMERICA. 121 

mission, in tlie exercise of its right of control in san- 
itary matters, will doubtless strictly prohibit all such 
practices. There has been an abatement of the evil 
in recent years as a result of the protests of for- 
eigners. This disgraceful custom of disturbing the 
dead was confined to the natives. In the Chinese 
cemetery and in that of the Jews, corpses have been 
permitted to rest in peace, and it goes without say- 
ing that such has been the case in the burial grounds 
controlled by the railroad and canal companies. 

IN SPANISH-AMERICA GRAFT EXTENDS TO THE GRAVE. 

One would naturally infer from the conditions, 
that the Panamans entertained no respect for the 
memory, or bones, of their deceased relatives, but 
such is not the case. The truth is that the system 
of renting graves is an exhibition of the " graft " that 
has for ages pervaded every rood of territory under 
Spanish rule. The right to conduct a cemetery, like 
the privilege of running a gambling establishment, 
was farmed out to the highest bidder, and the con- 
cesionero might regulate his business in almost any 
manner he pleased. The price of a permanent grave 
was placed so high that the poorer classes conld af- 
ford no more than a temporary lease, and when that 
had expired often found themselves unable to re- 
new it. The fact that they did not dispense with 
consecrated ground, as they might have been excused 



122 ; PANAMA. 

for doing under the circumstances, is sufficient evi- 
dence of their regard for the welfare of their dead. 
The stranger in Panama is struck by the large 
number of saloons and low groggeries. They are 
on every hand and remind one of Port Said in the 
seventies. These places are well patronized by the 
mixed lower class of the city who account for fully 
two-thirds of its population of eighteen thousand. 
There are dissipated Indians, vicious negroes, half- 
castes of various combinations, an occasional China- 
man, and even a few European loafers. Alcohol 
is poison in this climate and the alcohol they drink 
would be poison anywhere. The liquor traffic was 
encouraged by the Colombian Government, which had 
a monopoly of the wholesale business. Gambling 
also enjoyed the friendly countenance of the clique 
of politicians at Bogota, who received tribute from 
it. There is every reason to believe that Panama, 
under American guidance, will redeem its reputation 
in this and other undesirable respects. The Com- 
mission has instituted a high license within the Zone 
with markedly good effects. 

AMBKICAN ATJTHOEITY IN THE PANAMAN REPUBLIC. 

The recently effected treaty with the Republic of 
Panama gave to the United States jurisdiction in 
the matter of sanitation and order, beyond the limits 
of the Canal Zone, into the cities of Colon and Pan- 



PANAMA ENJOYS GOOD WATER. ll>;] 

ama and over the adjacent waters. The Commis- 
sion has in mind to make Panama a clean and, at 
least, moderately healthy city, and there is no doubt 
whatever about the ultimate accomplishment of its 
purjDose. The task is a stupendous one, and the diffi- 
culties involved by it are fully appreciated, but it has 
already been attacked and plans are laid for a 
thorough transformation of the capital, Panama has 
existed without a water supply, or u sewerage system, 
for more than three centuries, and a magazine writer 
recently remarked that it would not ceem to matter 
greatly if it were left in the same conditiun for anoth- 
er decade or so. That, however, is not the way in 
which the Commission views the matter. These de- 
fects will be immediately remedied and, indeed, a 
great deal toward their removal has already been 
accomplished, 

PANAMA ENJOYS THE BOON OF GOOD WATEKw 

By the enlargement of a dam, which the Panama 
Canal Company had constructed at the headwaters ol 
the Rio Grande, an extensive reservoir has been 
formed. The water will be piped from this to another 
reservoir, on the summit of a small hill at Ancon, hav- 
ing a capacity of one million gallons. Thence it will 
flow by gravity to the city. The system is designed to 
furnish sixty gallons a day per head to a population 
of thirty thousand. At points on the streets, or other 



124 PANAMA. 

public places, where portions of the population may 
not have sufficient means to make house connections, 
hydrants have been placed, so that an unlimited sup- 
ply of good water may be obtained without cost or 
difficulty. Before deciding upon the source of the 
supply, the Commission submitted samples of the 
water from the upper, or Rio Grande, reservoir to 
expert bacteriologists and chemical analyzers. After 
thorough tests the water was pronounced satisfactory 
before even the banks and bed of the reservoir had 
been cleaned of vegetation. 

The city has a few surface drains, but as they have 
been laid for the most part without regard to grade 
they are in many instances worse than none. The 
water in these conduits is frequently stagnant, or 
almost so, and impregnated with decaying vegetable 
and animal matter, 

A system of sewerage is in course of installation 
which will care for sixty gallons per head of the 
population per day and, in addition, one inch of 
rainfall per hour. This does not provide for the 
disposal of the maximum precipitation in the rainy 
season, but any excess over the capacity of the sew- 
ers will be carried through surface channels. The 
sewerage system, with a total length of nearly eight- 
een miles, will serve eveiy portion of the city, and 
may be readily extended to the proposed addition, or 
to outlying districts. 



VI. 

PANAMA. 

THE PANAMA CANAL CKDMPANY. 

Columbia's Concession to the French Promoters — Conclusion 
of the International Conference — Ferdinand de Leeaepa 
Diplomatist and Promoter — Fronde's Characterization of 
the French Management — Ruinous Financing From the 
Outset — The Promoters Feathered Their Nests Comfortably 

— The Organization of the Panama Canal Company — Peck- 
less Estimates of the Cost of Construction — The Stock Is 
Oversubscribed by the Public — The Company Commences 
the Work of Construction — A Simple Undertaking Accord- 
ing to de Lesseps — The Company Seeks Authority to Issue 
Lottery Bonds — De Lesseps Weakens Under the Pressure 
of Difficulties — An American Officer Inspects the Operation 

— Signs of Collapse Begin to Be Evident — The French 
Public Refvises to Subscribe Further Funds — A Receiver 
Takes Over the Panama Canal Company. 

Whilst the American Interoceanic Canal Commis- 
sion "was investigating the comparative merits of the 
various isthmian routes, a project for a waterway 
through the Isthmus of Panama was set on foot 
in France. 

In 18Y5 the subject was discussed at length by 
the Congres des Sciences Geographiques at Paris, 
which strongly recommended the immediate prose- 

125 



126 PANAMA. 

cution of surveys with a view to decisive action. 
Following the session of the Congress a provisional 
company was formed by General Tiirr and other in- 
dividuals for the purpose of securing a concession 
from the Republic of Colombia. This syndicate was 
composed of speculators whose sole motives were of 
a commercial nature. They despatched to the Isth- 
mus Lieutenant L, N. B. Wyse, an officer of the 
French Navy and a brother-in-law of General Tiirr, 
with instructions to select a route and negotiate with 
the Colombian Government for a concession. In 
making his selection the Lieutenant was to be guided 
by a consideration for the prime object of the syndi- 
cate, which was to make as large a profit as possible 
from the sale of whatever interests it might acquire. 
Wyse and his employers were not actuated by any 
utilitarian sentiments, but merely by a desire to make 
money out of the scheme regardless of ultimate con- 
sequences. The spirit that moved them in the pro- 
motion was exhibited by their successors in the con- 
duct of the enterprise, the management of which was 
" characterized by a degree of extravagancq and 
corruption that have had few if any equals in the 
history of the world." 



Colombia's concession to the fkench pkomotees. 

Lieutenant Wyse made a perfunctory survey, com- 
mencing at Panama and extending only about two- 



COLOMBIA'S CONCESSION. 127 

thirds of the way to the Atlantic coast. Neverthe- 
less, he calculated the cost in detail and claimed that 
his estimate might be depended upon to come within 
ten per cent of the actual figures. The Colombian 
Government entered into a contract with the Lieu- 
tenant which in its final form was signed two years 
later. It gave to the promoters the exclusive privi- 
lege of constructing and operating a canal through 
the territory of the Republic without any restrictive 
conditions, excepting that if the route adopted trav- 
ersed any portion of the land embraced in the con- 
cession to the Panama Railroad the promoters should 
arrive at an amicable arrangement with that cor- 
poration before proceeding with their operations. 
On the part of the concessionaires it was agreed that 
the course of the canal should be determined by an 
international congress of engineers. 

The concession was transferred to La Compagnie 
Universelle du Canal Interoceanique de Panama, 
generally known as the " Panama Canal Company," 
and on the fifteenth day of May, 1879, the Interna- 
tional Conference met to determine the route. It was 
composed of one hundred and sixty-four members, 
of whom more than half were French and the re- 
mainder of various nationalities. Porty-two of the 
members only were engineers. The proceedings 
were pre-arransred and those who knew most about 
the snbiect in hand found that their opinions were 
lea'^t in demand. The following conclusion was put 



12S PANAMA. 

to the vote and carried by a small margin, the en- 
gineers who voted affirmatively being in a minority: 

CONCLUSION OF THE INTEKJSTATIONAX, CONFERENCE. 

" The conference deems that the construction of an 
interoceanic canal, so desirable in the interests of 
commerce and navigation, is possible and, in order 
to have the indispensable facilities and ease of access 
and of use which a work of this kind should offer 
above all others, it should be built from the Gulf of 
Limon (Colon) to the Bay of Panama ; and it particu- 
larly recommends the construction of a ship canal on 
a level in that direction." 

,It was at this meeting that Ferdinand de Lesseps 
made his first public appearance in connection ynth 
the enterprise. He took the chair and dominated 
the sessions of the Conference, and there is no doubt 
that his will was the most potent influence in bring- 
ing about its decision. Several members, who were 
radically opposed to the conclusions, rather than de- 
clare their difference from the opinions of a man of 
the great distinction and high .reputation that de 
Lesseps enjoyed at the time, absented themselves 
when the final vote was taken. 

FERDINAND DE LESSEPS, DIPLOMATIST AND PROMOTER. 

Ferdinand de Lesseps was born in France in 1805. 
At an early age he entered the consular service of 



FERDINAND DE LESSEP&. 129 

his coiintrj and on more tlian one occasion distin- 
guished himself in critical emergencies. In 1854, 
he visited Egypt and conceived the idea of the Suez 
Canal. For several years the opposition of the Brit- 
ish Government obstructed his efforts to carry out 
the great undertaking which was eventually brought 
to a successful conclusion by him. He also promot- 
ed the construction of the Corinth Canal. 

De Lesseps was at the height of his reputation, 
when he assumed the direction of the ill-fated Pan- 
ama venture. His great intellect may have been 
on the wane, but it is certain that his self-confidence 
and boundless belief in his own abilities were never 
greater than when he made the declaration, that " the 
Panama Canal will be more easily begun, finished 
and maintained than the Suez Canal." The dis- 
graceful failure that resulted must be attributed 
largely to de Lesseps himself. He publicly assumed 
the responsibility for the enterprise and its manage- 
ment from the outset. Although he was not an en- 
gineer and had but a very limited knowledge of the 
science of engineering, he considered himself better 
informed than men who had the advantage of tech- 
nical training and experience. He laid out the work, 
acting upon data which a professional engineer 
would have deemed insufficient or unreliable. With 
fatuous disregard for the opinions of experts, he al- 
tered plans and estimates to conform with his own 
unsupported ideas and, in, short, exercised an ar- 
9 



130 PANAMA. 

bitrary and unwise control over every feature of tlie 
undertaking. Almost to the last he cherished the 
belief that he enjoyed the unbounded confidence of 
the French people and that their purses would never 
be closed to his demands. Although his plans were 
fatally faulty and largely impracticable, there is no 
reason to doubt de Lesseps's good faith in the earlier 
stages of the enterprise. As it advanced and the 
errors of his basic calculations were forced upon him, 
he resorted to deception and, with the constantly in- 
creasing diflficulties of the situation, his words and 
actions took an ever increasing divergence from the 
direction of truth and honesty. 

!N^otwithstanding that the project was essentially 
a French one, and the money absorbed in it was sub- 
scribed in France, the interest in it was universal, 
and the collapse of the Company caused widespread 
excitement. !Not the least serious of the results was 
the discredit cast upon the whole question of inter- 
oceanic communication and especially upon the Pan- 
aman phase of it. Exaggerated pessimism succeeded 
to the optimistic hopes which attended the launching 
of the venture and even after this lapse of time 
doubts of its practicability are extensively enter- 
tained. Such doubts, however, can not find a logical 
basis in the fiasco produced by the Panama Canal 
Company. Its entire enterprise was built upon an un- 
stable foundation. The plans were conceived in er- 
ror and in ignorance of some of the most potent 



FRENCH MISMANAGEMENT. 131 

factors in the problem to be solved. Important cir- 
cumstances were overlooked or inadequately pro 
vided for. Available knowledge was neglected and 
past experience disregarded. One man's precon- 
ceived ideas were applied to the situation in substi- 
tution of a scientific study of the conditions. The 
original miscalculations were followed by a series 
of avoidable mistakes, the inevitable consequence 
of which was the final disaster. 

The mismanagement of the undertaking amply 
sufficed to insure its failure, but the catastrophe that 
ensued was rendered greater by the insane extrava- 
gance and the unbounded corruption which charao- 
terized the conduct of the Company. Froude, in his 
book on the West Indies, says: 

froude's chaeacteeization of the feench mis- 
management. 

" In all the world there is not, perhaps, now con- 
centrated in any single spot so much swindling and 
villainy, so much foul disease, such a hideous dung 
heap of moral and physical abomination, as in the 
scene of this far-famed undertaking of nineteenth 
century engineering. By the scheme, as it was first 
propounded,* six and twenty millions of English 



• The noted author meant to say, th« equivalent of " bIx and 
twenty millions, etc." Very little English money was inyetted 
in the scheme. 



132 PANMIA. 

money were to unite the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans, to form a highway for the commerce of the 
globe and enrich, with untold wealth, the happy own- 
ers of original shares. The thrifty Erench peasantry 
were tempted by the golden bait and poured their 
savings into M. de Lesseps's money box." 

Commenting upon the causes that contributed to 
the failure, a writer in the Forum, stated that " fol- 
lowing his acknowledged principles of being sole ar- 
biter of the companies which he founded, M- de 
Lesseps has directed every step without counsel, con- 
trol or, it may be added, knowledge of what was re- 
quired. His eyes has been bent steadily upon the 
Bourse. He has never put forward a single esti- 
mate that has not been falsified by the event. For 
the work of a responsible engineer he has substituted 
the action of what he called consultative commit- 
tees, superior councils, and the like, which have been, 
for the most part, little more than picnic parties at 
public cost, and with the recommendations of which 
he has dealt as he thought fit." 

RTJINOFS FINANCING FROM THE OUTSET. 

The first and a continuous drain upon the finan- 
cial resources of the Company was in the form of 
" founders' profits." At the initial meeting of 
the shareholders, when they all fondly imagined that 
the venture was a bonanza, they were informed that 



RUINOUS FINANCING. 13.T 

thej had to pay the following claims, and accepted 
the statement without a murmur : 

ESTABUSHMEINT EKPENSES OF THE PANAMA CANAL 
COMPAITT. 

Tor the Concession $2,000,000 

Preliminary Expenses. 2,160,000 

Profit on Preliminary Expenses 2,360,000 

American Financial Group....... 2,400,000 

Total , $8,920,000 

The greater part of this sum was taken by the 
founders out of the first $20,000,000 paid in. It is 
doubtful if any of the outside shareholders knew 
precisely, or even approximately, what these figures 
represented. They were too absorbed in visions of 
vast prospective profits to concern themselves over- 
much with present expenditures. 

In addition to the immediate cash benefits the 
founders were to receive fifteen per cent of the net 
profits of the Company. These prospective pay- 
ments were capitalized under the name of 'pwrts de 
fonduieur in " parts " of 5,000 francs each. There 
were originally five hundred and later nine hundred 
of these " parts," which attained a price of 80,000 
francs each. De Lesseps is authority for the state- 
ment that in l!Tovember, 1880, they sold at 380,000 
francs each. 



134 PANAMA. 

In 1883 the promoters netted $716,900 and the 
directors and staff, $186,900, out of the " profits " 
of the undertaking. The directors were allowed a 
further three per cent of the profits, which contingent 
benefit they commuted into a present payment of 
$48,000. 

RECKLESS E(XTKA.VAGANCB OK THE ISTHMUS. 

Dr. Nelson, who was upon the ground whilst the 
Panama Company's operations were In progress, 
makes the following statement : " The famous 
Bureau System is what has obtained in the Isthmus 
up to the present time, with changes and amplifica- 
tions without number. There is enough bureau- 
cratic work, and there are enough officers on the 
Isthmus to furnish at least one dozen first-class re- 
publics with officials for all their departments. The 
expenditure has been something simply colossal. 
One Director General lived in a mansion that cost 
over $100,000 ; his pay was $50,000 a year ; and 
every time he went out on the line he had his de- 
placement, which gave him the liberal sum of fifty 
dollars a day additional. He travelled in a hand- 
some Pullman car, especially constructed, which 
was reported to have cost some $42,000. Later, 
wishing a summer residence, a most expensive build- 
ing was put up near La Boca. The preparation of 
the grounds, the building, and the roads thereto, cost 



PANAMA CANAL COMPANY FORMED. 135 

upwards of $150,000. . . . Another man had 
built a large bath-house on the most approved prin- 
ciples. This cost $40,000. Thousands and tens oi 
thousands have been frittered awaj in ornamental 
grounds, for all had to be beau, utility being a sec- 
ondary consideration." 

THE OBGANIZATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL COMPANY. 

We will nov7 resume the history of the Panama 
Canal Company. It was capitalized at 400,000,000 
francs in shares of 500 francs each, which were 
opened to public subscription in Europe and Amer- 
ica in August, 1879. Less than one-tenth of the 
amount was taken up and the organization of 
the corporation was indefinitely postponed. In the 
criminal trial that followed the failure of the Com- 
pany, Charles de Lesseps stated that after the abor- 
tive effort to float the Company his father placed 
the financial arrangements connected with the dis- 
posal of the shares in the hands of an influential 
group of financiers and journalists, who undertook to 
mould public opinion to a favorable form. Here 
we find the explanation of three of the enormous 
items of preliminary expense which are given above. 
Early in 1880 M. de Lesseps arrived at Colon, ac- 
companied by an international technical commis" 
sion which was charged with the work of making 
the final surveys and marking the precise line to be 



136 PANAMA, 

followed by the Canal. This highly important task, 
like all the other preliminary steps of the undertak- 
ing, was performed in haste and the party left the 
Isthmus before the close of February, 

EECKLBSS ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF COOSrSTKUCTION, 

The Paris Congress had estimated the cost of con- 
structing the Canal at 1,070,000,000 francs and the 
time necessary for its completion at twelve years. 
The technical commission expressed the opinion that 
the entire operation might be finished in eight years 
at a cost of 843,000,000 francs. In view of the 
fact that several of the engineer-members of the con- 
gress considered the former estimate too low, it is 
difficult to understand how the commission arrived 
at its figures. The reduction was not, however, suf- 
ficiently great to satisfy the purpose of de Lesseps, 
which was to present to the public a proposition so 
attractive as to be irresistible. In order to promote 
this object, he took upon himself to alter the sum 
fixed by the commission to 658,000,000 francs, which 
he declared would be sufficient to provide for the en- 
tire expenses of the operation. The first year's 
traffic was estimated at 6,000,000 tons assuring a 
revenue of 90,000,000 francs and this was claimed to 
be a very conservative assumption, whereas, it was in 



* An approximate equivalent of this sum in dollars may 
be arrived at by calculating five francs to the dollar. 




FERDINAND DE LESSEES 
Promoter of the French Enterprise. 



STOCK OVERSUBSCRIBED. 137 

reality almost beyond tJie possibility of realization. 
The limit of fanciful prediction had not, however, 
been reached. In May, 1880, Mr. A. Couvreux, Jr., 
a member of a large contracting firm, publicly stated 
that his house was prepared to undertake the entire 
work at a cost of only 512,000,000! In the light 
of our present knowledge the absurdity of these state- 
ments is patent, but we must remember that at the 
time the whole proposition rested upon a basis of 
theory. The fact should have been an incentive to 
conservatism and, although there may not be suffi- 
cient ground at this stage of the enterprise to impugn 
the honesty of the promoters, the recklessness with 
which M. de Lesseps submitted his inexpert calcula- 
tions to the public was little short of criminal. 

THE STOCK IS OVUESUBSCEIBED BY THE PUBLIO. 

Having prepared his new financial prospectus on 
the alluring lines indicated M. de Lesseps made a 
tour of the United States, England, Belgium, Hol- 
land, and France, delivering speeches in which the 
enormous profits to accrue to the fortunate investors 
in the Panama Canal project were depicted in the 
seductive rhetoric that was always at his command. 
Following this campaign of words, 300,000,000 
francs in shares of 500 francs denomination were 
offered to the public and doubly subscribed for. 

It was agreed that the first two years should be 



138 PANAMA. 

a period of organization to be devoted largely to sur- 
veying and ascertaining from actual experience some- 
thing of the cost of excavation and other features of the 
operation. In other words, the public having invested 
its money upon the strength of certain wild guesses 
advanced with all the assurance of conviction it was 
now proposed to investigate the facts. Later devel- 
opments proved that even the surveys of the line were 
unreliable. Three years after the engineering force 
had been at work upon the ground it was discovered 
that what they supposed to be an almost fathomless 
swamp was composed of solid rock a few feet below 
the surface and this was only one of a number of 
similar misapprehensions which from time to time 
necessitated changes in the plans. 

The second period, of six years, was to be occupied 
with the actual work of construction under contract 

THE COMPANY COMMENCES THB WOKK OF CONSTBUC- 
TION. 

In February, 1883, the latter stage was entered 
upon with Mr. Dingier as engineer in chief. His 
plan for a sea level canal made the following pro- 
visions: The canal, which had its origin at Colon, 
in Limon Bay, was to follow the bottom of the 
Chagres Valley for a distance of about 45 kilometers, 
to Obispo; it was then to cross the Cordilleras, the 
passage accounting for about 11 further kilometers of 



FRENCH SEA-LEVEL PLAN. 139 

its length; continuing thence, the line traversed the 
Valley of the Rio Grande and terminated in deep 
water near the Island of Naos, in the Bay of Pan- 
ama, The full length of the proposed cut was 74 
kilometers. The depth of the canal was to be 9 
meters and its width at bottom 22 meters. 

For the regulation of the waters of the Chagres, 
which vary from 20 cubic meters at low water to 
2,000 cubic meters in flood, it was proposed to con- 
struct a large storage reservoir at Gamboa by 
damming the river and deflecting its affluents to the 
sea on either side of the Isthmus. 

The cube of the excavations provided for by this 
plan, was a minimum of 120,000,000 meters, being 
45,000,000 more than had been estimated by the 
commission and 75,000,000 more than the congress 
had indicated. 

This plan was accepted and, despite the enormous 
increase of work entailed by it, de Lesseps adhered 
for a year longer to his original estimate of cost 
and time of construction. It was not until a meet- 
ing of the shareholders in 1885, that he increased 
the former to $120,000,000, and extended the latter 
to July, 1889. 

A SIMPLE UNDEKTAKIN^O ACCOBDINa TO DB LESSBPS. 

At the inception of the enterprise M. de Les30«i. 
established a Bulletin which became the medium for 



l4U PANAMA. 

the dessemination among the shareholders and the 
general public of the most exaggerated reports and 
the most reckless misstatements. In March, 1881, 
de Lfisseps stated in this publication : " But two 
things need be done: to remove a mass of earth and 
stones, and to control the river Chagres. . . . 
The canal is, therefore, an exact mathematical op- 
eration." This statement alone betrays the promot- 
er's ignorance of the great engineering problems in- 
separably connected with the undertaking; for the 
control of the Chagres involves the most intricate and 
difficult calculations and engineering works imag- 
inable. 

By the middle of 1885, hardly one-tenth of the 
estimated minimum excavation had been done, and it 
became evident, even to the non-professional observer 
that the program could not be carried out in accord- 
ance with the assurances repeatedly given by de 
Lesseps. The enterprise began to be severely criti- 
cised and passionately discussed in the press of 
France. The credit of the Company was seriously 
affected by these assaults and it became necessary to 
adopt drastic measures for the restoration of public 
confidence in order to secure the additional funds 
that were already needed. At this critical jmicture, 
the promoter, for M. de Lesseps had long since taken 
the whole affair into his own hands, sought the aid 
of the Government, which had been extended to him 
during the Suez Canal operation. He applied for 



SUEZ AND PANAMA CANALS. IH 

permission to issue lottery bonds, but the desired au- 
thority was not granted at that time. 

By this time it was widely recognized that, de 
Lesseps's declaration to tlie contrary notwithstand- 
ing, the Panama project involved immeasurably 
greater difficulties than those encountered in the Suez 
undertaking. In fact, the two operations were so 
dissimilar in every essential respect that the latter 
afforded no criteria by which to judge the former. 
At Siuez, the entire line lay along low ground and 
most of the way traversed lakes, marshes, and 
swamps. One of the chief difficulties rose from the 
softness and instability of the material to be dealt 
with. In Panama the main problems are the passage 
of a chain of mountains and the disposition of a 
number of streams. At Suez, the tides are the same 
at each end of the Canal ; at Panama there is a dif- 
ference of twenty feet between the Atlantic and Pa- 
cific extreme oscillations. In the earlier enterprise 
neither climate nor labor entailed unfavorable con- 
ditions, whereas in all the operations upon the Amer- 
ican Isthmus they have been among the most 
vexatious factors entering into the situation. The con- 
structors of the Suez Canal had the support of the 
French Government and of the Khedive of Egypt, 
and the encouragement of the whole world. In his 
later venture de Lesseps start.ed with well-founded 
opposition against his plans and which steadily in- 
creased as the attempted execution of them betrayed 



142 PANAMA. 

their futility. The comparison admits of extension 
were that necessary. 

In his letter of August the first, 1885, to the Min- 
ister of the Interior, praying for authority to raise 
a loan of 600,000,000 francs on lottery bonds, Ferdi- 
nand de Lesseps stated: 

" The organization of the working camps, the 
installation along the whole line of twenty-seven con- 
tractors piercing the isthmus at their own risk and 
peril, an immense stock on working footing, is such 
as to allow the canal to be completed and inaugu- 
rated in 1888." 

THE SEA-IaBVEL PEOJECT INVESTIGATED BY THEiEE 
PEOMINENT BNGINEEOKS. 

The Chamber of Deputies recommended that the 
desired permission should be granted to the Com- 
pany without delay, but the Government decided be- 
fore complying to send a competent engineer to the 
Isthmus with instructions to investigate and report 
upon the situation. At the time that this official 
was conducting his examination, two other engineers 
were similarly engaged. Each proceeded independ- 
ently of the others, but all arrived at one conclu- 
sion, which is the more remarkable since two of them 
were in the employ of the Company. In the fore- 
part of 1886 the reports were submitted to the re- 
spective principals. 



SEA LEVEL PROJECT CONDEMNED. 143 

Armand Rousseau, the Government commissioner, 
found that the completion of the Canal with the re- 
sources available and in prospect was practically im- 
possible unless the plan was changed to one involving 
the use of locks. 

M, Jacquet declared that after a thorough investi- 
gation of the work in all its details he was convinced 
of the necessity of abandoning the original design and 
he recommended the construction of a lock canal 
along the precise line adopted for the sea level proj- 
ect. Leon Boyer, who held the position of Director 
of Works upon the Isthmus, stated tliat the completion 
of a canal on a level was impossible with the money 
at command and in the time stipulated. He sug- 
gested a temporary waterway, to be operated by locks 
and to be replaced by a sea level canal as soon as 
possible. 

This weight of expert opinion, which it must be 
remembered was in corroboration of similar expres- 
sions voiced by eminent engineers on previous occa- 
sions, de Lesseps discarded in his usual high-handed 
manner. He would not listen to a word against the 
sea level project, but declared in the most emphatic 
terms his intention to pursue it to the end. He 
had " promised the world a canal at the level of the 
oceans," and he proposed to keep his word despite 
all opposition. At this stage of the proceedings the 
" Great Undertaker," as he began to be dubbed, as- 
sumed the role of the persecuted philanthropist. 



144 PANAMA. 

The shareholders of the Company were frequently 
informed henceforth that all kinds of powerful in- 
terests were in league against their enterprise, 
but at the same time they were assured that 
he, de Lesseps, might be depended upon to cir- 
cumvent the machinations of these wicked plotters. 

Lest the reader should fall into misapprehension 
as to the true significance of the recommendations 
of the engineers which have been cited, it may be 
well to remind him that the undertaking of the Pan- 
ama Canal Company was a purely commercial en- 
terprise, and that the reports and suggestions of the 
experts in question were made with that fact con- 
stantly in mind. None of them expresses the opin- 
ion that a sea level canal is impracticable, nor is the 
question taken into consideration by either of them 
directly. The point of their de^jision was whether a 
sea level canal could be constructed at a cost and in 
such time as to make its after operation a profitable 
business for the shareholders. Time, of course, is 
a great factor in the cost of an operation involving 
hundreds of millions. Interest increases at an enor- 
mous rate during the later years. Therefore, con- 
siderations which would preclude the pursuit of a 
project solely contemplating commercial results 
might not be of sufiicient weight to deter a govern- 
ment from following the same lines. The United 
States, observing business principles to the utmost 
reasonable extent, might justifiably construct a sea 



INCREASING DIFFICULTIES. 145 

level canal at an expense that would entail the ruin 
of a private corporation. Even though the opera- 
tion of the canal should fail to return any interest 
upon the money invested the Government might well 
consider itself fully compensated for the outlay by 
the political advantages secured, the great savings in 
the movements of warships, and other desiderata 
which will be noticed in detail in later chapters. 

FURTHEE EFFORTS TO RE&TOREi THE WANING CONFI- 
DENCE OF THE PUBLIC. 

Whilst the engineer reports to which reference 
has been made above were in course of preparation, 
de Lesseps visited the Isthmus with a large party of 
individuals, many of whom were influential in the 
commercial and financial circles of France. Few of 
them had any technical knowledge, but the majority 
seem to have been susceptible to the persuasive elo- 
quence of the great promoter, for upon their return 
the enterprise received the endorsements of various 
chambers of commerce and general boards. In July, 
1886, the Government declared its intention of post- 
poning for several months the decision in the matter 
of the lottery bonds. De Lesseps took umbrage at 
this action and, relying upon the effect of the moral 
support of the powerful commercial bodies, with- 
drew his request. He received from the stockhold- 
ers permission to issue a new series of bonds, and 
10 



146 PANAMA. 

did so with success, but the enterprise had passed be- 
yond the stage of possible salvation. 

AN AMEKICAlir OFFICER INSPECTS THE OPEEATION. 

In March, 1887, Lieutenant C. C. Rogers, U. S. 
N., was ordered by the I^avy Department to inspect 
the canal work. He took three weeks to the task, 
and went thoroughly over the line. He found the 
hospitals and quarters for officers and laborers clean, 
well-ventilated frame buildings, admirably suited to 
the climate. The canteens were kept by Chinamen, 
who boarded laborers at reasonable rates. There 
were upwards of 10,000 workmen, employed by con- 
tractors, who, with the number of the Company's 
employees, made up a total of 11,566. The labor- 
ers were chiefly importations from the West Indies, 
with a few negroes from the Southern States of 
America. The standard wage was $1.50 in silver 
a day. The laborers were paid every Saturday. 
Sunday was spent in drinking; Monday in recupera- 
tion; and on Tuesday they returned to work; 
" hence," says the lieutenant, " the number of work- 
ing days in a month seldom exceed twenty or twenty- 
two." The Company endeavored to put 20,000 la- 
borers upon the ground and, as they could not be had 
from the West Indies, tried to get them from West- 
em Africa and Southern China, but without success. 

The hospital records of the Company showed a death 



SIGNS OF COLLAPSE. 147 

rate of seven per cent of those employed on the work 
from its inception to July, 1887, but this did not 
include the great number who contracted disease on 
the Isthmus and died elsewhere. 

SIGNS OF COLLAPSE BEGIN" TO BE EVIDENT. 

By this time the work had become seriously dis- 
organized. There had been changes of contractors. 
Sbme had thrown up their contracts, others had 
brought suits against the Company. There had 
been frequent alterations in the working plans and 
there was a general feeling of uncertainty as to the 
character of the future operations. 

In the meanwhile de Lesseps had found his atti- 
tude on the sea level question untenable and, after a 
considerable amount of beating about the bush, he 
consented to what he called " a provisional lock 
canal." 

The new plans were hurriedly prepared and adopt- 
ed. The estimates of the expenditure of money and 
time that would be necessary to carry them out 
were made low enough to create some hope that the 
public would advance further financial assistance to 
the scheme. The new route was to follow the exist- 
ing line of the Company's work. The surface of 
the canal at its summit was to be forty-nine meters 
above the level of the oceans. For the sake of econ- 
omy the depth of the cut was so far reduced that 



148 PANAMA. 

had tihe work been carried to a conclusion it must 
have prohibited the passage of a large proportion of 
ocean-going vessels. The summit was to be reached 
by the use of hydraulic elevating machinery. 

THE FRENCH PUBLIC EE.FUSBS TO SUBSCRIBE FURTHER 
FUNDS. 

The next step was to procure the necessary funds. 
Application was again made to the Government for 
authority to issue lottery bonds and the Company was 
granted permission to raise 800,000,000 francs in 
this manner. The bonds of 400 francs denomina- 
tion were offered at 360 francs each. They were to 
bear four per cent interest and to be redeemed by a 
civil amortization association and to share in semi- 
monthly drawings. The proposition, backed by bet- 
ter security, would have been an extremely attractive 
one but, to so low an ebb had the Company's credit 
fallen that only 800,000 bonds were subscribed for. 
A second attempt to float the bonds, with extra in- 
ducements to subscribers, only proved the futility of 
the effort. 

The Company had already issued shares and obli- 
gations approximating the immense sum of $350,- 
000,000 for an undertaking which it had promised 
to complete at a cost of $120,000,000. It now 
asked for an additional amount of upwards of $13;],- 
000,000 for the purpose of constructing a " tern- 



FRENCH PUBLIC REFUSES TO SUBSCRIBE. 149 

poraiy " waterway with a very limited capacity. Of 
the vast sums which the Company had expended, 
$105,000,000 went for interest, administration ex- 
penses, bankers' commissions, etc., and less than 
half was made available for the actual work. The 
annual interest charge was running in excess of $16,- 
000,000 and at this time the Company had in hand 
barely sufficient cash to cover one month's current 
expenses. 

Before the close of 1887 a general belief pre- 
vailed in England and America, and, perhaps, every- 
where but in France, that de Lesseps would never 
complete the Panama Canal. The failure to place 
the lottery bonds in the following year showed 
plainly that at length the French public had lost all 
confidence in the scheme and its chief promoter, 
whose statements and estimates had been so greatly, 
and so often, changed. Bankers could not be in- 
duced to handle the loan issues on any terms. The 
Government was not disposed to advance money to 
the Company and was itself so involved financially 
as to put the question of its finishing the canal be- 
yond consideration. It was universally doubted 
whether the Company could complete the waterway 
even though it received the money asked for and it 
was shown that, in the event that it did succeed, its 
fixed charges would be in the neighborhood of $30,- 
000,000, a sum far in excess of the maximum traffic 
returns of a sea level canal according to de Lesseps's 



150 PANAMA. 

largest estimate. So that upon his own showing the 
project under the most favorable circumstances 
would be a financial failure. 

A RBCEIVEB TAKES OVER THE PANAMA CANAL 
COMPANY. 

On the fourth day of February, 1889, the civil 
court of the Seine appointed Joseph Brunet judicial 
receiver of La Universelle CoTnpagnie du Canal In- 
tervceanique de Panama, 

We will give a brief statement of the receipts and 
expenditures of the Panama Canal Company from 
the date of its organization until the end of the 
year 1889.* 

RECEIPTS. 

Francs. 
Proceeds from tlie Capital Stock, 

various loans and bond issues. . . .11,271,682,637 
Other receipts from sundry sources. . 39,666,589 
Expenses incurred but not paid 18,343,851 



Total amount collected and due by 

the Company 1,329,693,078 



* A few comparatively small sums should strictly come with- 
in the account of 1890, but, for the present purpose, may with- 
out impropriety be included in the above statement. 

■j- Fractions have been discarded throughout. 



FINANCIAL STATEMENT. 151 



EXPENDITURES. 

{Outlay on the Isthmus.) 
Salaries and expenses of management. . 82,704,415 
Rents and maintenance of leased prop- 
erty 16,505,352 

Purchase of articles and material for 

consumption 29,239,602 

Purchase and transportation of machin- 
ery, etc 119,374,679 

Surveys and preparatory work 1,354,733 

Central workshops and management. . . 29,947,885 
Various constructions, buildings, and 

general installation 47,038,528 

Work of excavation and works of con- 
struction 447,171,124 

Purchase of lands 4,753,275 

Sanitarv and religious service 9,183,841 



Total expenditures on the Isthmus. .783,273,438 

(Outlay at Paris.) 

Paid for the Concession 10,000,000 

Paid to the Colombian Government. . . . 750,000 
Various expenses incurred before organ- 
ization 23,061,221 

Paid to American Financial Group. . . . 12,000,000 

Interest on various obligations 215,621,361 

Amortization transactions 22,528,085 



152 PANAMA. 

Expenses of floating bonds, loans, etc., 

commission, advertising, printing, etc. 83,084,203 
Paid to agents of the Colombian Gov- 
ernment 213,800 

Boards of management and direction. . 6,212,291 

Salaries of employees. 5,117,221 

Sundries 3,713,393 

Home Office and furniture 2,087,397 

Compensation to contractors on cancella- 
tion of contracts. . 1,200,000 



Total expenditures at Paris 390,701,648 

SUMMABY. 

Receipts from all 

sources 1,329,693,000 

Expenditures: — 

At Panama 783,273,438 

At Paris 390,701,648 

Paid for Railroad 

shares 93,268,186 

In connection with 

Lottery bonds 32,264,680 

Advance to the Co- 
lombian Gov't 2,455,075 

Various debtor accts. 11,455,801 

Cash and negotiable 

paper in hand. , . . 16,274,238 

Total equal to receipts 1,329,693,000 



VII. 

PANAMA. 

THE NEW PANAMA CANAL COMPANY, 

An Effort to Restore to Public Confidence — Steps Towards the 
Reorganization of the Company — Well-calculated Action by 
the New Company — Report of the Committee of Inter- 
national Engineers — The Plan of the New Panama Canal 
Company — General Abbot's Estimate of the Task at 
Culebra — French Estimates of Cost of Excavation — The 
Dam and Lock Constructions at Bohio — Alhajuela and 
Gamboa Dam Sites Compared — Crystalization of Amer- 
ican Interest — Appointment of the First Isthmian Canal 
Commission — The Report of the Commission Favors the 
Nicaragua Route — French Company Meets Our Bid ■ — The 
Senate Investigates the Question of Route — The Nicara- 
guan Route Compared With that of Panama — Nicaragua 
Route Presents Many Extraordinary Difficulties — Control 
of Lake Nicaragua a Serious Problem — The Conditions at 
Panama Are Thoroughly Understood. 

The task entrusted to the receiver of the Panama 
Canal Company was an extremely difficult one. If 
the affairs of the Company should be wound up it 
would be impossible to save the shareholders from 
total, or almost total, loss of their investments, for 
the property and work which was estimated as worth 
450,000,000 francs depended for its value upon a 
continuation of the operation. 

153 



154 PANAMA. 

The gravity of the situation, in which two hundred 
thousand persons, the majority of them in moderate 
circumstances, were involved, was fully appreciated 
by the Government and special legislation was effect- 
ed for the purpose of affording the Company tempo- 
rary relief from the pressure of its liabilities. 

Several circumstances militated against the en- 
deavors of the receiver to reorganize the enterprise. 
The most serious of these was the public scepticism 
which had followed the failure of de Lesseps to make 
even a respectable approach towards the achievement 
of his undertaking. The shareholders had learned 
at last that systematic deception had been practised 
upon them for years, and they felt that they had no 
reliable knowledge as to the state of affairs at the 
Isthmus. 

AN" EFFORT TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCBw 

The first step in the process of restoring public 
confidence was the investigation of the commission 
to which reference was made in the preceding chap- 
ter. In addition to tlie statement of the amount of 
work done and tlie value of the plant, the commis- 
sion gave an opinion that a lock canal might be com- 
pleted in eight years at a further cost of 500,000,- 
000 francs. 

Any hope that might have been derived from thia 
report was, however, dependent upon the success 



STEPS TOWARDS REORGANIZATION. 155 

of tJie receiver in negotiating new concessions with 
tJie Colombian Government, for tlie time limit, under 
the contract, for the completion of the canal, neared 
its termination. Lieutenant Wyse, who had secured 
the original grant, was sent to Bogota immediately 
following the submission of the commission's report. 
After pourparlers that extended over four months, a 
new agreement was signed December the tenth, 1890, 
providing for an extension of ten years. 

In the meanwhile Joseph Brunet had died and was 
succeeded by Achille Monchicourt. The new re- 
ceiver applied himself with remarkable energy and 
acumen to the organization of an active company. 
He had contrived to keep the work going upon the 
Isthmus, although the scale of operations was greatly 
reduced. During the years 1891-3, he settled, by 
a series of compromises, most of the lawsuits exist- 
ing with the old company and successfully resisted 
certain creditors and bondholders who would other- 
wise have ruined the interests of all concerned. 

STEPS TOWARDS THE RBORGANTZATTON OP THE 
COMPANY. 

In April, 1893, Colombia made a further conces- 
sion to the receiver, by granting an extension until 
October the thirty-first, 1894, for the organization 
of a new company and ten years from that date for 
the completion of a canal. A few months later *' a 



106 PANAMA. 

special law for the liquidation of the Interoceanic 
Canal Company " was passed and kad the effect of 
suspending the most obstructive actions before the 
courts. Earlj in the following year, death relieved 
Achille Monchicourt and hi8 place was filled by M. 
Gautron, There remained but a few months in 
which to effect the organization of the new company 
and, with the co-operation of the attorney for the 
bondholders, the receiver bent his energies to the 
task. They secured the co-operation of the managers 
of the old company, the contractors, and certain 
other interested persons, in the new enterprise, in the 
form of abatements of their claims, and subscriptions 
to the capital of the reorganization. The amount 
necessary to complete the full sum was to be asked 
of the old bondholders and shareholders. 

The by-laws of the ISTew Panama Canal Company 
were filed towards the close of June, 1894. The 
capital of the company consisted of 650,000 shares 
of 100 francs each, 600,000 of which were to be 
subscribed for, whilst 50,000, absolutely unencum- 
bered, were to be given to the Colombian Govern- 
ment in consideration of the contracts granting ex- 
tensions. Thus, five years after the appointment of 
a receiver for the Interoceanic Canal Company, what 
was generally known as the " New Panama Canal 
Company " was definitely established. 

The new company, like its predecessor, was a com- 
mercial concern, pure and simple. Although tlie 



WELL-CALCULATED ACTION. 157 

French Government, by the exercise of extraor- 
dinary legislation, had been largely instrumental 
in the creation of the company, neither govern- 
mental patronage nor responsibility were extended 
to it. 

The directors of the new company appointed a 
Comite Technique to thoroughly examine the whole 
problem of the canal. This was a wise determina- 
tion, for the surveys made under the direction of 
the old company had been of such a cursory character 
that little reliance could be placed upon them. 

WELL-CALCULATED ACTIOIST BY THE NEW COMPANY. 

The Comite Technique was composed of seven 
French engineers and an equal number of foreign 
experts, including several who had the special ad- 
vantage of experience in canal work. Whilst making 
careful surveys and maturing plans for the ulti- 
mate operations, the committee directed the continu- 
ance of excavations in places where they were certain 
to come within the specifications of any plan that 
might eventually be adopted. In addition to its 
original investigations the Comite Technique verified 
and rectified the surveys and measurements of the 
old company. In short the te<jhnical committee per- 
formed the most valuable scientific work that has 
yet been done in connection with the Isthmus and 
handed over to the Isthmian Canal Commission 



158 PANAMA. 

maps and documents which Admiral Walker de- 
clared to be worth at least a million dollars. 

EBPOET OF THE COMMITTEE OF INTEEJiTATIONAJL 

ENGINEE3S&. 

The final report of the Comite Technique was 
submitted at the close of the year 1898. It esti- 
mated the cost of a canal, which could be completed 
in ten years, and would be equal to all the demands 
of commerce, at one hundred million, dollars. Aside 
from the question of health the Comite recognized 
two principal difficulties to be overcome — the cut 
through the divide and the conti'ol of the Chagres. 
The former, whilst a stupendous task, is merely a 
matter of excavation and involves no serious engi- 
neering problem ; the latter, on the contrary, presents 
features sufficiently intricate and perplexing to tax 
to the utmost the available technical ingenuity of the 
world. The solution appears to be susceptible of 
achievement by several different methods and numer- 
ous plans have emanated from sources that command 
respectful attention. 

" The studies of the New Company were based 
on three fundamental principles: (1) To reject 
any plan that did not, independently of considera- 
tions of time and expense, offer every guarantee of 
a serviceable canal. (2) To reject any fanciful 
scheme depending on the application of new and un- 



THE CANAL ZONE. 



159 



AXLAVtTiC OCEAVy 

c, 




TIIE CANAL ZONE. 

This map shows the line which has been adopted, 
with slight variations, in all canal projects for this 
region. Both the sea-level and lock plans of the 
Consulting Board of Engineers also conform to this 
route. The profile chart shows the relative eleva- 
tions. 



160 PANAMA. 

tried devices not justified by experience; and (3) 
to give due weight to the peculiar tropical condi- 
tions under which the work must be executed. These 
must compel the employment of a class of laborers 
inferior to those available in better climates, and 
the work will be exhausting to those supervising the 
constructions, ^o technical details should there- 
fore be admitted involving operations of exceptional 
difficulty." * 

THE PLAN OP THE NEiW PAJSTAMA CANAL COMPANY. 

The plan provided for the impounding of the 
floods of the Chagres to about the quantity of 
250,000,000 cubic metres. For this purpose it 
was proposed to increase the area of Lake Bohio to 
twenty-four square miles.t As this would not, how- 
ever, accommodate the desired volume, it became nec' 
essary to provide for another reservoir. The old 
company had selected Gamboa as the site of a dam 
for this purpose, and it has been favored by a recent 
Isthmian Canal Commission, but the Comite decided 
that the location is " one of the most unfit that can 
be chosen," and found that the topography of Al- 



* Problems of the Panama Canal. Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Ab- 
bott, U. S. Army (retired). Late Member of the Comity 
Technique. New York, 1905. 

f It has been deemed advisable, where exactness is not es- 
sential, to reject fractions and give closely approximate figures. 



PLAN OF NEW COMPANY. 161 

liajiiela, about ten miles higher up the river, lends 
itself admirably to all the requirements of the case. 
A lake of about twelve miles may be formed there, 
which will hold up to 150,000,000 cubic metres of 
reserve waters. 

The report of the C&mite includes two plans con- 
templating two summit levels, of which the bottom 
of the canal was respectively sixty-eight and thirty- 
two feet above mean tide. The relative costs of 
construction were nearly the same, but the fact that 
a canal at the higher level could be completed in 
much less time decided the Comite to recommend 
that plan. 

General Abbott intimates that but for this consid- 
eration it is certain that the conclusion of the Comite 
would have been different. He declares that in the 
hands of the American Government, with expense a 
minor condition, " there can be no question that the 
low level variant should be preferred." Since the 
prospect at the time of writing (February, 1906) is 
that the canal will be completed at an eighty-five foot 
level, it is useless to <3onsider the details of the 
Comite s pro jet, to which the plan recommended 
by the first Isthmian Canal Commission closely con- 
formed. The line follows closely that adopted by 
the old company, which, with slight variations has 
been accepted by all subsequent technical surveys. 
Thus the excavations already made will be included 

in any future operation. More than half the dis- 
11 



162 PANAMA. 

tance follows straight lines, and in the remainder of 
the route the highly important feature of curvature 
leaves nothing to be desired. This is a detail of the 
utmost consequence as affecting safety of transit and 
speed of passage. " Experience on tlie Suez Canal 
has compelled, since the rout© was opened to traffic, 
a costly increase from the original minimum radius 
of 700 metres (2,300 feet) to 1,800 metres (5,905 
feet). On the Panama pro jet the ruling radius is 
3,000 meters (9,842 feet), falling occasionally to 
2,500 meters (8,202 feet), the minimum being 1,700 
meters (5,577 feet), and this latter only for about 
half a mile in approaching Obispo, where the width 
is sufficiently increased to justify the reduction.". 

GENERAL ABBOTT's ESTIMATE OF TASK AT CULEBKA. 

The old company's excavations in the Culebra cut 
were mainly in disintegrated material near the sur- 
face, and they occasioned serious trouble by caving 
and sliding, much of which might, in the opinion 
of engineers, have been prevented by proper drain- 
age. The Comite made a careful examination of 
this section and by means of extensive boring and 
tunneling at a low level established the fact that the 
dangerous material has already been passed and with 
ordinary precautions there need be no fear of a re- 
currence of the disasters to which we have referred. 
General Abbott remarks that tie " remaining exca- 



GENERAL ABBOTT'S ESTIMATE OF TASK. 163 

vation is greatly exaggerated in popular estimation, 
the fact being ignored that a large volume has already 
been taken out. Thus the height of the continental 
divide on this route is constantly stated at its original 
figures, v?hich on the line of the axis of the canal was 
really 345 feet above tide. The narrow bottom of 
the cut there has now attained a level but little over 
100 feet In fine, the old phantom of a sliding 
mountain and an impassable continental divide has 
been definitely laid at rest by the operations of the 
E^ew Company. . . . The locus of maximum 
difficulty,* lying between points 54.1 and 55.3 kilo- 
meters from Colon, and only about three-quarters of 
a mile in length, is what will cause the greatest delay 
in execution and which, therefore, demands the clos- 
est study. . . . The facts make it clear that to 
complete the work as soon as possible the point of at- 
tack must be this length of three-quarters of a mile, 
and that here every effort must be made to gain 
time. . . . All the spoil must be transported 
either to the northerly dump at the Lirio or to the 
southerly dump at the Mallejon, distant three or more 
miles apart. Any general plan of operations must 
therefore deal with two problems — how locally to 
concentrate the work . . . and how to provide 



* That is to say, " the locus of maximum difficulty " in the 
divide. Greneral Abbott agrees with all other authorities that 
the Chagres presents the greatest difficulties involved in the 
enterprise. 



164 PANAMA. 

for running the trains to and from the dumps with- 
out interference and without needless shifting of 
rails. . . . The study of the local conditions 
makes it evident that the prompt completion of the 
cut at the Culehra lies not so much in extreme effi- 
ciency of the excavating machines as in the rapidity 
of transporting the material to the dumps. The fre- 
quent shifting of tracks under the heavy rainfall that 
prevails during seven months of the year, aggravated 
by the weight of locomotives causes derailments and 
other delays. The early completion of the Alhajuela 
dam, permitting the electrical transmission of the 
water power there developed, would dispense with 
the use of steam at the cut and thus serve an excel- 
lent purpose. 

FKENCH ESTIMATES ON THE COST OF EXCA- 

! VATION. 

M. Choron, the Chief Engineer of the IN'ew Pan- 
ama Canal Company, made the following estimate 
of probable future work in the cut. He calculated 
that one excavator working continuously for ten hours 
per day would take out 994 cubic yards, measured 
in place, or 1,570 cubic yards measured in bulk. 
But he considered a reduction of forty per cent neces- 
sary in order to allow for the loss of time in remov- 
ing the material. A further allowance was made for 
the delays and complications incidental to the opera- 



DAM AND LOCK AT BOHIO. 1(35 

tions in the rainy season and experience had proved 
that twenty-five per cent discount v^^as not too great a 
reduction on this account. Thus the basic figure, 
994 cubic yards, was brought down to 445 cubic 
yards per day. The American engineers, into whose 
hands the problem has come, whilst they have not 
agreed in their estimates, have all reached figures 
greatly in excess of M. Choron's result, without dis- 
puting the general correctness of his calculations. 
The former arrive at their conclusions from entirely 
different bases. In the first place, they find that 
they can employ American steam shovels, which will 
perform considerably more work per day than the 
machines used by the French company. They have 
devised more than one scheme for the disposal of the 
spoil in a much more rapid manner than that con- 
templated by M. Choron. Again, the American 
plans include the early utilization of the available 
water power for the generation of electric light, by 
means of which the work may be continued day and 
night without cessation, save for a twenty-four hours' 
interval on the Sabbath day 

THE DAM AND LOCK CQISTSTRUCTTONS AT BOHIO. 

The most important group of construction em- 
braced in the plans of the Comite Technique 
consists of the dam, spillway, and locks at 
Bohio. 



166 PANAMA. 

It is not considered necessary to give tiie details 
of this dam projet^ but General Abbott's concluding 
remarks upon the subject are worth special attention 
in view of the divergence of opinions as to the most 
desirable method of regulating the Chagres. " This 
construction (the Bohio dam) was approved unani- 
mously by all the engineers of the ISTew Company, as 
meeting all the requirements of the case ; and the 
fact that Mr. Fteley, past President of our Society 
of Engineers, whose experience in dam construction 
had been second to none in the United States, cor- 
dially concurred with his colleagues in this opinion, 
should have weight with American engineers. The 
difSculty of successfully damming the Chagres at 
this locality has been unduly exaggerated by oppo- 
nents of the route." 

ALHAJTJEaLA AND GAMBOA DAM SITES COMPABED. 

Of the proposed Alhajuela dam, the same author- 
ity states : " This site is so much superior to that 
at Gamboa, or to any other between them, that un- 
less the visionary scheme of a sea level canal be 
contemplated there can be no question that it should 
be preferred for the necessary upper lake. 
There are no engineering difficulties in construction, 
or in conducting the operations at Alhajuela." The 
foregoing sentence illustrates the striking differences 
of opinion entertained by the foremost engineers of 



AMERICAN INTEREST ACUTE. 167 

the world about the most important features of the 
canal problem. Mr. Williams, one of the Amerioan 
engineers-in-chief, after ample examination of the 
rival sites, has given his decisive preference to the 
Gamboa dam and the Advisory Board of Engineers 
has decided in favor of the sea level project which 
General Abbott, and not he alone by any means, 
characterizes as " visionary." 

The scientific information accumulated by the 
Comites Technique is amongst the most valuable data 
relating to the Panama Canal extant, and its in- 
vestigations will undoubtedly afford much of the data 
for any course that may ultimately be followed in the 
completion of the work, except in the improbable con- 
tingency of a sea level canal being decided upon. 

CEYSTAX,IZATION OF AMERICAN INTEKESTS. 

By the time the Comite Technique had made its 
report, public sentiment in this country had become 
strongly impressed with the desirability of a trans- 
isthmian canal under American control, and a ma- 
jority in Congress favored immediate action to that 
end. The Nicaragua route appeared to be the best 
available at the time and general opinion favored 
it. The situation thus created caused extreme anxi- 
ety to those interested in the welfare of the New 
Panama Canal Company. It had reached precisely 
the stage where the directors proposed to appeal to 



I6B PANAMA. 

the financiers of tJie world, wlien its prospects were 
thus suddenly overshadowed. Although firmly con- 
vinced that the Nicaragua route was greatly inferior 
to their own, the company realized that should the 
United States construct a waterway there, or else- 
where, commercial competition would be impossible. 
This and other considerations would surely deter in- 
vestors from backing the private enterprise. Fur- 
thermore, with the American Government in the 
field, the completion of the Panama Canal would be 
retarded, if not prevented, by the difiiculty in se- 
curing labor. 

In this dilemma the directors decided upon a 
course calculated to bring the comparative merits of 
the Nicaragua and Panama routes squarely before 
the American Government. Since the report of the 
Comite had not been made public, the directors were 
satisfied that the United States authorities could not 
possibly have anything like adequate knowledge or 
appreciation of the superior advantages of their 
proposition. 

The full report of the Comite Technique, including 
details of the pro jet recommended by it, was oc- 
cordingly placed in the hands of President McKin- 
ley during the first week of December, 1898. On 
the twenty-first day of that month the Senate, by a 
large majority, passed a bill providing for govern- 
ment support of the Maritime Canal Company in its 
Nicaraguan enterprise, but the House adjourned 



FIRST ISTHMIAN CANAL COMIHISSION. !{][) 

"W ithout taking action upon the measure. On the re- 
assembling of Congi-ess the French Company se- 
cured a hearing before the Rivers and Harbors Com- 
mittee of the lower house, to whom the Senate bill 
had been, referred on an amendment. The Com- 
pany's representatives frankly explained their 
project and expressed the willingness of the Com- 
pany to re-incorporate under American laws in case 
the Panama route should be decided upon. The 
Senate amendment was defeated and, in March, 
1899, Congress authorized the President to make an 
exhaustive investigation as to the most practicable 
and feasible isthmian route for a canal that should 
be under the complete control of the United States 
and the absolute property of the nation. 

APPOINTMETTT OF THE FIEST ISTHMIAN CANAL COM- 
MISSION. 

In accordance with these instructions President 
McKinley placed the work of investigation in the 
hands of a body which was officially styled " The 
Isthmian Canal Commission," and which was com- 
posed of the following members: Pear-Admiral 
John C. Walker, U. S. N". (retired) ; Hon. Samuel 
Pasco ; George S. Morison ; Lieutenant-Colonel Os- 
wald H, Ernst, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. ; Lewis 
M. Haupt, C. E.; Alfred Xoble, C. E. ; Colonel 
P. C. Hains, Corps of Engineers, TJ. S. A. ; Wm. 11. 



170 PANAMA. 

Burr, C. E. ; Prof. Emory K. Johnson. The Com- 
mission made an examination of the New Panama 
Canal Company's project, both in Paris and on the 
Isthmus, and then proceeded to ascertain upon what 
terms and conditions the property and rights of the 
Company might be transferred to the United States, 
for the law under which the Commission was acting 
forbade the consideration of government support to a 
private enterprise. The Eepublic of Colombia hav- 
ing signified its willingness to consent to the aliena- 
tion of the concession, it only remained for the Com- 
mission to learn the purchase price in order to make 
its report to the President There was considerable 
delay and some misunderstanding about this last 
detail. The Company was naturally reluctant to 
submit a definite figure to a body which " had no au- 
thority to accept or reject any terms," but proposed 
instead to make a tentative offer subject to an item- 
ized valuation and arbitration where necessary. To 
this the Commission would not listen, but insisted 
upon a statement of the Company's price in a lump 
sum without reservation. 

THE EEPOBT OF THE COMMISSION FAVOES THE 
NICARAGUA ROUTE. 

The report of the Isthmian Canal Commission 
was presented to the President in I^ovember, 1901. 
It discarded altogether the detailed memorandum of 



NICARAGUA ROUTE RECOMMENDED. 171 

valuations submitted by the Company and briefly de- 
clared that the '*' total amount for which the Com- 
pany offers to sell and transfer its canal property to 
the United States " is $109,141,500. The value set 
upon it by the Commission was $40,000,000. It 
needs no extensive calculation to determine that this 
was an underestimate, even when due allowance is 
made for the usual depreciation of second-hand prop- 
erty. It will be remembered that the receiver of the 
old company valued the assets that passed into his 
hands at about $90,000,000, and several millions had 
been expended in a judicious manner by the new 
company. 

The report closed with the following recommenda- 
tion : " After considering all the facts developed by 
tlie investigations made by the Commission and the 
actual situation as it now stands, and having in view 
the terms offered by the ISTew Panama Canal Com- 
pany, this Commission is of the opinion that ' the 
most practicable and feasible route ' for an Isthmian 
canal, to be ' under the control, management, and 
ownership of the United States ' is that known as the 
Nicaragua route." 

THE FREOSrCH COMPANT MEETS OUR BID. 

When this finding became known at Paris the di- 
rectors of the ISTew Panama Canal Company immedi- 
ately resigned and at a general meeting of stockhold- 



1Y2 PANAMA. 

ers held in the last days of the year it was decided 
to meet the terms of the Commission's estimate. Ac- 
cordingly an offer to sell out all assets, rights, and 
interests for the sum of $40,000,000 was telegraphed, 
the owners realizing that with only one possible pur- 
chaser and the certainty of the property becoming 
practically valueless unless taken by that purchaser, 
no alternative existed. The Company's change of 
base impelled the Commission to make a supple- 
mentary report, in which it stated that " the unrea- 
sonable sum asked for the property and rights of the 
New Panama Canal Company when the Commission 
reached its former conclusion overbalanced that 
route, and now that the estimates by the two routes 
had been nearly equalized the Commission can form 
its judgment by weighing the advantages of each and 
determining which is the more practicable and feasi- 
ble. . . . After considering the changed condi- 
tions that now exist, the Commission is of the opin- 
ion that ' the most practicable and feasible route ' 
for an Isthmian canal to be ' under the control, man- 
agement, and ownership of the United States ' is 
that known as the Panama route." 

THE SENATE INVESTIGATES THE QUESTION OF EOUTE. 

In the meanwhile, and before the Isthmian Canal 
Commission had filed its report, an ill-considered bill 
had been passed by the House, authorizing the Presi- 



QUESTION OF ROUTE INVESTIGATED. 173 

dent to secure a concession from Nicaragua and to 
proceed at once to the construction of a waterway 
by that route. ^Fortunately the Hepburn Bill was 
not hastily disposed of in the Senate. The matter 
was thoroughly investigated in committee and ex- 
tensively debated in the chamber. The weight of 
engineering opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of 
the Panama route, but, perhaps, the most effective 
statement in its favor was delivered by Senator Han- 
na, who had made a close personal investigation of 
the question. A series of practical enquiries sub- 
mitted by him to eighty shipowners, shipmasters, of- 
ficers and pilots engaged in operating the most im- 
portant intercontinental steamship lines and sailing 
vessels elicited replies which were without exception 
strongly in favor of the Panama route. More than 
ten per cent of these emanated from persons inter- 
ested in sailing ships and familiar with the naviga- 
tion of them, a result especially significant in view 
of the fact that one of the very strongest objections 
advanced against the more southerly location is its 
assumed disadvantage to sailing craft.* The debate 
in the Senate was followed by the passage in both 
branches of Congress of the Spooner Bill. This 
measure authorized the President to acquire the 
rights and property of the New Panama Canal Com- 



* Full details of this interesting information will be found 
in the Congressional Record, June 9, 1902. 



174 PANAMA. 

pany for a sum not to exceed $40,000,000 and to 
secure by treaty with the Kepublic of Colombia the 
perpetual control of the territory needful for oper- 
ating the canal; it also provided for the prosecution 
of the work by an Isthmian Canal Commission con- 
sisting of seven members to be appointed by the Pres- 
ident. 

We have already recited briefly the incidents of 
the imbroglio that followed the failure of the Colom- 
bian Legislature to ratify the Hay-Herran Treaty 
and culminated in the independence of Panama. 
Sufficient has been said to show how nearly the Amer- 
ican people came to being committed to the Nica- 
ragua route. What, in such an event, would have 
been the actual outcome it is impossible to conjec- 
ture, but there is ample ground for the belief that 
the undertaking would have proved more hazardous, 
more difficult, and less satisfactory when completed, 
than the Panama project. 

It will be convenient at this point to consider 
briefly the most important features of difference be- 
tween the two routes. In the first place, the verified 
data upon which to work is very much greater in the 
case of Panama, not to mention the fact that a con- 
siderable proportion of the task has already been 
accomplished at that point. In fact the Nicaragua 
project is still a mass of theory which application 
might prove to be infinitely erroneous, whilst at Pan- 
ama the stage of uncertainty has been virtually 



TWO ROUTES COMPARED. 175 

passed and the operation presents definite and cal- 
culable tasks. 

THE mCABAQVAIN EOUTE COMPAECEID WITH THAT OF 
PANAMA, 

The American Isthmus does not contain a single 
natural harbor on the Nicaraguan coast. A satis- 
factory approach to a canal might be excavated upon 
the Pacific side, but the Atlantic littoral offers no such 
facility. The harbor of Greytown, which was once 
a good one, has long since been closed by the forma- 
tion of banks whose material is constantly carried 
down by the San Carlos and Serapiqui Rivers. 
These obstructions could be cleared, but only at great 
expense and the maintenance of the necessary chan- 
nel would involve incessant dredging. At Panama, 
an excellent entrance is available at either end of the 
canal. 

Whilst both routes lie within the zone of seismic 
disturbances, there is no recorded convulsion, nor 
any physical evidence of one, in the Isthmus of suffi- 
cient force to have seriously damaged a lock level 
canal, much less one upon the sea level. ISTicaragua, 
on the other hand, presents volcanic features, includ- 
ing Lake N'icaragua itself, which betoken tremendous 
upheavals in the past. The earthquake that oc- 
curred in that region in 1844 must have caused great 
destruction to a canal had one been in existence at 



176 PANAMA. 

the time, as well as to the shipping on it. The pro- 
posed line passes close to the active volcano Ome- 
tepe, which was in violent eruption as late as 1883. 
The great volcano, Momotombo, on the edge of Lake 
Managua, after fifty years of inactivity, burst out 
with great violence in the month of February, 1905. 
This eruption was preceded by earthquakes. 

NICAEAGUAN ROUTE PRESEOSTTS MANY EXTRAORDINAEY 
DIFFICULTIES. 

The region traversed by the Nicaraguan route is 
subject to strong winds and heavy rainfall, which 
would militate against the safe navigation of a canal. 
The latter preventing clear observation would tend 
to delay or prevent passage at night. It is true that 
Panama is also subject to heavy rainfall, but it is 
neither so continuous nor so great as upon the At- 
lantic coast of Nicaragua, which has no definite dry 
season. Moreover, any delays occasioned from this 
cause would be of shorter duration and of less con- 
sequence in Panama owing to tlie difference in length 
of passage. 

Serious difficulties in tlie case of the Nicaragua 
construction would be created by the San Juan River, 
which may be considered as at least equal to those 
involved in the regulation of the Chagres. The 
course of the former stream is extremely tortuous, 
and expert opinion holds that it would be impossible 



DIFFICULTIES OF NICARAGUAN ROUTE. 177 

to reduce it to a safe curvature. General Abbott 
says : " This long river route, exceeding in length 
the entire distance from ocean to ocean by the Pan- 
ama line, must remain subject to the combined effects 
of strong winds, sharp curvature, and longitudinal 
and cross currents, to say nothing of the obscuration 
due to heavy rainfall. It may well be doubted 
whether any system of artificial lighting could ren- 
der night transit safe for large ships, and without 
it delays and possible congestion could hardly be 
avoided." A popular idea prevails that the IvTica- 
ragua route offers a great advantage in the seventy 
miles of lake section, but this is fallacy. Something 
like one-half of the distance is over bottom that pre- 
sents a similar problem to that encountered at Lake 
Menzeleh in the construction of the Suez Canal, to 
wit, the opening and maintenance of a channel 
through soft mud. The Isthmian Canal Commis- 
sion estimated the cost of this portion of the opera- 
tion at $8,000,000. Even when made, this expen- 
sive and difficult channel would be a source of 
frequent danger, for Lake l^icaragua is subject to 
violent storms, during which there would be serious 
liability of vessels grounding. To quote General 
Abbott : " It remains to refer to what from an en- 
gineering point of view would be perhaps the most 
serious objection to the ^N^icaragua route if com- 
pleted and opened to traffic. This would be the risk 

of longer or shorter interruptions liable to result 
12 



118 PANAMA. 

from the complicated systems of water supply in sea- 
sons of drought of long duration; and the lake lies 
in a district where they are far from uncommon. It 
has been claimed that a vast lake about 3,000 square 
miles in extent must furnish an ideal source of sup- 
ply, but the matter will bear a little examination. 

CONTROL OF LAXE, NICAEAGUA A SERIOUS PROBLEM. 

By the dam on the lower San Juan river the chan- 
nel of the present stream would be transformed inta 
an arm of the lake, maintained sensibly at the same 
level, and through this arm all shipping must pass, 
the depth of water depending wholly on the stand 
of the lake. This stand is now subject to a natural 
oscillation of about 13 feet. Under the projected 
conditions the entire outflow must pass over the dam 
at a distance of 50 miles from the main lake, and if 
the level is allowed to rise above the present high 
water stand, valuable lands under cultivation on the 
west shore of the lake would be flooded and claims 
for damages would result. On the other hand the 
bed of the river is crossed by many ledges of rock, 
and the cost of excavation fixes a limit to the depth 
economically practicable. . . . The level of the 
lake must be held approximately between 111 feet 
and 104 feet above tide and the bed of the present 
river must be excavated sufficiently to afford a sail- 
fug depth of 35 feet at all times. But the records 



CONDITIONS ITNDERSTOOD. 179 

establish that years of high lake and years of low 
lake follow in no regular succession. As it is im- 
possible to provide a reserve sufficient to control the 
level of an immense body of water 3,000 square 
miles in extent, the regulation of this vital element 
must be left to the foresight and good judgment of 
the operator controlling the outflow of the dam. 
. . . Carelessness or bad judgment on the part of 
the operator at the dam, or an abnormal season, 
might therefore involve the stoppage of traffic for an 
indefinite period. A really desirable canal should be 
subject to no such contingency." 

THE CONDITIONS AT PANAMA ABE THOBOUGHLT 
UNDEKSTOOD. 

The work of construction will be carried on at 
Panama with very much greater facility than it pos- 
sibly could at Nicaragua. In the former location 
the Panama Railroad and the tracks to the dumps 
will afford ideal facilities when the latter are put in 
a satisfactory condition. The Isthmian Canal Com- 
mission called attention to some of the difficulties in 
this respect that might be expected at Nicaragua. 
The forty mile stretch between Greytown and the 
San Juan is a swamp throughout, and as one of the 
members of the Commission stated : " There are no 
roads in it. You cannot make any roads except by 
hauling in material to make them. . . . There 



180 PANAMA. 

is a very uncertain element as to how mucK timber 
you will find to interfere with your dredges while 
working in that swamp." 

The ]^icaragua route shows some savings in dis- 
tances between important shipping points as meas- 
ured upon the map, but these would almost certainly 
be made up for by the much shorter time of passage 
through the Panama Canal. 

It must be borne in mind that the decision of the 
Isthmian Canal Commission in favor of Nicaragua 
was prompted by the price asked by the Company 
for its interests in the Panama enterprise and that 
decision was promptly reversed as soon as the Com- 
mission's estimate was accepted. As the cost of 
coustructing and maintaining the respective water- 
ways was practically equal in the Commission's opin- 
ion, it is evident that the alacrity with which they 
turned to the Panama proposition when the terms 
were favorable was due to a conviction of the superior 
merits of that project. There is not in fact any re- 
spectable opinion to the contrary and the support of 
the N^icaragua route and the antagonism of the 
Panama enterprise in Congress and elsewhere is not 
based at all upon scientific or utilitarian considera- 
tions but has its existence in a desire to conserve 
certain commercial interests. 




u 



fc 




VIII. 

PANAMA. 

THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE. 

United States Authority in Colon and Panama — The Price 
of the Concession — The Canal to be Neutral Forever — 
Instructions Regarding the Inhabitants of the Zone — Atti- 
tude of the United States Towards Panama — A Futile 
Revolutionary Movement — The Commission Visits the 
Isthmus — The Plan of the Walker Commission — The Ob- 
jections to the Commission — Wallace Resigns and Stevens 
Steps In — The President's Address to the Consulting En- 
gineers — A Disappointing Conclusion — Consideration of 
the Rival Projects. 

The Hay-BimaiT-Yarilla Treaty was negotiated be- 
tween the respective representatives of the United 
States and Panama in the autumn of 1903 and fully 
ratified February, 1904. The most important fea- 
tures of this convention are as follows : 

Article 1. " The United States guarantees and 
will maintain the independence of the Republic of 
Panama." 

Article 2. " The Republic of Panama grants to 
the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation 
and control of a zone of land, and land under water 



182 PANAMA. 

for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanita- 
tion and protection of said canal, of tiie width of ten 
miles, extending to the distance of five miles on each 
side of the centre line of the canal to be con- 
structed; the said zone beginning in the Caribbean 
Sea three marine miles from mean low-water mark 
and extending to and across the Isthmus of Panama 
into the Pacific Ocean to a distance of three marine 
miles from mean low-water mark, with the proviso 
that the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors 
adjacent to said cities, which are included within 
the boundaries of the zone above described, shall not 
be included within this grant . . . The Repub- 
lic of Panama further grants in like manner to the 
United States in perpetuity all islands within the 
limits of the Zone above described and, in addition 
thereto, the group of small islands in the Bay of 
Panama, named Perico, Naos, Culebra and Flam- 
enco." 

Article 3. " The Republic of Panama grants to 
the United States all the rights, power, and authority 
within the Zone mentioned and described in Article 
2 of this agreement . . . which the United 
States would possess and exercise if it were the 
sovereign of the territory within which said lands 
and waters are located, to the entire exclusion of the 
exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such 
Bovereign rights, power or authority.'^ 

Article 6 provides for compensation to private 



UNITED STATES AUTHORITY. 1S3 

property owners, by the United States, for any 
damage to private property occasioned by the canal 
operations and for the assessment of such compensa- 
tion by arbitration. 

UNITED STATES AUTHORITY IN COLON AND PANAMA. 

Article 7. " . . . The Republic of Panama 
a^ees that the cities of Panama and Colon shall 
comply in perpetuity with the sanitary ordinances, 
whether of a preventive or curative character, pre- 
scribed by the United States and, in case the Grovem- 
ment of Panama is unable, or fails in its duty, to 
enforce this compliance by the cities of Panama and 
Colon with the sanitary ordinances of the United 
States, the Republic of Panama grants to the United 
States the right and authority to enforce the same. 

" The same right and authority are granted to the 
United States for the maintenance of public order 
in the cities of Panama and Colon and the territories 
and harbors adjacent thereto in case the Republic of 
Panama should not be, in the judgment of the 
United States, able to maintain such order." 

Provision is made in this article for the reimburse- 
ment of the United States for any outlay it may 
make, under the discretionary authority referred to 
above, in " works of sanitation, collection and dis- 
position of sewage, and distribution of water, in the 
cities of Panama and Colon." 



184 PANAMA. 

Article 9, " The United States agrees tliat the 
ports at either entrance of the canal and the waters 
thereof, and the Republic of Panama agrees that the 
towns of Panama and Colon shall be free for all 
time, so that there shall not be imposed, or collected, 
custom-house tolls, tonnage, anchorage, light-house, 
wharf, pilot, or quarantine dues, or any other charges, 
or taxes of any kind upon any vessel using, or pass- 
ing through the canal, or belonging to, or employed 
by, the United States, directly or indirectly, in con- 
nection with the construction, maintenance, opera- 
tion, sanitation and protection of the main canal, or 
auxiliary works, or upon the cargo, officers, crew, or 
passengers, of any such vessels, except such tolls and 
charges as may be imposed by the United States for 
the use of the canal and other works, and except tolls 
and charges imposed by the Republic of Panama 
upon merchandise destined to be introduced for the 
consumption of the rest of the Republic of Panama, 
and upon vessels touching at the ports of Panama 
and Colon and which do not cross the canal,*' 

THE PRICE. OF THE CONCESSION. 

Article 14. "As the price of compensation for the 
rights, powers, and privileges granted in this conven- 
tion by the Republic of Panama to the United 
States, the Government of the United States agrees 
to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of ten 
million dollars ($10,000,000) in gold coin of the 



CANAL TO BE NEUTRAL. 185 

United States on the exchange of the ratification of 
this convention and also an annual payment, during 
the life of this convention, of two hundred and fifty 
thousand dollars ($250,000) in like gold coin, be- 
ginning nine jeavs after the date aforesaid. . . ." 

THE CANAL TO BE NEUTKAL FOREVEB. 

Article 18. " The canal, when constructed, and the 
entrances thereto, shall be neutral in perpetuity, and 
shall be open upon the terms provided for by section 
1 of article three of, and in conformity with all the 
stipulations of, the treaty entered into by the Govern- 
ments of the United States and Great Britain on 
November 18, 1901." ■==- 

In accordance with the provisions of the Spooner 
Bill, the President appointed a commission of seven 
members to prosecute the canal operations. They 
were: Rear-Admiral John G. Walker, U. S. N. (re- 
tired), Chairman; Major-General George W. Davis, 
U. S. A. (retired). Governor of the Canal Zone ; Wil- 
liam Barclay Parsons, C. E. ; William H. Burr, 
C. E. ; Benjamin M. Harrod, C. E. ; Carl E. Grun- 
sky, C. E. ; Erank J. Hecker. John F. Wallace, an 
engineer of experience and ability, was appointed 
Engineer-in-Chief, and Surgeon-Colonel W. C. Gor- 
gas, of the United States Army, whose splendid ree- 



*The reference is to the Hay-Pauneefote Ti'eaty, which was 
desismed to facilitate the construction of the Panama Canal. 



186 PANAMA. 

ord in Cuba marked him as pre-eminently fitted for 
the task, was placed in charge of the Sanitary De- 
partment. 

In a letter dated May the ninth, 1904, the Presi- 
dent directed the Honorable William H. Taft, Secre- 
tary of War, to assume supervision of the work of the 
Isthmian Canal Commission. The same document 
defines the duties of the Commission, which are, in 
general, to make all needful regulations for the gov- 
ernment of the Zone ; and " to make, or cause to be 
made, all needful surveys, borings, designs, plans, and 
specifications of the engineering, hydraulic, and san- 
itary works required and to supervise and execute the 
same." 

rNSTETJCTIONS EEGAEDING THE LNHABITAIJTS OV THB 
ZONE. 

This letter goes on to instruct the Secretary that 
" the inhabitants of the Isthmian Canal Zone are 
entitled to security in their persons, property, and re- 
ligion, and in all their private rights and relations. 
They should be so informed by public proclamation. 
The people should be disturbed as little as possible 
in their customs and avocations that are in harmony 
with principles of well-ordered and decent living. 

" The municipal laws of the Zone are to be admin- 
istered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they 
were before the change. Police magistrates and jus- 



OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS PANAMA. 187 

tices of the peace and other oflacers discharging duties 
usually devolving upon these officers of the law, will 
be continued in office if they are suitable persons. 
. . . The laws of the land, with which the inhab- 
itants are familiar, and which were in force on Feb- 
ruary 26, 1904, will continue in force in the Canal 
Zone and in other places on the Isthmus over which 
the United States has jurisdiction until altered or an- 
nulled by the said Commission," but the principles of 
government set forth in the Constitution of the Unit- 
ed States are to be observed in the administration of 
the Zone. 

In a later letter to the Secretary, the PYesident 
makes an important declaration of the broader pol- 
icy of the United States towards the Republic of 
Panama as follows: 

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWAEDS PANAMA. 

" The United States is about to confer on the 
people of the State of Panama a great benefit by the 
expenditure of millions of dollars in the construction 
of the canal: but this fact must not blind us to the 
importance of so exercising the authority given us 
under the treaty with Panama as to avoid creating 
any suspicion, however unfounded, of our intentions 
as to the future. We have not the slightest inten- 
tion of establishing an independent colony in the 
middle of the State of Panama, or of exercising any 



188 I»ANAMA. 

greater goveminental functions than are necessary 
to enable us conveniently and safely to construct, 
maintain, and operate the canal under the rights 
given us by the treaty. Least of all do we wish to 
interfere with the business and prosperity of the 
people of Panama. However far a just construction 
of the treaty might enable us to go, did the exigencies 
of the case require it, in asserting the equivalent of 
sovereignty over the Canal Strip,* it is our full in- 
tention that the rights which we exercise shall be 
exercised with all proper care for the honor and in- 
terests of the people of Panama. The exercise of 
such powers as are given us by the treaty within the 
geographical boundaries of the Republic of Pana- 
ma may easily, if a real sympathy for both the pres- 
ent and future welfare of the people of Panama, is 
not shown, create distrust of the American govern- 
ment." 

It is not our purpose to enter into a discussion of 
the political aspects of the treaty, but a careful read- 
ing of the portions which have been reproduced will 
give an idea of the great scope of this convention. 
To draw attention to but one direction in which its 
potency extends, the provision for the maintenance 
of order by the United States in the cities of Colon 
and Panama is a practical preventive of future revo- 
lution in the Republic. 



* See article 3, of the treaty quoted above. 



SUPPLEMENTAKY AGREEMENTS. 189 

At the close of the year Secretary Taft visited 
the Isthmus and entered into an agreement with 
President Amador, covering several supplementary 
matters of importance. A tariff adjustment, satis- 
factory to the Panamans, was effected. It was ar- 
ranged that only supplies for the canal, and goods in 
transit, were in future to be entered at the Zone 
ports, thus assuring the Government of Panama of 
all customs receipts and port dues. The Republic 
agreed to reduce its tariff from fifteen to ten per 
cent, except upon wines and alcohol, and to place its 
postal rates upon the two-cent basis. Panama also 
agreed to adopt the gold standard, a very necessary 
measure for the welfare of that republic, as well as 
for the facility of transactions between the two na- 
tions. At the time this understanding was arrived 
at, the Colombian currency had become so debased 
that a five-dollar bill was exchangeable for an Amer- 
ican nickel, and there was one cent change due at 
that. 

A FUTILE EEVOLUTIONAHY MOVEMENT. 

Just before the arrival of Secretary Taft, General 
Huertas had planned one of the puny revolutions 
which have furnished librettists with inexhaustible 
material. He had mobilized the army of 182 half- 
clad men and boys, with the design of subverting 
the Amador government. The threat of calling upon 



190 PANAMA. 

half a dozen American marines who happened to be 
in the city with their side-arms on, induced him to 
give up the idea. He was placed upon the retired 
list and the army of the Republic was disbanded. 

At a banquet given in his honor by the Panaman 
President the Secretary delivered a timely homily on 
the subject of revolutions and urged upon his audi- 
tors the necessity of the government preserving the 
rights of the minority. The speech, which was in 
the nature of a friendly warning and an intimation 
that the United States expected the Republic to re- 
frain from any revolutionary disturbances in the 
future, was well received by the representatives of 
both political parties, and doubtless had a salutary 
effect. 

THE COMMISSION VISITS THE ISTHMUS. 

The Canal Commission arrived at the Isthmus in 
April, 1904. The only work in progress at the time 
was the excavation of the Culebra Cut, where a few 
French machines were employed with a force of 
about seven hundred men. Owing to the long lapse 
of time since the ISTew Panama Canal Company 
ceased operations, a chaotic condition prevailed along 
the entire line of the canal and the plant and equij> 
ment transferred by that Company was in such a 
deteriorated and scattered state as to require months 
for its collection and repair. Whilst the task of 



PLAN OF WALKER COMMISSION. 191 

straightening up was being carried out Engineer 
Wallace tested some American steam excavators and 
established important data as to units of cost and ex- 
penditure of time. Meanwhile the Commission pro- 
ceeded, bj means of new surveys and examinations, 
to gain such information as might afford a satisfac- 
tory basis for the ultimate plans. As has been stated, 
the French companies performed a great deal of 
accurate scientific work along the same lines, but 
much of the data secured from them needed to be 
modified in order to bring it into harmony with the 
more extensive scheme of the American project. The 
Commission was not restricted by the limitations 
which governed the plans of the purely commercial 
enterprises, and whilst its work was entirely of a 
tentative nature, a waterway much larger than any 
contemplated by the French companies was a fore- 
gone conclusion. 

THE TJjAir OF THE "WALKEB COMMISSIOIir. 

The Commission formulated a plan for a lock 
canal at an 85-foot level with a dam at Bohio and 
a lake 38.5 square miles extending from that point 
to Obispo. The Commission rejected the sea-level 
plan, prefacing its conclusion with the following 
statement : " If a sea-level canal be constructed, 
either the canal itself must be made of such dimen- 
ftionfl that maximum floods, modified to some extent 



192 PANAMA. 

by a resei^voir in the Upper Cliagres, could pass 
down its channel without injury, or independent 
channels must be provided to carry off these floods. 
As the canal lies in the lowest part of the valley, the 
construction of such channels would be a matter of 
serious difficulty, and the simplest solution would 
be to make the canal prism large enough to take the 
full discharge. This would have the advantage, 
also, of furnishing a very large canal, in which navi- 
gation under ordinary circumstances would be ex- 
ceptionally easy. It would involve a cross section 
from Obispo to the Atlantic, having an area of at 
least 15,000 square feet below the water line, which 
would give a bottom width of at least 400 feet. The 
quantity of excavation required for such a canal has 
been roughly computed, and is found to be about 
266,228,000 cubic yards. The cost of such a canal, 
including a dam at Alhajuela and a tide lock at 
Miraflores, near the Pacific end, is estimated at not 
less than $240,000,000. Its construction would 
probably take at least twenty years." 

The investigations of the Commission were neces- 
sarily directed chiefly to the various suggestions for 
the control of the Chagres. The question had to be 
considered from the point of view of a sea level 
canal as well as that of a waterway with locks. In 
the former case the flood waters of the river, if ad- 
mitted into the canal, would create dangerous cur- 
rents and carry in heavy deposits, necessitating ex- 



OBJECTIONS TO COMMISSION. 193 

tensive dredging. The various dam projects were 
examined by tlie Commission as well as the plans 
of the French Companies for diverting the river 
through a tunnel to the Pacific Ocean. 

Before the Commission closed the first year of its 
existence the question of its efficiency and adaptabil- 
ity to the work in hand was widely raised. Secre- 
tary Taft, upon his return from the Isthmus in De- 
cember, 1904, had expressed to the President an 
opinion that the Commission, whilst it had " made 
as much progress in the necessary preparations for 
the building of the canal as could be expected in the 
short time since its appointment," was unwieldy and 
so constituted as to render difficult the apportion- 
ment of specific work and responsibility among its 
members. Chief Engineer Wallace complained that 
his plans were repeatedly changed and that he was 
hampered in the effort to carry them out. 

THE OBJECTIONS TO THE COMMISSION. 

In a message sent to Congress on the 13th of Jan- 
uary, 1905, President Roosevelt plainly expressed 
his objections to the existing arrangement. He asked 
for " greater discretion in the organization of the 
personnel " to be employed in the management of 
the enterprise. 

" Actual experience has convinced me," he said, 

" that it will be impossible to obtain the best and 
13 



194 PANAMA. 

most effective service under the limitations prescribed 
by law. The general plans for the work must be 
agreed upon with the aid of the best engineers of the 
country, who should act as an advisory or consulting 
body. The consulting engineers should not be put 
upon the Commission, which should be used only as 
an executive instrument for the executive and ad- 
ministrative work. The actual work of executing the 
general plans agreed upon by the Commission, after 
receiving the conclusions of the advising engineers, 
must be done by an engineer in charge ; and we now 
have an excellent engineer." The President went on 
to state that the Commission should consist at most 
of five members and preferably of three. 

In response to this message, the House passed a 
bill to abolish the Commission and place the govern- 
ment of the Zone and the construction of the canal 
entirely in the hands of the President, but the meas- 
ure was defeated in the Senate. Failing Congres- 
sional relief the President determined, in his charac- 
teristic way, to deal with the situation himself. He 
secured the resignation of the entire Isthmian Canal 
Commission and reformed that body, placing the 
control of affairs definitely in the hands of an Ex- 
ecutive Committee composed of three of the seven 
members required by law to constitute the whole. 
Each of the executive members had distinct duties 
assigned to him. Chairman Shouts was placed in 
charge of the entire enterprise, with powers resemb- 



WALLACE RESIGNS, STEVENS STEPS IN. 195 

ling those of a railroad president. Engineer Wal- 
lace was made field manager, with full control of the 
construction. Judge Magoon was created Governor 
of the Canal Zone and United States Minister to 
Panama. 

WALLACE RESIGNS AND STEVENS STEPS IN. 

The new arrangement had been in force less than 
sixty days when the Chief Engineer, for some cause 
which has never been fully explained, resigned his 
position. The resignation, coming as it did without 
warning or adequate explanation, naturally aroused 
resentment on the part of Secretary Taft, and Mr. 
Wallace retired from the service under a cloud. The 
place thus made vacant was promptly and satisfac- 
torily filled by the selection of John F. Stevens, who 
had been engaged by the War Department to super- 
vise the construction of the new railroads in the 
Philippines. Mr. Stevens assumed charge of the 
canal operations in August, 1905. 

On the first day of the following month the In- 
ternational Board of Consulting Engineers met in 
Washington. This body had been formed with the 
co-operation of several foreign governments for the 
purpose mainly of examining the principal problems 
involved in the construction of the canal. The most 
important matters considered by the Board pertain 
to the foiTu of the waterway. The members of the 



196 PANAMA. 

Board are: Henry Hunter, Chief Engineer of the 
Manchester Ship Canal (nominated by the British 
Government) ; Adolph Guerard (nominated by the 
Trench Government), Eugene Tincauser (nominated 
by the German Government), J. W. Welcker (nomi- 
nated by the Government of the ^Netherlands), M. L. 
Quellenec, Consulting Engineer of the Suez Canal; 
Gen. George W. Davis, U. S. A. (retired) ; Alfred 
ISToble, Chief Engineer of the Pennsylvania Rail- 
road ; William Barclay Parsons, formerly of the New 
York Rapid Transit Commission; William H. Burr, 
of Columbia University ; Frederick P. Steams, hy- 
draulic engineer of Boston ; Gen. Henry L, Abbott, 
U. S. A. (retired) ; Joseph Bipley, engineer of the 
Sault Ste. Marie Canal; Isham Randolph, engineer 
of the Chicago Drainage CanaL These men are 
eminently qualified to exercise the important advis- 
ory functions entrusted to them, not only by reason 
of technical knowledge, but also on account of spe- 
cial experience. General Abbott and Mr. Hunter 
had been members of the Comite Technique; Gen- 
eral Davis, Mr. Parsons and Professor Burr, of a 
former Isthmian Canal Commission. 

THE president's ADDRESS TO THE CONSULTING 
ENGINEERS. 

The President addressed the assembled Board at 
length, explaining that his remarks were to be taken 



THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS. 197 

as suggestions rather than as instructions. " I hope," 
he said, " that ultimately it will prove possible to 
build a sea-level canal. Such a canal would un- 
doubtly be best in the end, if feasible, and I feel 
that one of the chief advantages of the Panama Route 
is that ultimately a sea-level canal will be a pos- 
sibility. But, while paying due heed to the ideal 
perfectibility of the scheme from an engineer's stand- 
point, remember the need of having a plan which 
shall provide for the immediate building of the 
canal on the safest terms and in the shortest possible 
time. 

" If to build a sea-level canal will but slightly 
increase the risk, then, of course, it is preferable. 
But if to adopt a plan of a sea-level canal means 
to incur hazard, and to insure indefinite delay, then 
it is not preferable. If the advantages and disad- 
vantages are closely balanced I expect you to say so. 

" I desire also to know whether, if you recom- 
mend a high-level multi-lock canal, it will be possi- 
ble after it is completed to turn it into, or substi- 
tute for it, in time, a sea-level canal, without inter- 
rupting the traffic upon it. Two of the prime con- 
siderations to be kept steadily in mind are: 1. The 
utmost practicable speed of construction. 2. Prac- 
tical certainty that the plan proposed will be feasible ; 
that it can be carried out with the minimum risk." 

After a thorough study of the maps and docu- 
ments in the possession of the Isthmian Canal Com- 



198 PANAMA. 

mission, the Board of Consulting Engineers spent 
three weeks on the Isthmus. Upon the return of 
the Board to the United States early in December, 
it was given out that their report would not be signed 
and submitted until February, or March, of 1906. 
It was, however, allowed to be known that the final 
recommendation of the Board would favor a sea-level 
canal. The majority which reached this decision 
was made up of the five foreign members, together 
with General Davis, Professor Burr and Mr. Par- 
sons. Tbe remaining five members, all Americans, 
advocated a lock canal. This conclusion of the ad- 
visory engineers was received with disappointment 
throughout the country and especially in adminis- 
tration circles. 

A BISAPPOINTING CONCLUSION. 

The Walker Commission, after detailing tiie re- 
quirements of a sea-level canal, had stated : " Whilst 
such a plan would be physically practicable and 
might be adopted if no other solution were available, 
the difficulties of all kinds, and especially those of 
time and cost, would be so great that a canal Avith 
a summit level reached by locks is to be preferred." 
It was upon this testimony, arrived at by the ex- 
penditure of much time and a million dollars, that 
Congress made its appropriation for a lock canal. 
The people had formed an idea that it was an ac- 



A DISAPPOINTING CONCLUSION. 199 

cepted matter, and they were not inclined to be easily 
reconciled to a contrary decision on the part of a 
majority of the engineers, no matter how eminent, 
who were foreigners and therefore might be supposed 
to have less concern than Americans regarding the 
cost and delay entailed by following their proposal. 
At the present time it is impossible to tell what 
may be the outcome of the report of the Advisory 
Board, The body acted in a purely consultative 
capacity and there is no obligation, implied or other- 
wise, to heed its recommendations. The President 
is kno"\vii to be strongly averse to changing the plans 
in any manner that M'^ould involve serious uncertainty 
as to money and time that will be required for the 
completion of the undertaking. The Secretary of 
War and a majority in Congress are in accord with 
his sentiments. The law gives him unquestionable 
authority to proceed with the canal in the way he 
thinks fit. He may, if he chooses, entirely disre- 
gard the advice of the Board as to the form of the 
waterway and continue the work on the present lines 
with a view to the completion of the canal with locks. 
If, on the other hand, the President should adopt 
the recommendation of the Board it would be neces- 
sary for him to secure the endorsement of Congress 
in the form of a further appropriation to meet the 
additional cost of sea-level construction. It is proba- 
ble that the President will formally submit the re- 
port of the Board to Congress, accompanied by a 



200 PANAMA. 

message arguing the desirability of adhering to tlie 
Sock-level project, 

COI^SIDERATIOasr OF THE RIVAL PROJECTS. 

It is universally admitted that a sea-level canal is 
the ideal waterway. It would involve few engineer- 
ing problems of consequence tbat would be absent 
from the plans for a lock canal. The two important 
elements of construction are the same in either case 
— the control of the Chagres and the passage of tbe 
divide. In botb cases it would be necessary to pro- 
vide for one or more dams and spillways to accommo- 
date the flood waters of the river and tbe diversion 
of its lower course is also a feature of each project. 
The construction of a sea-level canal would require 
a much deeper cut at the Culebra pass and other 
points, but it might not entail any greater difficul- 
ties in excavation than may be expected in digging 
a lock level, though tlie task of transportation to the 
dumps, a very serious one under any circumstances, 
would be greatly enhanced by the greater excavation. 

As to the time that should be estimated for mak- 
ing a waterway at the level of the oceans, expert opin- 
ions differ. It is believed that the Board will place 
it at fifteen years, whilst many authorities are in- 
clined to the belief that twenty would be a more 
reasonable figure. 



IX. 

PANAMA. 

THE PLAN OF THE CANAL. 

Sea-level Plan Recommended by the Board — The Starting 
Point of the Canal — Accommodation for the Largest Ves- 
sels — The Question of Time — The Great Culebra Cut 

— The Board's Estimate of Time — Cost of Maintenance 

— Lock Canal Project of the Minority — The Config- 
uration of the Canal Line — Excavation in the Cut — 
The Lake and Dam at Gatun — Dimensions of the Dam — 
Enormous Weight of the Dam — The Advantages of the 
Gatun Dam — Important Matter of Water Supply — The 
Summit Level — Lake Sosa — Early Suggestions Adopted 

— The Gatun Locks — Differences of Opinion as to Type 
of Canal — The Board Depreciated the " Soo " Canal, 

The report of the International Board of Consult- 
ing Engineers was transmitted to Congress by the 
President, February 19, 1906. The report was 
accompanied by letters of comment and advice from 
the President, Secretary Taft, Chairman Shonts and 
Chief Engineer Stevens, all of whom substantially 
agree in their criticisms and suggestions. 

As had been anticipated, a majority of the Board, 
composed of the following members, recommended 

the construction of the canal on the so-called " sea- 

201 



202 PANAMA. 

level " : Messrs. Hunter, Tincauser, Guerard, Quel- 
lenec, Welcker, being all the foreigners, and the three 
Americans, Messrs. Davis, Parsons and Burr. The 
Board made a close study of the question in all its 
aspects, both at Washington and upon the Isthmus. 
The plan of a former Isthmian Canal Commission, 
that of the Comite Technique,, and several plans sub- 
mitted by individual engineers, were carefully exam- 
ined. 

SEA-LEVEL PLAN RECOMMENDED BY THE BOAED. 

The report is prefaced by a statement of the rea- 
sons why a sea-level canal is feasible only in the 
Panama region. The width of the Isthmus of Pan- 
ama is less than at any other point that may be con- 
sidered. It is but thirty-six miles from sea to sea 
as the crow flies. This is five miles greater than the 
distance at San Bias, but there an open cut, or, in- 
deed, any kind of canal is impracticable on several 
accounts. The original summit on the Panama route 
was no more than 333 feet above the sea, and this is 
lower than the summit of the divide at any other 
point on either continent, with the exception of ISTic- 
aragua, where a sea-level canal has never been within 
the bounds of consideration. 

The general direction of the Isthmus of Panama 
is nearly northeast and southwest and the general 
route for the canal nearly northwest and south- 



THE CANAL ROUTE. 203 

east. The summit at Culebra lies about nine miles 
from Panama Bay, and the distance between the 
point on the northern approach to this summit, where 
the present elevation on the proposed canal axis is 
100 feet above sea level, to the point on the southern 
approach, to Culebra at the same height, is nearly 
nine miles. Within this distance will be found nearly 
one-half the total excavation required to make an 
open channel at the sea level adequate in dimensions 
and capacity to pass not only the largest existing 
commercial and naval vessels, but the largest which 
may be expected to require transfer between the At- 
lantic and Pacific oceans for many years to come. 

For the ultimate construction of the proposed sea- 
level canal the Board approves in general the align- 
ment adopted by the two French companies, to which 
later plans have conformed more or less. Some 
slight changes of direction are, however, recom- 
mended for the purpose of reducing curvature and 
minimizing excavation. 

Colon and La Boca are retained as the terminals, 
but extensive improvements at each entrance are sug- 
gested. 

THE STARTING POINT OF THE CANAU 

The initial point of the axis of the canal is located' 
about one mile northwest of Manzanillo light. 
Thence the line runs direct to the mouth of the Kiver 



204 PANAMA. 

Mindi, where it connects with the centre line of the 
canal as partially excavated bj the Panama Canal 
Company. From Mindi the proposed line is along 
the cutting in question nearly as far as Bohio, a dis- 
tance of 12 miles. The canal first meets the Chagres 
at Gatun and repeatedly cuts its course between that 
town and Bohio. 

After passing Bohio the ground gradually rises 
toward the divide. The bed of the Chagres is prac- 
tically at sea level at Bohio, whilst at Obispo, 14 
miles distant, it is 50 feet above sea level. Between 
these two points the canal follows the general course 
of the river, coinciding with it or cutting it at many 
points. At Obispo, or Gamboa, which are less than a 
mile apart, the trend of the Chagres valley is to the 
northeast almost at right angles to its former course, 
but the canal maintains the southeasterly direction 
followed by it from Colon to Obispo. The project 
contemplates a dam at Gamboa to control the floods 
of the Chagres. The waters escaping from the reser- 
voir through regulating sluices vrould enter the canal 
prism about a mile below Obispo. 

Obispo may be considered the northern entrance 
to the great cut through the divide ; from this point 
the ground rises abruptly. Between Obispo and Pe- 
dro Miguel the greater part of the material to be ex- 
cavated in accordance with this plan would be rock. 
A sea-level canal would require a cut to a depth of 
3Y3 feet from the original summit. The present 



CAPACITY OF CANAL. 205 

excavation has, however, reached a depth of 160 feet, 
so that 213 feet would be the maximum of future ex- 
cavation required for a sea-level canal with a depth 
of 40 feet. The length of the cut between Obispo 
and Pedro Miguel is nearly nine miles. 

The line of the canal reaches low marshy ground 
about two miles below Pedro Miguel. Thence to 
deep water in Panama Bay the Board has adopted a 
different alignment from that of the French plan. 
The latter closely conformed to the course of the Rio 
Grande to its mouth at La Boca. This line avoids a 
considerable amount of rock excavation, but involves 
two curves, in order to exclude which the line of the 
Board takes a straight direction from Miraflores 
through the Rio Grande swamp. The canal con- 
tinues in a straight line to and through the saddle 
between Ancon and Sosa hills, where the tidal lock 
is to be placed, and thence to deep water off Isla Fla- 
menco. The plan provides for levees from Mira- 
flores to the lock so as to prevent the tidal flow from 
entering the canal. The French plan required a 
tidal lock at Miraflores, about five miles from the 
coast 

ACCOMMODATION FOR THE LARGEST VESSELS. 

The proposed dimensions of the sea-level canal are 
calculated to facilitate the passage of the largest ves- 
sels afloat and to allow for some increase of size and 



206 PANAMA. 

draft in tihe future. It is believed by the Board 
that a canal constructed on the plan suggested might 
be traversed by a ship of 90 feet beam and 38 feet 
draft at a speed of four or five miles an hour. The 
largest existing vessels might make six miles an hour 
and the average craft eight. These speeds would 
permit of passages ranging from five to ten hours in 
time. 

Summarized, the sea-level canal as recommended 
by the Board is a channel commencing at the 41-foot 
contour in Limon Bay, about 5,000 feet northerly of 
a line between Toro and Manzanillo lights, protected 
by two converging jetties with a width of opening of 
1,000 feet; thence with a straight channel 500 feet 
in width at the bottom and a depth of 40 feet, pro- 
tected by a parallel jetty on the west and by Man- 
zanillo Island on the east, to Mindi, whence the land 
canal commences. This canal is designed with a 
depth of 40 feet and a bottom width of 150 feet in 
earth, with side slopes adjusted to the nature of the 
ground so as to give a surface width of from 302 
feet to 437 feet. In rock the section is to be altered 
so as to have a bottom width of 200 feet and a sur- 
face width of 208 feet. At the Pacific end, the 
canal is to be furnished with a tidal lock located 
between Ancon and Sosa hills. Beyond this lock a 
straight channel is to project into the Bay of Panama 
with a bottom width of 300 feet and extending for 
a distance of three and three-fourths miles to the 45- 



QUESTION OF TIME. 207 

foot contour.* The width adopted for the canal will 
be sufficient to permit steamers to maintain a speed 
of six to eight knots per hour, and to allow two ordi- 
nary steamers to pass each other on the line of the 
canal without stopping. 

At Gamboa there is to be located a dam, either of 
masonry or of earth and masonry combined, for the 
control of the Chagres, and at Corozal, sluices by 
which, during half the tide period when the level in 
the Pacific is lower than that in the Atlantic, water 
can be discharged from the canal into Panama Bay. 

The entire length of the line between shores is a 
little over 40 miles, while the total distance, includ- 
ing harbor channels, is 49.35 miles. The total length 
of curves is 19.17 miles, leaving 30.18 miles of tan- 
gents, or straight stretches. 

THE QUESTION OF TIME. 

In proceeding to its estimate of the time necessary 
for the construction of a canal, which " is one of the 
main elements of the whole question," the Board 
confidently assumes that its plan is superior to the 
lock-level project On this assumption it concludes 
that " if the work required under the less desirable 
plan can be finished within ten or twelve years, while 
that under the more desirable plan would require but 



* Contours refer to mean sea level. 



208 PANAMA. 

two years longer, the small delay in tlie passage of 
the first vessel through the waterway might easily 
be neglected in comparison with the advantages se- 
cured under the better plan." The plan involves 
three great tasks — the installation of the locks, the 
construction of the dam at Gamboa and the excava- 
tion at the summit. The last is considered the con- 
trolling factor in the expenditure of time, as it will 
consume greatly more than any other portion of the 
work. The final estimate then is based upon a calcu- 
lation of the length of time necessary to complete the 
great cut. 

THE GEEAT CULEBEA CUT. 

The Board is of the opinion, derived from a study 
of the work already accomplished upon the prism, 
that " from 80 to 100 steam shovels of the most effec^ 
tive type now in use on the Isthmus can be efficiently 
employed continually on this work after complete 
organization. It will require from two to two and a 
half years to install and put in operation this exca- 
vating plant. The independent studies by the Board 
of the arrangement of railroad tracks and of com- 
plete systems of attack at both ends of this summit 
cut completely confirm the conservatism of the evi- 
dence given before it. It is as clearly demonstrable 
as any estimate of rate of progress and time for the 
completion of any great engineering work can be 



TRANSPOKIATION PROBLEM. 209 

that after the full installation of plant not less than 
100 steam shovels may be continuously engaged be- 
tween Obispo and Pedro Miguel until the amount of 
work remaining to be done becomes too small to 
afford space for the operation of the whole plant. 

" The Board recognizes that the removal of the 
material in the summit cut is in reality a problem 
of transportation. It is a comparatively simple mat- 
ter to excavate the material within a much shorter 
time than that allowed for the work, even on the sup- 
position that all of it except the clay near the surface 
must be shattered by preliminary blasting. The 
whole difficulty attending this part of the construc- 
tion of the canal is attached to the removal of the 
material from the shovels or other excavators to the 
spoil banks. This problem of transportation is in 
reality the substance of the problem of building the 
transisthmian canal, and, in treating tliis part of the 
project, the Board realizes and has considered the 
large amount of railroad track and the extensive 
transportation organization required for the dispo- 
sition of the waste material. It is probable, as has 
been estimated, that not less than three miles of stand- 
ard track will be required for each shovel employed, 
making a total of 300 miles of trackage for 100 
shovels. 

" If it be assumed that 100 shovels are available 
for continuous work, there being a sufficient surplus 
above that number undergoing repairs whenever nec- 
14 



210 PANAMA. 

essary to maintain the working complement, it can 
be demonstrated that as mucli as 20,000,000 cubic 
yards of material classed as rock may be annually 
removed from the summit cut. This estimate is 
based upon an average number of v^^orking days of 
not less than 20 per month throughout the year, 
which is an underestimate on the basis of the experi- 
ence of the French companies and of that which has 
accrued since American occupation began in May, 
1904. In this estimate the capacity of one shovel 
is taken as materially less than would be justified 
by the actual operation of steam shovels in the Cule- 
bra Cut during the past year, both in wet and dry 
seasons. Furthermore, it has been supposed that the 
working day is to be but eight hours long and that 
one shift only of laborers would be employed per day, 
whereas it is perfectly feasible to work two shifts in 
twenty-four hours, during the greater part of the 
year and possibly during the whole year. Using 
these estimates for the period of what may be as- 
sumed to be the maximum annual output in the Cule- 
bra Cut, and allowing at least two and a half years 
to attain this maximum rate at the beginning of the 
work and a period of not less than three years for a 
decreasing output in the more contracted space in 
the lower portions of the cut during the closing 
period of the operations, it is found that the entire 
quantity of 110,000,000 cubic yards of material in 
the divide can be removed within ten years. 



ARGUMENT FOR SEA-LEVEL. 211 

" Although the preceding estimate of time has 
been based upon ample allowances for the effect of 
the rainy seasons, for the low grade of labor availa- 
ble on the Isthmus, and for climatic conditions in 
general, the Board has added about 25 per cent to it 
for other contingent causes of delay, either similar 
to those already provided for or of any other charac- 
ter. It is therefore the judgment of the Board that 
a ship canal on the sea-level plan outlined in this re- 
port can be completed within a period of time not ex- 
ceeding twelve or thirteen years." 

ARGUMENT FOR SEA-LEVEL CANAL. 

The report goes on to a statement of the reasons for 
preferring a sea-level canal to one on the lock plan. 
Many of these reasons are vigorously disputed by the 
minority section of the Board who have the support 
of a number of engineers thoroughly conversant with 
the subject. 

The chief argument of the Board for the adoption 
of its plan is based on the assumption that any type 
of canal involving lift locks as an essential feature 
must entail a degi'ee of hazard in the matter of ob- 
structions and accidents that would be absent from 
a watei-way at sea level. A large proportion of the 
report is devoted to the advancement of this propo- 
sition which, as we shall see later, is open to question, 
to say the least of it. In the opinion of the Board 



212 PANAMA. 

the " locks constitute a restriction or limit to the 
capacity for traffic of the waterway in which they are 
found, i. e., they are in a substantial measure ob- 
structions to navigation. There is a limit to the 
number of lockages per day which may be made, per- 
haps not to exceed ten per lock or twenty per pair 
in any of the lock plans hitherto considered. The 
maintenance and operation of locks is also expensive. 

COST OF MAINTENAJSrCE. 

" If of such great dimensions as those considered 
necessary by the Board under the Spooner Act, they 
require the installation, maintenance, and operation 
of an extensive power plant for the working of the 
gates. It is not easy to estimate what the annual 
cost of maintenance, including renewals and opera- 
tion, of these would be, but, using the estimates of the 
Isthmian Canal Commission of 1899-1901, it is 
probable that the annual cost of operation of the six 
locks contemplated in the project brought before the 
Board would be about $525,000. This annual charge 
capitalized at three per cent would make a sum of 
$17,500,000 to be added to the cost of the lock canal. 
The corresponding item in the sea-level plan would be 
the capitalized annual cost of operating the tidal 
locks near Panama, 



COST OF SEA-LEVEL. 213 

" It has already been stated as the opinion of the 
Board that the time required for the construction of 
the Panama Canal with a suimnit level at 60 feet 
above mean sea level will at best be only two years 
less than required for the construction of the sea- 
level canal. But, as affecting this question of time, 
it should be observed that accidents during construc- 
tion leading to an extension of the time required to 
complete the canal would be more likely to occur in 
the more numerous structures involved in the build- 
ing of the lock canal than in the works of the sea- 
level canal. It has further been shown that the dif- 
ference in cost between the two plans will not exceed 
about $71,000,000 in favor of the former, which 
must be reduced by the capitalized cost of the main- 
tenance and operation of locks and by the cost of the 
overflowed lands." 

The report closes with an expression of the belief 
of the Board that " the essential and the indispensa- 
ble features of a convenient and safe ship canal at 
the American Isthmus are now known; that such a 
canal can be constructed in twelve or thirteen years' 
time ; that the cost will be less than $250,000,000 ; 
that it will endure for all time." 

The minority report was signed by Messrs. ISToble, 
Abbot, Steams, Ripley and Randolph. The project 
proposed by it is set forth more exhaustively and 
with greater precision than is the plan recommended 
by the majority. 



iU PANAMA. 

The minority " believe a lock canal the better one 
for the United States to construct, for the following 
reasons : 1. Greater capacity for traffic than af- 
forded by the narrow waterway proposed by the 
Board. 2. Greater safety for ships and less danger 
of interruption to traffic by reason of the wider and 
deeper channels which the lock canal makes possible 
at small cost. 3. Quicker passage across the Isth- 
mus for large ships or a large traffic. 4. Materially 
less time required for construction. 5. Materially 
less cost." It will be noted that the most important 
of these considerations are precisely the advantages 
which the Board claims for the sea-level over the 
lock type of waterway, but, it may be added, the 
minority has made out a strong enough case on ita 
side to gain the support of the Canal Commission and 
of the Administration. 

lock: canal pkoject of the minoeity. 

The project is a modification of that proposed by 
the Isthmian Canal Commission of 1899-1901, which 
was itself based upon a number of preceding plans. 
The summit level is practically the same in each case. 
The minority plan provides for gi'eater dimensions 
than did that of the Commission, and recommends a 
dam at Gatun in place of that proposed at Bohio and 
places the terminal lock at Sosa instead of at Mira- 
flores. 



THE CANAL ROUTE. 215 

A brief description of the configuration of the land 
along the canal line will conduce to a clearer under- 
standing of the plan proposed by the minority, 
which may safely be assumed to be that on which 
the waterway will be ultimately built. 

THE CONFIGUEATION OF THE CANAL, LINE. 

The Island of Manzanillo, off the northwestern 
point of which the harbor entrance to the canal is 
located, lies to a considerable extent below the level 
of the ocean. Whilst the harbor entrance to the chan- 
nel is located off the northwestern point of the Island 
of Manzanillo, it is at the mouth of the River Mindi, 
four and a half miles beyond, that the land canal be- 
gins. Here the surface of the ground is slightly above 
the ocean level. Three miles farther on it attains a 
height of 85 feet in the vicinity of Gatun. It then 
dips abruptly and from Gatun to Obispo, a distance 
of 23 miles, lies at a general elevation of 40 feet 
above the mean level of the Atlantic. Obispo may 
be called the northern entrance to the divide and 
Pedro Miguel its southern exit. The Culebra Cut, 
which extends between these points, is at present at 
an elevation of 173 feet, being 160 feet lower than 
the original crest. The cut as defined extends ap- 
proximately from point 31 to point 39.* From Pe- 



See profile map of the Canal line. 



216 PANAMA. 

dro Miguel to Sosa Hill, on the shore of Panama 
Bay, is a stretch of six miles, throughout which the 
land hardly anywhere exceeds an elevation of more 
than 10 feet above the mean level of the Pacific 
Ocean. From Sosa Hill to the 7-fathom contour in 
the Bay, near Isla Perico where the channel termi- 
nates at point 49.72, is a distance of about five miles. 
Thus we have the canal line divided into four dis- 
tinct sections: 1. The Atlantic Ocean Level, length 
7.15 miles. 2. The Summit Level, length 31.64 
miles. 3. The Pedro Migiiel-Sosa Level, length 
5.47 miles. 4. The Pacific Ocean Level, length 
4.23 miles. The sum of these sections gives us an 
aggregate of 48.49 miles, and if we add to this the 
total measurements of the locks, we shall have 49.72 
miles, being the exact length of the axis of the canal. 

The project of the 85-foot lock-level waterway is 
as simple as it is practicable. It consists briefly in 
damming the Chagres on one side of the divide and 
the Rio Grande on the other, and so forming two 
large artificial lakes. One of these will extend the 
full length of Section 2 and the other of Section 3. 
The two outer sections will be tidal channels at sea 
level. 

A glance at the profile map will show that in order 
to secure a depth of 45 feet throughout the canal, 
under this plan very little dredging and excavation 
will be required as compared with the amount neces- 
sary to the construction of a waterway at sea level. 



EXCAVATION IN THE CUT. 217 

The former has its bottom at elevation 40 above sea 
level; the latter at 40 below. It is, however, only 
where the ground stands at elevation 40 or over, that 
there will be a clear saving of 80 feet in this respect. 
In places, such as the terminal channels, the depth 
of excavation requisite will be the same in each case 
and the fact that the lock plan contemplates a much 
broader channel through much of the course tends to 
decrease the disparity in the respective excavations. 

EXCAVATION IN THE CUT. 

Between points 8 and 25 there is practically no 
elevation exceeding 40, and consequently the natural 
bottom is at or below the desired level. From San 
Pablo, point 25, to Obispo, point 31 plus, some small 
material must be removed, but the work involved will 
be insignificant. The Cut must be reduced by 133 
feet to reach the standard level of the bottom of the 
lock canal. For the sea-level construction it would 
be necessary to go 80 feet deeper and the extra depth 
would be through hard rock requiring to be blasted. 
In Lake Sosa, which will have a water level at 55 
feet, no work worth mentioning will be needed to 
secure the 45-foot depth, because, as has been stated, 
the ground lies, with insignificant exception, below 
elevation 10. 

In general the minority approves the Board's plans 
for the Colon entrance, but suggests that the break- 



818 PANAMA. 

"water might be altogether dispensed with as expen- 
sive and unnecessary, and the channel widened to 
1,000 or more feet, with advantage to navigation and 
with a reduction in cost. 

From the point where the land canal commences, 
near the mouth of the Mindi, a 500-foot channel ia 
to be continued 2.6 miles to the locks at Gatun. 

THE LAKE AHB I>AM AT GATITN". 

The controlling feature of the project, with sum- 
mit level at elevation 85, is the earth dam across the 
Chagres at Gatun. The object of this dam is to 
form a great reservoir, or inland lake, in which the 
floods of the Chagres may be received and from 
which the surplus water will be discharged through 
sluices and the height of water in the reservoir regu- 
lated. Lake Gatun will be about 110 square miles 
in area and will form the summit level of the canal. 
The lake will also serve to impound water for lock- 
age and other purposes during the dry season and 
to give free, open navigation in a broad waterway 
all the way from Gatun to Obispo. 

Every plan for a lock canal at Panama has in- 
cluded a dam across the Chagres. Various sites 
for the structure have been suggested, the most fa- 
vored being Gamboa, Bohio, and Gatun. The plan 
of the Commission, which has been referred to, con- 
templated a dam at Bohio, fonuing a lake 32 square 



GATUN DAM. 219 

miles in extent. The minority report presents forci- 
ble reasons for substituting the Gatun dam. The 
project when put into effect will transform the canal 
prism into two lakes practically extending from coast 
to coast and joined by the channel through the divide. 
The conclusions of the minority in this matter are 
based upon a great number of borings and recent 
topographical surveys. From these it is apparent 
that Gatun affords not only an entirely suitable loca- 
tion for the dam but also an excellent site, on the 
neighboring high ground, for locks. Investigation 
along these lines seems to establish the fact, which 
is of the greatest importance, that there would be 
no appreciable seepage under the dam, owing to the 
practically impervious nature of the material on 
which it would rest. In places where material of a 
somewhat less favorable character is found, it is 
covered with a blanket of practically impervious 
material 200 feet in thickness. The plans for the 
dam contemplate a structure of earth which could 
not be destroyed by the forces of nature and " could 
only be destroyed by making excavations which would 
require a large force working for a long time." 

DiMEasrsioNs of the dam. 

The top of the dam is 100 feet wide and stands 
50 feet above the normal level of the lake ; at water 
level the distance through the dam is 374 feet, aiul 



220 



PANAMA. 



GATUNDAM 




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GATUN DAM. 



The embankment, with its great sluice, extends 
across the map, with the Locks upon the extreme 
right. 

The Panama Railroad will be diverted to a line 
east of tlie Locks and will cross an arm of Lake 
Gatun over a causeway, via Tiger Hill, to dry gronnd 
near Ahorca Laffarto. 



DIMENSIONS OF DAM. 221 

at sea level the corresponding distance is 2,625 feet, 
or one-half mile. For the upstream slope, rock ob- 
tained from canal excavations will be dumped as 
riprap, with a special thickness about tJie level at 
which the dam will be exposed to wave action. 
Above elevation 80 the dam will be built of imper- 
vious material to a few feet above the water level, 
and the higher portions will be made of whatever 
materials may be most convenient, it being expected 
that spoil from the Culebra Cut will be used to a 
great extent. 

EN^ORMOUS WEIGHT' OF THE DAM. 

A dam such as the one proposed is enormously 
heavy, the weight upon its foundation being about 
one ton per square foot for each 20 feet in height of 
embankment. Under the highest part of the em- 
bankment the pressure would be six and one-half ton3 
per square foot. It is believed that this dam will 
be earthquake proof. It is designed to be very much 
stronger than the greatest existing earth dams in the 
world, those of San Leandro and Pilarcitos, con- 
nected respectively with the waterworks systems of 
Oakland and San Francisco. 

The total leng-th of the dam from the locks to the 
westerly end is 1,700 feet. About midway in its 
length is rising ground through which it is proposed 
to excavate a diversion channel to carry the Chagres 



222 PANAMA. 

during the construction of the dam. The regulating 
works, which will be described hereafter, are to be 
located on each side of the diversion channel and 
partly within it. On either flank of the rising 
ground to which reference has been made, and ex- 
tending from it westerly to the high ground and 
easterly to the locks at the back of Gatun, there will 
be great earth embankments of the cross section al- 
ready described, which will together contain 21,200,- 
000 cubic yards of material. The westerly embank- 
ment will cross a French diversion channel. The 
easterly embankment will cross the French canal and 
the Chagres. 

The regulating works are thus designed. The cen- 
tral 150 feet of their length, which will be built 
from the bottom of the diversion channel, is to be a 
solid mass of concrete, having its crest at elevation 
69. On the top of the crest, piers eight feet in thick- 
ness, grooved for Stoney sluice gates, are to be built, 
38 feet from centre to centre, having clear openings 
of 30 feet. The gates, as proposed, are almost exact 
counterparts of the gates provided for controlling the 
flow from the lower end of the Chicago Drainage 
Canal. For the whole length of the regulating works 
the design is the same as for the central portion, ex- 
cept that the concrete rests upon the surface of the 
rock or upon excavations made in the rock. The 
water passing through the central sluices will flow 
directly out through the diversion channel to the 



ADVANTAGES OF DAM. 223 

Chagres. The regulating works are capable of dis- 
charging 140,000 cubic feet per second when the 
water of the lake is no more than one foot above the 
normal level. 

Despite the great quantity of material to be placed 
in the Gatun dam, the report shows that a large 
saving will be effected by the structure. The project 
of the Commission included a dam at Bohio, a spill- 
way, an outlet from tlie Pena Blanca swamp, diver- 
sion channels for the Chagres and Gatun rivers, and 
a stretch of canal between Gatun and Bohio. All 
these works, which were estimated to cost $23,640,- 
221, are avoided by the scheme of the Gatun dam, and 
its construction, together with a necessary diversion 
of the Panama Railroad, will be effected with an ex- 
penditure of less than $12,000,000. The calcula- 
tion takes no account of locks, however. The Com- 
mission's plan provided for only two locks at Bohio, 
of comparatively small size. The requirement of the 
Spooner Act makes it necessary to provide locks of 
greater dimensions and the minority members of the 
Board deem it advisable to make the ascent to the 
8 5 -foot summit level with three flights. These will 
cost more than the two proposed for the Bohio dam. 

THE AI>VAJSrT'AGES OF THE GATUN DAM. 

" The adoption of Gatun as a site for a dam not 
only provides for reduced cost and a better lock site, 



224 PANAMA. 

but, as compared with Bohio, it affords several advan- 
tages. The first of these is a large addition to the^ 
drainage area tributarj to the summit level and to 
the amount of water available for canal uses, which 
is of special value during dry seasons ; the second is 
the great increase in the reservoir area. Lake Gatun 
having three times the area of a lake formed by a 
dam at Bohio ; this permits storing water for the dry 
season and the reception of floods with a maximum 
variation of lake level of ouly about one-half of that 
taken by the first Isthmian Canal Commission for 
Lake Bohio. A third advantage is the extension of 
lake navigation nine and one-half miles toward the 
Atlantic from Bohio; a fourth is that the Chagres 
and all its important tributaries will be received into 
the lake at points so distant from the canal route that 
no deposit of suspended matter will occur along it, 
and a fifth is that the water discharged from the lake 
will enter the Chagres at the point where it finally 
diverges from the canal so that no diversion chan- 
nels or heavy protecting embankments will be re- 
quired along the canal line." 

IMPORTANT MATTER OF "WATER SUPPLY. 

The highly important subject of water supply 
has been treated by General Henry L. Abbot in a 
paper which forms an appendix to the report. Re- 
corded measurements of flow covering a period of 



WATER SUPPLY. 225 

fifteen years give 1,250 feet per second dnring the 

three driest months. In order to make their calcn- 

lation entirely safe the minority has accepted 80 per 

cent of this volume as a basis. The lake can, towards 

the end of the wet season, be safely raised one foot 

above the normal level and provision has been made 

in the plans for drawing the water three feet below 

this mark. Therefore the equivalent of four feet 

of depth in the lake, or 12,270,000,000 cubic feet, 

will be available for water supply purposes in the 

dry season. This quantity will furnish a steady 

flow of 1,577 cubic feet per second for ninety days, 

making the total quantity of water after adding the 

inflow, 2,577 cubic feet per second. After allowing 

for evaporation, infiltration, power for operating 

gates and for lighting, etc., there remains 1,350 

cubic feet per second available for lockage. 

" To determine the number of lockages which this 
quantity of water will provide for, the following pro- 
visions and assumptions have been made : 

" Intermediate gates are to be provided for the 
locks at Pedro Miguel and Sosa, so as to give a 
chamber length of 600 feet,* and it is assumed that 
the intermediate gates will be used for eight-tenths 
of the lockages, ... It is further assumed that 
all ships passing in one direction will use one set of 
locks and all ships passing in the other another set. 



The full length of lockf? is 900 feet clear. 
15 



226 PANAMA. 

On this assumption the same quantity of water is 
used whether a ship passes through a single lock or 
through two or three in flight. The lift to the nor- 
mal level at Pedro Miguel is 30 feet and at Gatun 
28.50 feet per lock. The quantity oi water required 
per lockage at Pedro Miguel, on the assumption that 
intermediate gates will be used eight-tenths of the 
time, is 22.13 cubic feet per second, and the quan- 
tity per lockage at Gatun 29.77 cubic feet per second, 
making a total of 51.90 cubic feet per second. The 
net available quantity of water is, as already stated, 
1,350 cubic feet per second, and will therefore pro- 
vide for 26 lockages per day at each lock in the driest 
season." 

When the time comes that a greater number of 
daily lockages must be provided for there will be no 
difficulty about compassing the requirement. The 
Alhajuela dam and reservoir as proposed by the 
Comite Technique, will supply enough water for at 
least 27 additional lockages per day. 

In order to ascertain the amount of tonnage that 
may be accommodated by the canal as planned, with- 
out the contingent Alhajuela addition, the traffic of 
the Suez Canal has been taken as a basis. The size 
of the vessels passing through that waterway has 
fiteadily increased during the past decade: in 1894 
they averaged 2,398, and ten years later 3,163. The 
system of measuring tonnage at the canal, however, 
gives figures about one-sixth in excess of Lloyd's 



THE SUMMIT-LEVEL. 227 

net register. It seems propable that when the traffic 
at the Isthmus requires 26 lockages per day, in view 
of the growth in the size of ships and of the fact that 
two ships of ordinary size can pass through a lock 
at the same time, the amount of tonnage per lock will 
be as much as 5,000. On this assumption the canal, 
as planned by the minority, will accommodate up- 
wards of 47,000,000 tons without the Alhajuela reser- 
voir and twice as much with the aid of its water 
supply. 

THE SUMMIT LEVEL. 

Three flights of locks at Gatun will give access to 
the summit level. These locks will be in duplicate, 
thereby admitting of the temporary disuse of one 
flight on account of accident or repairs without seri- 
ous impediment to traffic. The dimensions of locks 
throughout the canal will be length clear, 900 feet; 
usable width, 95 feet; depth over the miter sill, 40 
feet. 

Of the total length of the lake — 30 miles — 23 
miles will be included in the line of the canal. At 
Gatun, and as far thence as Bohio, the depth will be 
75 feet or thereabouts, gradually reducing until at 
Obispo it will be 45 feet. For a distance of nearly 
sixteen miles from the Gatun locks the deep portion 
of the lake will have a width generally exceeding 
half a mile and, with only a small amount of exca- 



228 PANAMA. 

vation, a channel may be provided having a width 
nowhere less than 1,000 feet at the bottom and with 
a minimum depth of 45 feet. .Farther up the lake, 
as the amount of excavation needed to secure a sim- 
ilar depth increases, the channel will narrow, first 
to 800 feet for a distance of almost four miles, from 
San Pablo to Juan Grande, then for about the same 
distance to 500 feet until Obispo is reached. Foi 
one and a half miles, from Obispo to Las Cascadas, 
the width of the channel at bottom will be 300 feet 
and through the remaining distance of the Culebra 
Cut it will be 200 feet. Thus the 23-mile stretch 
from Gatun to the entrance of the great cut will be 
through a channel nowhere less than 500 feet wide. 
This broad waterway will actually furnish lake navi- 
gation very similar to that of the chain of small 
lakes that connects Lake Superior with Lake Huron, 
and which is styled St. Mary's River. This channel, 
from 300 to 600 feet in width, is traversed monthly 
by a tonnage approximating 3,500,000, at a speed 
Avhich is limited by regulation to nine miles an hour 
only on account of the density of the trafl&c. 

The projected canal is designed to follow straight 
lines in the main. Where changes of direction oc- 
cur, the outer channel lines of adjacent courses are 
to be carried to an intersection, which may be done 
with little additional excavation ; the point of the 
inner angle will be dredged ojff so that a curve of 
8,000 feet or more radius can be laid down wholly 



LAKE SOSA. 229 

witliin the channel limits. All the changes of direc- 
tion in the stretch above described will be in a chan- 
nel at least 600 feet broad above the turn and 300 
feet below it. 

Following the 200-foot channel through the deep 
portion of the Culebra Cut will come a stretch of 
close on two miles, with a width of 300 feet, to the 
locks at Pedro Miguel, where the summit level ter- 
minates. The duplicate locks at this point will have 
one lift of 31 feet. 

LAKE SOSA. 

On the farther side of the Pedro Miguel locks will 
be formed an artificial lake by the construction of 
three dams. This lake will have an area of about 
eight square miles and will extend from Pedro Mi- 
guel to Sosa Hill where duplicate flights of two 
locks each will be placed. The channel through 
Lake Sosa will be 500 feet wide for a distance of 
more than a mile and a half from the Pedro Miguel 
locks ; it will then open out to 1,000 feet or more for 
the remainder of the^distance. 

The principal dam is the one at La Boca which 
extends from the locks at Sosa Hill across the mouth 
of the Rio Grande to San Juan Hill. The other 
dams extend from Sosa Hill to Ancon Hill and from 
Ancon Hill in the direction of Corozal to high land 
across the Panama Railroad. Tn order to provide 



230 PANAMA. 

for the discliarge of the Rio Grande and other rivers 
entering the lake during the construction of the earth 
dams, a diversion channel about 50 feet wide is t6 
be cut through the slope of Sosa Hill, near the end 
of the Ancon-Soea dam, and sluices or regulating 
works, similar to those designed for the Gatun dam, 
but of much less extent, are to be subsequently built 
in the channel. 

EARLY SITGGESTIONS ADOPTED. 

The idea of building dams at, or near, the ends of 
the canal and forming artificial lakes is not a new 
one; in fact it was amongst the very earliest sugges- 
tions made in connection with the canal enterprise. 
It was presented by Mr. Kliet>z to the International 
Congress of Engineers at Paris in 1879, but that 
body decided in favor of a sea-level waterway. The 
Gatun dam was suggested in a discussion of inter- 
oceanic canal projects by Mr. Ashbel Welch in 1880, 
before the American Society of Civil Engineers. 
Both the Gatun and Pacific dam projects were ad- 
vanced in a paper read before that society by Mr. 
C. D. Ward in 1904, and were included by Mr. Lin- 
don Bates in the plan submitted by him to the Con- 
sulting Board of Engineers. 

The advantages of the terminal lake on the Pacific 
side are a saving of about $8,000,000 in the cost of 
the canal and greatly improved navigation secured 



ESTIMATES OF LOCK CANAL 231 

by the introduction of more than five miles of chan- 
nel not less than 500 feet wide and 45 feet deep. 
It also dispenses with the sea-level cut from La Boca, 
to Miraflores which involved several objectionable 
features. 

From the Sosa lock to the seven-fathom curve in 
Panama Bay the distance is four miles. The chan- 
nel along this stretch will be 300 feet wide and 45 
feet deep below mean tide. These are the dimen- 
sions adopted by the Board for the sea-level project, 
and whilst accepting them, the minority take occasion 
to express their opinion, that they might be increased 
in both respects with advantage to navigation. As, 
however, frequent dredging will be necessary to the 
maintenance of this channel, it is more than probable 
that it will become gradually enlarged. 

Only about one-seventh of the entire channel, ac- 
cording to this project, having a length of 49.72 
miles, is less than 300 feet in width, while more 
than two-thirds of it is 500 feet wide or over. The 
estimated cost of the canal to be built in accordance 
with this plan is " in round numbers," $140,000,000. 

The estimated time required for the completion of 
the minority project is calculated upon much the 
same bases as those employed by the Board in making 
its time estimate, but the minority expresses the 
opinion that the allowance of their confreres for the 
completion of the Culebra Cut to 40 feet below sea 
level is much too low and that it should be not less 



232 PANAMA. 

than fifteen years. Upon the assumption that it will 
require fifteen years to excavate the 110,000,000 
cubic yards involved in the sea-level project, it is de- 
cided that the " time required for the lock canal 
with summit level at elevation 85, which requires the 
excavation of 53,800,000 cubic yards from the cen- 
tral mass, would be about seven and one-half years, 
a conclusion which is verified by a study of conditions 
in the heaviest portion; but before accepting this 
period as the time required to build the canal, con- 
sideration must be given to the question of time re- 
quired to build the locks." 

THE GATUN LOCKS. 

Under the minority plan the greatest amount of 
lock construction will be needed at Gatun. The 
amount of excavation for this lock, embracing a dis- 
tance of 3,136 linear feet, measured along the canal 
axis, will be 3,600,000 cubic yards, and the average 
width of the excavation will not differ greatly from 
the average width of the Culebra Cut in the heaviest 
section. Applying the standard of measurement that 
has been accepted for the latter operation, the Gatun 
excavation should be completed in four years. This 
is a conservative estimate, for, whilst the material at 
Gatun is at least as easy to excavate as that of Cule- 
bra, the general conditions at the former point are 
much more favorable to expedition, 



GATUN LOCKS. 233 

The enormous amount of concrete masoniy re- 
quired for the Gatun locks — 1,300,000 cubic yards 
— is unparalleled in the building operations of mod- 
ern times. If the plant and materials are deposited 
and arranged upon tbe ground whilst the preliminary 
work of excavation is in progress, rapidity of con- 
struction will be greatly facilitated. Judging from 
the experience in similar work on a much smaller 
scale and with fewer facilities, the report concludes 
that 8,000 cubic yards per day might be attained at 
Gatun. This calculation contemplates the simultane- 
ous employment of 20 mixing plants distributed 
along the 9,000 linear feet of the main walls of the 
locks. The final estimate of time required for this 
work is, however, based, for the sake of conservatism, 
on a daily output of only 2,500 cubic yards. At 
this rate the entire concrete would be placed in two 
and a quarter years. The materials consumed in this 
daily output would amount to 4,000 tons. This 
quantity, large as it is, does not exceed one-fifteenth 
of the weight of the material to be daily removed 
from the Culebra Cut, and its transportation should 
not create any great difficulty. The only remaining 
work of magnitude connected with the installation 
of the locks is the erection of the gates, of which 
fourteen pairs will be required for the duplicate 
flights. Making a very conservative estimate, based 
upon the experience at the Poe lock in the St. Mary's 
Canal, where the climatic conditions and the facili- 



234 PANAMA. 

ties were inferior, the report allows one year for this 
portion of the task. 

The periods included in the preceding estimates 
aggregate about seven and one-half years, which is 
a shorter time than that calculated for the excavation 
of the Culebra Cut ; but this lock calculation is made 
on the assumption that each of the three stages of the 
operation under consideration would be entered upon 
at the termination of that preceding, whereas they 
would in fact overlap and to a considerable extent 
be carried on simultaneously, thus effecting a con- 
siderable reduction in the total expenditure of time. 
The locks at Pedro Miguel and those at Sosa are of 
less magnitude than the structures at Gatun and 
would occupy a shorter time in erection. There is 
no other single work which will entail anything like 
the time needed for the cut through the divide. 

Making ample allowance for possible delays, the 
minority members of the Board feel assured that the 
canal as projected by them may be completed in all 
its details within nine years from the time that opera- 
tions are commenced. 

DIFFEEENCES OP OPIIiflOlSr AS TO TYPE OF CAITAL. 

There has been much diversity of opinion amongst 
experts on the subject of the type of canal. The pre- 
ponderance of public sentiment is in favor of the so- 
called " sea-level " waterway, but it is generally based 



WEIGHT OF OPINION. 235 

upon a misconception. The idea that the sea-level 
canal recommended by the Board would be a wide 
channel that could be freely navigated by ocean ves- 
sels at comparatively high speed is altogetlier errone- 
ous. There is unanimous agreement amongst engin- 
eers that the ideal waterway would be one of the 
dimensions of straits, which might receive the waters 
of the Chagres and be subjected to the full action of 
the Pacific tide without serious impediment to traf- 
fic. Such a waterway is, however, entirely infeasible. 
Its completion would occupy fifty or more years and 
its cost would not be less than $500,000,000. In the 
sea-level canal contemplated by the majority of the 
Board, one-half of the distance the bottom width of 
the channel is only 150 feet and for about the same 
distance it is 200 feet. These lateral dimensions 
with a depth of about 40 feet are considered the 
greatest economically permissible. The question at 
issue is the choice between such a canal and one at a 
high level with locks. 

The weight of expert opinion is decidedly in favor 
of a lock canal. The Panama Canal Company was 
forced to abandon its sea-level project and the con- 
clusions of the Comite Technique support the lock 
plan, but, since the French companies were influ- 
enced by restrictive conditions from which the 
American Government is free, we may leave their ex- 
perience out of consideration. The first Walker Com- 
mission favored a lock canal, although its chief en- 



236 PANAMA. 

gineer, Mr. Wallace, entertained a belief that the 
sea-level construction would be preferable. With one 
exception, the present Commission supports the rec- 
ommendation of the five American members who 
made up the minority of the Consulting Board of 
Engineers. The President, Secretary Taft and 
Chief Engineer Stevens have lined themselves upon 
the same side and the weight of expert opinion, in 
this country at least, is, without doubt, similarly 
disposed. 

THE BOARD DEPRECIATED THE " SOO ''CANAL. 

In reaching their decision, the majority of the 
Board failed to give to the experience of the Sault 
Ste. Marie Canal the degree of consideration which, 
in the opinion of American authorities, it should 
have excited. Nevertheless, the St. Mary Canal is, 
measured by traffic, the most important ship canal in 
the world. Although navigation through it is sus- 
pended during the winter months, the annual tonnage 
it accommodates is in excess of the combined tonnage 
of the Suez, Manchester, Kiel and Amsterdam canals 
and the Poe lock alone has three times the traffic of 
the Suez Canal during the season of navigation. 

The difficulties and extent of construction would be 
much greater in the case of the sea-level canal than in 
that of the high level. Aside from the much greater 
excavation which would be for the most part in hard 



CAPACITIES OF CANALS. 237 

rock, a large dam at Gamboa Is provided for and 
tunnels and diversion channels to accommodate the 
superfluous waters of various streams. The plan of 
the lock canal is based on well-understood and tested 
conditions, whilst it is quite possible that unforeseen 
problems and difficulties might arise in the construc- 
tion of a waterway at sea level. In other words, one 
form of canal involves less hazard than the other. 

In the matter of permanency the project of the 
minority has a decided advantage. The high-level 
waterway may be deepened* and enlarged and its 
locks replaced by others of larger dimensions, at com- 
paratively small cost and without serious obstruction 
to traffic, but increase in the size of the channel at sea 
level could only be effected at great cost, together with 
interruption to navigation. 

In the comparison of capacity the difference be- 
tween the forms of canal under consideration is par- 
ticularly marked. Vessels of the largest size could 
not pass each other in the narrower waterway and 
there are two ships at present on the stocks whose 
load draft would bring their keels to within two feet 
of its bottom. It is doubted whether the largest type 
of ships could safely traverse the sea-level canal un- 
der their own steam and it is certain that they could 



* Increased depth in Lakes Gatun and Sosa could be effected 
by the simple process of elevating the dams and spillways and 
admitting a larger volume of water, of which the supply is 
practically unlimited. 



23S PANAMA. 

not exceed a speed of four miles an hour, whilst twice 
that rate would be quite practicable in the lakes form- 
ing the greater part of the lock canal. This advan- 
tage would more than compensate for the loss of time 
entailed in locking and would permit large vessels to 
make the transit by the high-level route in the shorter 
time. On the other hand, ships of smaller types 
would make the passage through the canal at sea 
level with about half an hour's saving in time. 

The majority of the Board seem to have entertained 
fears of the safety of the locks which the American 
authorities, whose experience in this respect is un- 
equalled, consider unwarranted. The latter express 
the utmost confidence in the locks and declare that 
the danger of blocking is much greater in the case of 
the narrow waterway than in that of the other. It 
is admitted by the advocates of the lock project that 
the mechanical structures in a canal of that type 
would be easily damaged or destroyed by an enemy, 
but they deem the commercial advantages paramount 
to military considerations. 

In regard to time and cost of construction, the 
high-level canal has altogether the better of the argu- 
ment, and especially so since the Commission seems 
to have demonstrated that the sea-level canal cannot 
be completed at a smaller outlay than $272,000,000 
and in less time than eighteen or twenty years. 

In passing the Spooner Act, Congress had in mind 
a canal such as was planned by the Walker Commis- 



EARTHQUAKE SCARE. 239 

sion: that recommended by the Administration and 
the present Commission conforms to the former in 
the essential features and departs from it only in the 
direction of improvements. 'No further Congres- 
sional action is necessary in order to proceed on these 
lines, but new legislation, including an increased 
appropriation, would be needed for the prosecution of 
the sea-level project. 

Note. — Almost at the moment of going to press, it is learned 
that the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals has, by a 
majority of one, decided to report in favor of the so-called 
" sea-level " canal. This decision is believed to be attributable 
to nervous apprehension, excited by the recent San Francisco 
disaster. Inadequate as is that reason, it appears to be the 
only one assignable to the surprising course of the Committee. 
That the weight of expert opinion is preponderatingly in favor 
of the lock, or high-level plan, is indisputable. Prudence, pub- 
lic policy, and the interests of the tax-payer point in the same 
direction. There are hazards involved in both projects, but by 
far the greater proportion attach to the sea-level undertaking. 
As to the earthquake risk, a shock that would seriously injure 
the lock canal as planned might be expected to work equal, 
or greater injury to the sea-level channel, and such a shock 
is not within the recorded experience of the Panama region. 
The sea-level plan includes dams, levees, and locks, connected 
with a waterway so restricted in dimensions, that any disturb- 
ance of its normal conditions could not fail to subject traffic 
to grave inconvenience and danger. In this connection it 
should be noted that the earth dams at San Francisco and 
Oakland, which are much less strong and massive than that 
proposed for Gatun, appear to have survived the recent con- 
vulsion on the Pacific Coast without damage. 



PANAMA. 

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE CANAL. 

The Healfn Problem — The Opinions of a Medical Expert — 
The Sanitary Campaign — Conservative Views of Colonel 
Gorgas — The Labor Question — Many Lands Will be 
Drawn Upon for Labor — Poor Quality of Labor is one oi 
the Chief Drawbacks — Expensive Character of Low-grade 
Labor — The Canal and the Commerce of America — Effect 
of the Canal on the Commerce of the South — Great Bene- 
fits to Our Pacific States — A Boon to the Northeastern 
Territory — Our Advantage Over Foreign Competitors — 
Political and Military Aspects — Difficulty of Guarding the 
Canal. 

No material work of man since tlie creation of the 
world lias had so deep and widespread influence upon 
the affairs of mankind in general as that which may 
calculablj be expected to ensue from the establish- 
ment of the Panama Canal. The results will be seen 
in commercial, political, social, and even religious, 
effects. It will make and mar the fortunes of na- 
tions. Cousin, the Trench philosopher, has said: 
" Tell me the geography of a country and I will tell 
you its destiny." By creating important modifica- 
tions in the geographical relations of certain com- 
munities the Canal will be the means of bringing 

240 



THE HEALTH PROBLEM. 241 

about great and lasting changes which are beyond the 
range of accurate forethought. The subject is a 
vastly interesting one that would afford ready mate- 
rial for a volume of speculative studies, but our 
present purpose will only permit a limited considera- 
tion of a few of the most obvious conditions con- 
nected with the construction and future operation of 
the prodigious waterway. 

THE HEALTH PROBLEM. 

The question of sanitation, closely allied as it is 
to that of labor, has always been an important factor 
in operations conducted upon the Isthmus of Pan- 
ama, but fortunately, with the advance of time, 
the difficulties presented by it have become ever more 
susceptible to scientific treatment. The Panama 
Eailroad was built at an appalling sacrifice of life. 
At that time a blind contest was waged with disease, 
but no serious effort was made to mitigate the con- 
ditions that produced it. The French companies 
adopted some preventive measures and their pro- 
vision for the care of tlie sick was admirable, but it 
remained for American administration to attack the 
problem in the determined and radical manner that 
promises to minimize effects by reducing causes. 

The observation and expeHence of medical scien- 
tists in recent years has led to the conclusion that 

the dangers to health and the difficulties of sanita- 
16 



242 PANAMA. 

tion in Panama have been very much exaggerated. 
It is believed that the climate is not nearly so harm- 
ful, even to white men, as has generally been sup- 
posed. Due allowance has not been made hitherto 
for the indulgent habits of most of the French em- 
ployees of the canal company, nor for the poor phy- 
sique of a large majority of the laborers engaged by 
it. Furthermore the physical conditions of the scene 
of operations have undergone great changes since the 
inception of the work and we are now past the stage 
of surface disturbance, when deadly emanations were 
constantly released by the excavations. Several ac- 
tive factors of a favorable character enter into the 
present calculations of the sanitary department. The 
cities of Panama and Colon are being rapidly placed 
in possession of good and adequate water and sewer- 
age systems and strict quarantine regulations are en- 
forced. Certain unsanitary practices of the inhabit- 
ants of the Canal Zone and the cities in question 
have been abated and will be abolished. Add to all 
this the war on the infectious mosquito and we have 
conditions that ensure a vast improvement in the 
general health of the Isthmus. Still it is not ex- 
pected that the utmost results hoped for will enable 
white men in general to perform manual labor at 
Panama any more than they may in other tropical 
regions. The object sought, and which will surely be 
attained, is to eliminate all unnecessary inimical 
conditions and limit the difficulty of residence on the 



A MEDICAL OPINION. 243 

Isthmus to mere resistance to a tropical climate of 
not extraordinary severity. 

THE OPINIONS OF A MEMCAL EXPERT. 

In tliis connection we can not do better than quote 
Doctor Lacroisade, who resided on the Isthmus in an 
official medical capacity from 1887 until recently: 
" Among the diseases attributed to the climate the 
most numerous are simple marsh fevers, which have 
not occasioned a single death. Two diseases only 
belonging ,to the epidemic type have appeared — the 
beriberi, of which there is no longer any question,* 
and yellow fever. The latter, after having been ab- 
sent from the Isthmus for at least six years, was im- 
ported in 189Y, and continued about six months, 
from March to August, when it again disappeared 
after very slight ravages (only six deaths). Thus it 
can not be considered that this pest is really epidemic 
on the Isthmus. From the other infectious epi- 
demics, such as variola, typhoid fever, diphtheria, 
etc., the Isthmus appears to be almost entirely ex- 
empt. From the foregoing we may conclude that 
life on the Isthmus scarcely incurs more dangers than 

* The disease, which had probably never before been known in 
the region, was introduced with an experimental importation 
of negroes from Africa, and disappeared when they were re- 
turned to their homes, but it has recurred. There were no 
fewer than thirty-two cases in the Aneon Hospital during 
October, 1905. 



244 PANAMA. 

elsewhere, even for Europeans, who, after the blacks 
of the British Antilles, appear to resist the climate 
best. Residence here would, then, offer nothing 
alarming, were it not for a constant feeling of fatigue 
and uneasiness due to a temperature always high, 
and an atmosphere saturated with moisture." In 
thus advancing arguments against the exaggerated 
notions prevalent regarding the climate and sanita- 
tion of the Isthmus there is no thought of detracting 
from the splendid work which the medical officers are 
performing imder the Commission. The object is to 
show that with their aid the canal operations may 
be, and doubtless will be, completed without an at- 
tendant heavy mortality. The Walker Commission 
was .accompanied on its first visit to the Isthmus in 
March, 1904, by three eminent physicians, who had 
achieved wide distinction by their sanitary work in 
Cuba. They were Colonel Gorgas and Major La 
Garde of the United States Army and Captain Eoss 
of the IsTavy. The sanitary work of the Isthmus was 
entrusted to these officers, but they occupied dis- 
tinctly subordinate positions and had no voice in the 
Commission nor, it is believed, the degree of inde- 
pendent authority in their particular sphere of labor 
with which they should have been invested. Amongst 
the charges of inefficiency that were brought against 
the former Commission was that of failure to give 
sufficient consideration to the immediate demands of 
sanitation. It was generally understood that the 



•AN EARLY MISTAKE. 245 

medical staff felt dissatisfied with conditions on the 
Isthmus in so far as thej related to the departments 
of health, but it is much to the credit of those officers 
that thej made no public complaint and pursued their 
efforts with unimpaired zeal whilst conscious that 
the arrangements were far from the best possible. 
Perhaps the Walker Commission may be excused 
for devoting its immediate and closest attention to 
excavation when we remember the unreasonable im- 
patience of the press and the people to see " the dirt 
fly." One of the members of the former Commis- 
sion has declared that it was fully appreciative of 
the wisdom of the policy since adopted and at pres- 
ent in force, and the presumption is that in following 
a different course Admiral Walker and his associates 
were impelled by a desire to have " something to 
show " as soon as possible. 

One of the first important decisions of the Execu- 
tive Committee of the Shonts Commission was to 
stop the work of excavation and to direct the labors 
of the entire force upon sanitary improvements. 
This policy is based upon a conviction that after 
the region has been cleansed and subjected to pre- 
ventive measures and when proper provision has been 
made for lodging and feeding the laborers and em- 
ployees the construction will progress with gTeater 
speed and fewer casualties than if it were to be 
pushed ahead without such preliminary work. 

Aside from the permanent improvements at the 



246 PANAMA. 

terminal ports the most important element in the task 
of sanitation is that of destroying or rendering in- 
nocuous the mosquitoes, through whose agency ma- 
laria and yellow fever are propagated. A similar 
problem was presented to Colonel Gorgas and his 
associates in Havana. The methods followed there, 
with necessary modifications, will be adopted in Pan- 
ama. 

THE. SANITAHY CAMPAIGIf. 

The plan is simple but entails a vast amount 
of labor. It is thoroughly established that the 
anopheles becomes infected by biting a sufferer from 
malaria. The first step, then, is to bring under im- 
mediate supervision, as nearly as possible, all the 
malarial subjects within the Zone, and to carefully 
isolate them within screens until tlie malarial para- 
site has been eliminated from their blood. Mean- 
while a vigorous campaign is in progress against tbe 
insect carrier. Long grass and rank vegetation is cut 
down all along the line, pools are swept out and 
sprinkled with oil, dwellings are cleansed, and, in 
short, every effort is made to destroy the pest. Ee- 
ferring to the result experienced from similar action 
in Havana, Colonel Gorgas says : " At the end of 
about eight months of this work it was found that 
the number of yellow-fever mosquitoes had been 
greatly decreased, and those that were left could find 
no human being infected with yellow fever, whereby 



VIEWS OF COLONEL GORGAS. 247 

thej, the yellow-fever mosquitoes, might become in- 
fected, and thus convey it to other human beings. 
For the past three years Havana has been free from 
yellow fever. An unacclimated man can go to Ha- 
vana now, and though he may probably be bitten a 
good many times by yellow-fever mosquitoes these 
mosquitoes have had no opportunity in the past three 
years of biting a human being infected with yellow 
fever, and therefore are themselves entirely harm- 
less. This condition we hope to bring about in the 
villages along the canal route by means similar to 
those adopted in Havana." 

CONSEKVATIVE VIEWS OF COLONEiL GOEGAS. 

We will close this discussion of the health prob- 
lem with a further quotation from Colonel Gorgas, 
in which it will be seen that his ideas conform very 
closely to those expressed by Doctor Lacroisade: 
" The Panama strip is now about as healthy as the 
ordinary tropical country. The death rate is a great 
deal higher than that in ISTew York, but this would 
be the cast almost anywhere in the tropics. About 
twenty people per thousand in New York die every 
year and about fifty per thousand at Panama. The 
general idea about Panama seems to be that we shall 
suffer as the French did and as all former European 
venturers into Panama did, and that instead of dy- 
ing as we do in 'New York at the rate of twenty per 



248 PANAMA. 

thousand per year, we shall die, as sometimes oc- 
curred to the French and others at Panama, at the 
rate of five or six hundred per thousand a year. 
Other men of experience in the tropics and who have 
been at Panama for some time, maintain that the 
matter of sanitation is exceedingly simple and easy, 
and that the health of the Panama strip ought to be 
as good as that of most parts of the United States. 
Both opinions, it seems to me, are extreme, and the 
truth will fall somewhere between the two. Any 
health ofiicer with experience in dealing with a prac- 
tical question of this kind will know how exceed- 
ingly difficult it will be in a population of about fif- 
teen thousand t people infected with malaria to de- 
vise and apply any system by which the cases can be 
individually recorded and treated. Personally I ap- 
proach the problem with hope and the expectation of 
having approximately the same success that rewarded 
similar efforts applied by our military authorities 
in Cuba. But it is no simple matter. We shall no 
doubt meet with many disappointments and discour- 
agements, and shall succeed in the end only after 
many modifications of our plans and after many local 
failures." * 



f This refers to the population of the villages along the 
line of the canal. 

* It may be added that this was written about twelve 
months ago and that at the present time a great degree of 
success 18 within sight. 



THE LABOR QUESTION. 24» 

Eacli of the enterprises that preceded the Ameri- 
can occupation of the canal territory found the diffi- 
culty in securing satisfactory labor one of the great- 
est deterrents to success. 

THE LABOR QUESTION". 

The experiences of the railroad and French com- 
panies embraced the enployment of almost every 
available form of labor and seemed to point to the 
conclusion that^ all things considered, the West In- 
dian negro is the best adapted to the work. The 
French did the greater and most satisfactory portion 
of their work with Jamaican field hands and the ma- 
jority of laborers at present upon the pay-rolls of the 
Commission are of the same class, but it is question- 
able whether the enlarged demand which will present- 
ly exist can be satisfied from the same source. Secre- 
tary Taft has already expressed his misgivings on 
this score. In the early part of the year 1905 he 
reported to the President the result of a visit to 
Jamaica undertaken for the purpose of sounding the 
local authorities on the subject. " The governor of 
Jamaica," the Secretary states, " was unwilling to 
consent to our taking 10,000 laborers from the is- 
lands unless we deposited five pounds sterling per la- 
borer with the island government to meet the bur- 
den which his leaving the island would probably 
throw upon his parish under the poor law of the 



250 PANAMA. 

island for the support of those dependent upon him. 
He also insisted that we should agree to pay the 
expenses of the return of each laborer whether he was 
satisfactory or not and whether he abandoned the 
work in violation of his contract or not." Such 
terms are of course completely beyond the question 
of acceptance, but there is a strong probability that 
a large number of laborers will go to the Isthmus 
from Jamaica of their own initiative. There are 
two regular lines between Kingston and Colon which 
carry passengers from one port to the other for five 
dollars a head. Of course there is a great induce- 
ment in the fact that the wages offered on the Isth- 
mus are twice as much as those paid in Jamaica. 

MANY LANDS WILL BE DRAWN UPON FOE LABOR. 

The Jamaican negroes like the service and the 
extremely good treatment they receive. A very large 
proportion of those who enter the employ of the 
Commission remain in it. There is, however, a ten- 
dency among them to take a holiday whenever their 
accumulated savings will permit, and so there is a 
constant flow of laborers to and fro between Jamaica 
and the Isthmus. The Commission has hope that 
natives of the north of Spain will prove more satis- 
factory than any laborers heretofore employed and it 
is believed that they can be secured in large numbers. 
The governor of Porto Rico has expressed his opinion 



THE CHINESE LABORER. 251 

that the agricultural laborers of the island may be 
satisfactorily employed on the canal works, and it 
is the intention of the Commission to try a selected 
number. At the same time a test will be made of 
one thousand Chinamen and the same number of 
Japanese contract laborers. Not a great deal should 
be expected from the Porto Ricans probably, but if 
exemption of the Canal Zone from the operation of 
the Chinese exclusion law is effected a large propor- 
tion of the permanent working force will in all like- 
lihood be drawn from China. There is no good 
ground for hope that Japan will furnish, any con- 
siderable number of the laborers required. The 
Japanese are not capable of great exertion in a trop- 
ical temperature. The climate of Formosa, which is 
not nearly so trying as that of Panama, overtaxes 
their powers of endurance. Furthermore, several 
years must elapse before Japan can spare any consid- 
erable number of laborers from her own neglected 
fields. Aside from the mere matter of digging, 
Chinese are likely to be very desirable employees in 
the future. The construction of a multi-lock canal 
will involve a great deal of cement and other work 
closely approaching to expert labor, and requiring for 
its proper accomplishment a degree of intelligence on 
the part of the workman, which, in the absence of 
white labor, may only be looked for in the Chinaman. 
The real difficulty of the labor situation pertains 
less to quantity than it does to quality. Probably the 



252 PANAMA. 

Commission will eventually be able to secure as many 
men as it desires from one source and anotlier, but 
unless the standard of efficiency which has hitherto 
obtained in the " silver " force of the operation is en- 
hanced the labor problem will continue to be a serious 
one. 

THE POOE QUALITY OF LABOR IS ONE OF THE CHIEF 
DEAWBACKS. 

It is the general agreement of those who are in 
position to judge from experience, that the efiiciency 
of the common laborer on the canal is not in excess 
of 33 per cent measured by the American standard. 
In this connection Mr. Stevens says : " On the basis 
of the present rates of pay for West Indian colored 
labor, which is the lowest grade of labor, we are pay- 
ing 20 cents silver per hour, and on the 8-hour basis, 
to which we are confined by law,* it is $1.60 silver 
per day, or 80 cents gold. The relative efficiency of 
this labor as compared to ours at home is about three 
to one. In other words, we are paying to-day for 
this labor $2.40 in gold, or $4.80 in silver. Close 
inspection of the different gangs, which extended over 
at least five months, demonstrates very clearly that 
the average superintendent or foreman, either white 
from the N^orthem States, or colored from Jamaica 

■" This hampering restriction was recently removed by act ol 
Congress. 



LOW GRADE LABOR COSTLY 253 

and the other West Indian islands, has never been 
able to work continuously more than 50 per cent nu- 
merically of the different gangs. . . . Instead of 
obtaining a fairly continuous amount of labor, as we 
do from gangs here at home, one-half of the eflBciency 
of this colored labor is lost, owing to their deliberate, 
unceasing, and continuous effort to do as little work 
as possible. In other words, instead of our colored 
labor costing us $2.40 per day, the real situation is 
that we are paying twice $2.40 gold per day, or al- 
most $5 for eight hours labor." 

EXPElSrSIVE CHARACTER OF LOW-GRADE LABOR. 

N^or is the item of wages by any means a full meas- 
ure of the excessive expense entailed upon us by the 
necessity of employing low-grade labor. ISTot only 
are we paying for this 300 per cent of its true value 
judged by our standard, but the employment of it 
entails upon us in incidental expenses, connected with 
housing, feeding, hospital treatment, supervision, etc., 
probably three times as much as would be expended 
upon one-third the number of men. 

To put the statement in another form : White la- 
bor, if it were practicable, would do the work upon 
the canal at a wage of $2.50, gold, per day. We 
pay for colored labor of 30 per cent efficiency, 80 
cents per day, which would make the rate practically 
the same but for the fact that the colored laborer 



254 PANAMA. 

works on an average only half the time for which 
he draws pay. Hence our colored labor costs in 
wages twice as much as would white labor. But since 
it is necessary t.o employ three times as many of the 
former as of the latter to perform a certain amount 
of work, our incidental expenses, which may be reck- 
oned on a per capita basis, are probably three times 
as great in one case as they would be in the other. 

The West Indian laborer entertains the idea, not 
without good reason, that he is indispensable to the 
progress of the operation and the only prospect of 
getting good work from him depends upon creating 
competition by the introduction of Chinamen or some 
equally efficient laborers. 

THE OANAL AND THE COMMERCE OP AMEiEICA. 

The establishment of a waterway between the two 

great oceans of the globe will more widely affect the 

commerce of the v/orld than any single work or event 

. in its history. y President Hayes, in 1879, declared 

I that " an interoceanic canal across the American Isth- 

I mus will essentially change tlie geographic relations 

\ between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United 

I States and between the United States and the rest 

lof J^ie^ world.''^j^^ Panama route will effect much 

greater economies of time and distance than those that 

are at present secured by the use of the Suez Canal. 

Colquhoun, in his " Key to the Pacific," says : 



CANAL'S EFFECT ON COZ^OHERCE. 255 

" It will bind together the remote sections of that 
immense country, assimilate its diverse interests, go 
far towards solving many difficult problems, and make 
the United States still more united. . . . ISTo 
greater impulse to commerce can be given than this 
complement to the Suez Cana l.> It w ill bene fit A mer- 
ica in an infinitely greater degTee than Europe. 

. \,Ji-t Will give an immense impetus to United T 
States/manufactures, ; especially cotton and iron, 
and wi'Tl greatly stimulate the shipbuilding industry 
\ and tlic naval power of the United States." ./ 

AVhilst the opening of the Panama Canal must 
prove an universal boon it will doubtless work to the 
detriment of some countries and certain industries, 
at least until after adjustment of the new trade rela- 
tions. America will always be the greatest benefici- 
ary of the advantages accruing from the use of the 
waterway and we will briefly consider a few of the 
conditions that may most surely be calculated upon to 
follow the completion of the enterprise to which so 
large an amount of American energy, intellect and 
capital is devoted. 

EFFECT OF THE CANAI. ON THE COMMEE.CE OF THE 
SOUTH. 



o region in the United StafPfi Tni^Y,.hfi,.fiy;Taect-p'^ ^" 



'^^JSa.S; 



feeLjJifiuinimcdiate bonefit of the new route to the 
same extent as the Southern States and the vast 



HCli^-K^. 



lS*!«S 



256 PANAMA. 

lej of the ]VIississipgi.,|^Xi^_.latter territory, the rich- 
est in all the world, one and a quarter million square 
i niiles in extenC"Tntersected by five thousand miles 
\ of navigable waterway, with prolific soil and ener 
ffetic people, will find new markets and a new outlet 
|,JorJJg^Xar.ied,4)rpducts no longer dependent ujppn ex- 
I pensive railway transportation. Chicago is nearly 
the same distance from New Orlealns as from New 
York, but St. Paul, Omaha, Dubuque, Evansville 
and Denver are nearer to the former point than to 
the latter. It is quite probable that the present gen- 
eration will see ocean steamships coming down from 
Duluth, through the Great Lakes, an inland canal, 
and the Mississippi River, to the Gulf of Mexico, 
and passing on to Pacific and Asian ports. 
I \/The opening of the new gateway to the Pacific will 
give - a tremendous inipetus to the industries of the 
South,' Its raw cotton, which for a decade has been, ^. 
•■ making small gains, under difficult competition witl^ 
the British East Indies and China, in the Japanese 

.... ..... . ■-'ffiS^ 

' market, will he relieved of an onerous handicap, Th||^g 
product of its mills, a coarse fabric, such as is es^ 
^pecially adapted to the requirements of South Ame^ 
lean and Oriental consumers, must enjoy an enlarge^ 
demand under stimulating conditions. At present 
almost all the cotton s-oods exported from this coun- 
-.-ta^ifi^ Asia. ..gp,,ja3itj3a„^ New York eastward by 

way of the Suez CanaLV/ , 

Alabama coal will find a constant and extensive 



EFFECT ON PACIFIC STATES. 257 

demand at Panama, which will become the greatest 
coaling port, in the world. Birmingham, where iron 
can be produced more cheaply than at any other 
place on the eaji;h, will find new markets in South 
America and Asian countries for its output "v'^e^ 
steel, machinery, and various hardware of Tennessee 
and other Southern States, which have been reaching. 
Australia and China during the past few years under 
the most disadvantageous conditions of shipment, will 
*1te" sent through the Canal to these and other destina- 
— tirafg"at a cost which may defy competition:"^^<^he 
"~l3Tge"lumber and wood manufacturing industries of 
the South will "Be" obviously benefited to a great ex- 
tent by the creation of a short route to the western 
coasts of Central and South America. 

GREAT BENEFITS TO OUR PACIFIC STATES. 

y^. The immense saving in the journey from our east- 
em "ports to the Pacific Coast will revolutionize tlie 
trade of the latter region. Von Schierbrand says: * 

'-^^S^'TfTTas been computed that on a single voyage of a 
1,500-ton sailing vessel between Port Townsend, Se- 
attle or San Francisco and Boston, l^ew York or 
Philadelphia, the saving effected in wages, repairs, in- 
surance, provisions, and freight charges, by reason of 
the Panama Canal will aggregate between $8,000 and 

* America, Asia and the Pacific. Wolf von Schierbrand. 

New York, 1904. 
17 



258 PANAMA. 

$9,500." Many raw products of our Pacific Coast, 
which at present can not bear the cost of long rail- 
road hauls, will be made available to eastern markets 
at prices profitable to the producer and the manufac- 
turer. This applies particularly to building lumber 
and furnishes a partial solution to the problem with 
which the rapidly disappearing forests of our middle 
and eastern states are confronting us. J^l|ie^jconomies 
thM^isill be effected in the t^'aasportation^of the cereal 
and fruit products of California and other western 
regions may easily be imagined. Millions of pounds J' 
of fish are sent annually in ice across the continent 
aside from the enormous quantities that go to Europe 
in English sailing vessels round Cape Horn. Alfe 
this would pass through the Canal if it w^exe openjjs^ 
and the present shipments of salmon alone wonild re- 
quire twenty vessels of 2,000 tons each. > ^^. 

,^he Canal will be the means of enabling the -pjefifc;^,^™ 
e of the Pacific Coast to buy more cheaply and >^k , 
secure better prices for their products, ^^y breaking 
the monopolistic power of the railroads it will lead 
to the agricultural development of the unoccupie^"^ 
sections of this territory, to a vast increase in its*'^ 
population and to the creation of world-wide maj^ 
kets for its products. 

A BOON" TO THE NORTHEASTEEJiT TEBKITOBY. 

The industries of the northeastern section of the 




CX)AL AND THE CANAL. 259 

United States, that is to say the territory lying to the 
east of Pittsburg and to the north of the James River, 
consist mainly of the manufactures of iron and steel, 
machinery, tools, etc., and textiles, coal mining, and 
shipbuilding. The exports of manufactured cotton 
from this and other parts of the United States go 
principally to ports in Asia and Oceania, where their 
chief competitor is the product of the British mills. 
It is not necessary to expatiate upon the advantage 
which the short route will give to us in this trade. 
-JjihQ countries of South America expend about $80,- 
000,000 annually in the purchase of cotton goods. 
At "pre sent, nowever, little more than five per cent of 
this large sum is paid for^ American cloth, but the 
facilities for shipping economically that will be cre- 
ated by the Canal must have, among other result%, 
that of giving to the njanufacturers of our North-,, J 
eastern and Southern States a veix large share of I ^ 
Siis desirable businesSi. ^ 

"^Tt Is hoped that by the use of a new type of steel 
river barge of large capacity and small draft the 
coal of Pennsylvania and the Southern mines may be 
shipped direct to Panama at a cost of one dollar per 
short ton. This would allow of its being sold at three 
dollars, a figure sufficiently low to preclude success- 
ful competition. The ability to supply cheap fuel 
would not only accrue to the benefit of our coal 
mining interests, but would, where other consid- 
erations balanced, decide shipmasters in favor of 



260 PANAMA. 

the Panama route, for the contract price of steam 
coal at Port Said is about six dollars and the current 
price about ten dollars per ton. 

OUK ADVAJ^TAGE OVER FOREIGN COMPETITOKS. 

The principal exporting competitors of the United 
States in the markets for the manufactures of iron 
and steel are Great Britain, Germany and Belgium. 
European producers can reach the west coast of South 
America, and the oriental countries in general, more 
readily than can our manufacturers, but the opening 
of the Canal will entirely subvert the condition in 
the favor of the latter. ^/T'ew of our industries are 
likely to receive such an expansive impulse from thaL.,, 
event as those dependent upon iron and steel for their 
material and the section which will benefit most in^ 
pthat respect is the coal and ore region of the Sout;^^ 
I One of tEe most certain consequences of the in- 
creased American trade that will follow the estab- 
lishment of a waterway between the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans will be the great extension of the mer- 
chant marine and the expansion of the shipbuilding 
industry of the country. The Canal will have the ef- 
fect of largely increasing the coasting trade of the 
United States and all tlie vessels engaged in it must 
be built in American yards. Aside from this the in- 
creased foreign trade under conditions that will make 
the shipping business once more profitable, must lead 



OPINION OF A SHIPBUILDER. 201 

to the construction of a large additional number of 
American vessels. 

A large shipbuilder responded to an inquiry by tlie 
Isthmian Canal Commission with the following state- 
ment : " In my judgment the opening of the isth- 
mian canal and the development of its traffic would 
stimulate American shipbuilding to the extent of an 
increased demand for vessels to be used in trade af- 
fected by said canal. As a rule increased demand de- 
velops increased sources of supply and the cost of 
product is invariably reduced in proportion of in- 
creased business to fixed expenses of any manufactur- 
ing establishment, and therefore the canal would in 
this case tend to enable shipbuilders to construct 
ships more economically and more surely to compete 
with foreign builders." 

The foregoing are only a few illustrative examples 
of the benefits to certain portions of the United States 
that may be counted upon from the construction of 
the Panama Canal. Anything approaching a compre- 
hensive statement of the matter would fill a large 
volume.* 

POLITICAl. AND MILITARY ASPECTS. 

Although the prime purpose of the canal is essen- 



* The subject has been extensively treated by Professor Em- 
ory R. Johnson in the report of the Isthmian Canal Commis- 
sion of 1899-1901. 



262 PANAMA. 

tially of a commercial character, its construction can 
not fail to entail important political results. These 
will be felt chiefly by the countries of the American 
continents and the adjacent islands. The Spanish- 
American republics, by being brought into closer and 
more frequent relations with the older civilizations 
will learn the lessons of modem government and the 
advantages of ordered and industrious social condi- 
tions. Whilst affording greater facilities for military 
movements, the Canal will ultimately prove to be a 
potent factor in the abolition of war. Without ven- 
turing too far into the realm of fancy, it may be per- 
missible to suggest one, by no means improbable, 
means to this end. Perhaps no agency within the 
bounds of present possibility could so effectively 
maintain the peace of nations as an alliance for that 
purpose and for mutual defence between the great 
naval powers, Britain, America and Japan. The 
bonds of friendship and commercial interest are more 
closely drawn in the case of these three peoples than 
between any other nations in the world and they will 
be the chief beneficiaries of the commercial and mili- 
tary facilities derivable from the Canal. 

THE CANAL PART OF OUR COAST LIITE;. 

To the United States the isthmian passage between 
the oceans has become a military necessity. The 
need for a short route from one coast to the other of 



li 



PROTECTION OF THE CANAL. 263 

our country was forcibly felt when the Pacific terri- 
tories were acquired and again when at the outbreak 
of the war with Spain, the battleship Oregon was 
obliged to make the long journey round Cape Horn in 
order to join the Atlantic fleet. 54;!^, Canal will be- 
come, as President TTayes tersely put it, "a part of 
lEe^coaS^Ere oitlie Ignited States, v^ It will be essen- 
tial to the safety of this country that the Canal is pre- 
served from the possibility of falling into the hands 
of an enemy in time of war. It will be a simple task 
to fortify the entrances, but to guard the whole extent 
of a structure so susceptible to damage would be an 
altogether different matter and it would not perhaps 
be feasible and certainly not desirable to employ guns 
and forts for that purpose. 

DIFFICULTY OF GUARDING THE CANAL. 

A canal of any type must necessarily be extremely 
vulnerable. A few sticks of dynamite in the hands 
of determined men would put it out of use for a 
greater or less period. 'Not could any practicable 
system of precautions insure immunity from such a 
hazard. Fortifications would be futile, for a covert 
attack by a small body would be more likely to suc- 
ceed than an assault in force. Aside from guarding 
locks, dams and other important works it is difficult 
to conceive of anything like effective defensive meas- 
ures. In this connection the Isthmian Canal Com- 



264 PANAMA. 

mission of 1899-1901 said : " It is the opinion of 
tlie Commission that a neutral canal, operated and 
controlled by American citizens, would materially 
add to the military strength of the United States; 
that a canal, whether neutral or not, controlled by 
foreigners, would be a source of weakness to the 
United States, rather than of strength; and that a 
canal not neutral, to be defended by the United 
States, whether by fortifications on land, or by the 
navy at sea, would be a source of weakness." 

The question is amongst the many problems con- 
nected with the Canal which are receiving the care- 
ful consideration of the Government, and it is quite 
probable that it will decide that we must depend 
upon the ISTavy to prevent any hostile force from 
landing upon the American Isthmus. 
jrOur possession of the Canal has emphasized the | 
lesirability of the United States owning the West 
Indies, or at least the four islands constituting the 
Greater Antilles, which most eifectually control the 
approach to the Caribbean Sea, and are characterized 
by Captain Mahan as " the very domain of sea power, 
if ever region could be called so.^' 



SHORTENED DISTANCES. 



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XL 

PANAMA. 

PREPARATORY WORK ON THE ISTHMUS. 

Difficulty of Gauging Work Done — The Work of the French 
Companies — Deteriorated Property — We Have Greater 
Opportunities Than Had the French — The Death Roll 
Under French Management — Former Condition of Panama 
and Colon — Sanitary Detective Work — Extensive Work of 
the Sanitary Department — the Question of Food Supply — 
Extraordinary Treatment of the Laborers — Improvements 
in the City of Panama — Conditions in the City of Colon 
— The Opinions of an Expert — Mr. Hunter is Favorably 
Impressed with Conditions — The Panamans Are Satisfied 
with the Situation — Heavy Expenditures for Material and 
Supplies — A Clean and Well-directed Management. 

Considered in all its aspects, the Panama Canal 

is undoubtedly tlie greatest material enterprise of 

modem times. ISTevertheless, no question in recent 

years has been generally discussed with so little 

discrimination and so much ignorance of the facts. 

The average citizen depends upon his newspaper for 

information in such cases as this, and the American 

press, with few exceptions, has treated this great 

national undertaking in a manner which must be 

characterized either as inefficient or unfair. There 

263 



YELLOW JOURNALISM. 267 

has been displayed, almost from its inception, a 
pessimistic attitude towards the project and a hyper- 
critical attitude towards its management that are 
not consistent with an understanding of the task 
and a knowledge of the conditions attaching to it. 
There has been an incomprehensible readiness to print 
any silly canard in connection with the undertaking, 
and no story, apparently, has been too extravagant to 
meet with wide credence. One or two of the most 
flagrant instances of misrepresentation have, it is 
true, been characterized by a degree of mendacity 
sufficiently transparent to defeat its purpose, but on 
the whole, unjustifiable criticism by publications of 
large circulation has seriously hampered the work 
of the Commission and perhaps, somewhat impaired 
the effi.eiency of the personnel under its direction. 
The bilious effusions of yellow journalism and the 
mendacious maunderings of sensation-mongers never 
furthered a good cause and can neither be expected 
to help us build the canal nor to aid us in arriving 
at a better understanding of the unfamiliar matters 
relating to it. 

The Panama Canal is the greatest engineering 
undertaking in the history of the world, and its 
accomplishment involves deeper problems and more 
difficult tasks than those with which any similar 
enterprise in the past has been beset. The best talent 
and the most active brains of all civilized countries 
have contributed to the perfection of the plans, and 



268 PANAMA, 

we have every reason to believe that the consumma- 
tion of them has been placed in the hands of the 
best men available in America. It is safe to say 
that no great engineering work ever entered npon 
the constructive stage under more favorable con- 
ditions and with better prospects for success. Ex- 
cellent work has been done during the period of 
preparation. We have an assurance of this fact in 
the unequivocal statements of officials who are in 
the best position to judge. They include our Presi- 
dent and are all men whose word is unimpeachable. 
But, if that were not sufficient, the testimony might 
be adduced of every disinterested individual whose 
professional training, and experience on the Isthmus 
hav6 been such as to render his judgment weighty. 

DIFFIOtTLTT OF GAUGING WORK DONE. 

It is difficult to conceive of an undertaking in 
which so much effective work might be done with so 
little to " show for it " as in this. Much, indeed, 
of the most important labor has no visible result at 
present. The extensive surveys, the borings, the 
fluvial investigations and a hundred similar re- 
searches are in evidence only in the office files. Even 
the splendid sanitary achievements are to be realized 
only by an examination of the records, which bear 
eloquent testimony to the scientific attainment and 
determined energy of Americans. N'or is it possible 



FAULTY OBSERVERS. 269 

for one to appreciate the vast amount of wort that 
has been done in the matters of organization and 
equipment unless he has some technical knowledge of 
such affairs and an opportunity for comparison with 
the pre-existing conditions. The progress that has 
been made on the Isthmus can not be discerned by 
casual inspection. The observer who permits super- 
ficial phenomena to fill his eye to the exclusion of 
sub-surface indications can not avoid erroneous con- 
clusions and unwarranted judgments. Photograph- 
ing discarded French machinery and nosing about 
in gutters and backyards are not conducive to a 
broad view or a just appreciation of what has been 
accomplished by our people on the Isthmus. The 
bruised and bandaged victim of a railroad collision 
affords little scope, except to the practised surgeon, 
for accurate judgment as to his condition when ad- 
mitted to the emergency ward, or as to the treatment 
which he has received. What would we say of 
the visitor to a hospital who should allow the per- 
vading presence of sickness and disease to excite 
his condemnation of the faculty, in ignorance or 
disregard of the fact that they are not responsible 
for its existence and have accomplished much towards 
its alleviation and cure. And, as the conduct of 
the most efficient hospital will not be free from fail- 
ures and mistakes, so these will be experienced, and 
should be expected, in the course of so extensive an 
operation as the constiiiction of the Panama Canal, 



27<l PANAMA. 

A clearer understanding of the present state of affairs 
in tlie Canal Zone and of the progress that has been 
made since American occupation will be secured by 
a review of the conditions and work during the 
French tenure. 

Little excavation has been done on the line of 
the canal since 1889, when the Old Panama Canal 
Company failed. During the five years of receiver- 
ship nothing more than the preservation of the prop- 
erty was attempted. In 1894, the New Panama 
Canal Company resumed the excavation of the divide 
in a restricted manner. At no time had they as 
many as 4,000 laborers employed, and when the 
United States came into possession, in 1904, the 
number was about 600. Aside from the limited 
excavation mentioned, the new company performed 
no work in furtherance of the project than some 
dredging at La Boca. 

THE WORK OF THE FEB]:«"CH COMPANIES. 

The French companies made extensive surveys and 
soundings and the results of these investigations were 
amongst the most valuable of the assets turned over 
to us. The Old Panama Canal Company erected 
many buildings, shops, hospitals, etc., but along the 
line of the canal its operations were confined to ex- 
cavation, except for the construction of some inada- 
quate docks and piers at Colon. Along the low 



WORK OF THE FRENCH. 271 

marshy stretch, between that point and Bohio the 
company dredged a channel with an original bottom 
width of 72 feet and a depth, near Mindi, of 29 feet 
below sea level, gradually decreasing toward its end. 
The portion of this channel between Mindi and Ga- 
tun, 11 miles in length, comes within the alignment 
of the prospective canal. The cut between Colon 
and Bohio and the excavation at Culebra are the two 
largest and most impressive features of the operation 
in its present condition. Omitting the divide, there 
is a shallow but almost continuous ditch between 
Bohio and Miraflores, which will not serve to expe- 
dite the American project. A large amount of ma- 
terial was removed by the old company at the con- 
tinental divide and a moderate amount — about 
7,000,000 cubic yards — by its successor. The orig- 
inal height of the summit at this point, 333 feet 
above sea-level, has been reduced to about 170 at the 
maximum depth. The old company excavated the 
canal for a distance of about two miles from La Boca 
to an average depth of about 20 feet from the original 
surface, which is at nearly extreme high water. As 
the extreme range of tide at the Pacific terminus of 
the canal is about 10 feet above mean sea level to 10 
feet below, the old company planned to make the 
Pacific sea-level section of the canal, from Miraflorec 
to deep water, 39.4 feet deep below mean tide. Less 
than one-third of the total requisite excavation was 
made between La Boca and Miraflores, nor was a 



272 PANAMA. 

channel to full deptli completed from La Boca to the 
deep water of Panama Bay. The old company ex- 
cavated a number of diversion channels aggregating 
about 40 miles in length. Very little of this work 
can be utilized in the execution of the plans of a 
lock canal. 

A total amount of about 80,000,000 cubic jards of 
all classes of material has been excavated throughout 
the entire length of the canal. By far the greater 
part of this was soft material or earth removed with 
dredges, and most of the future cutting must be 
through rock, much of it hard enough to necessitate 
blasting. Of course the entire cutting at the divide 
is of a useful character, but it is probable that all 
told, less than half the excavating done by the French 
will be available in future construction. 

DETERIOEATED PEOPERTY. 

Immense quantities of material, machinery, and 
appliances were received by the old company and 
distributed along the entire line of the canal, and 
are still upon the Isthmus, The book value of this 
property is about $29,000,000. Much of it is under 
cover and in good order, but practically useless, be- 
cause obsolete; the greater portion of it is scattered 
along the line of the canal, exposed to the elements 
and in various states of disrepair and decay. 

Upwards of 2,000 buildings, mostly houses for 



THE AMERICAN TASK. 273 

employees, were transferred to us by the French 
company. In general these were capable of being- 
put into service, but most of them needed restoration 
or alteration. The buildings included, besides ex- 
cellent hospitals, six machine shops of large capacity 
with a fair equipment. These have been enlarged 
and better furnished and will prove of great service 
in repairing machinery, rolling stock, etc., and may 
be utilized in building some of the minor plants 
required in the work. 

When the United States took possession of the 
canal strip, two years ago, the conditions were cha- 
otic. The Canal Zone had reverted to a state of 
wilderness. Machinery, rolling stock, and appliances 
were scattered throughout its length and overgrown 
with vegetation. The railroad, with its out-of-date 
equipment and inefficient personnel, was in a state of 
extreme deterioration. Aside from the few hundred 
laborers left by the French company there was not 
even the nucleus of an organization. 

These conditions were not, however, the most for- 
midable that confronted the Commission. The entire 
Zone was in an ideal state for the propagation of 
disease, and the cities of Colon and Panama, but 
especially the latter, were a reproach to civilization. 
The French had not the authority to enforce sanitary 
niles in the city of Panama and in Colon only within 
the bounds of their own property. Their hospital 

system was admirable, but they were necessarily re- 
18 



274 PANAMA. 

stricted to tlie cure of sickness or the mitigation of 
its effects. Preventive measures against the prevail- 
ing diseases were impossible to them, owing to ig- 
norance of causes. Malaria was attributed to mias- 
mic exhalations from the soil, and jellow fever to an 
ever-present poison. Under the circumstances it is 
not surprising that the casualties during the French 
occupancy ran into extremely high figures. 

WE HAVE GREATER OPPORTUNITIES THAN HAD THE 
FRENCH. 

Our latter-day knowledge enables us to adopt more 
effective mea,sures and affords ground for the hope 
that we shall rid the Canal Zone of yellow fever, 
and reduce malaria to an insignificant factor. The 
mosquito theory has been extensively tested, and its 
truth may be said to be established. The experi- 
ences of Havana, New Orleans, and other places 
seem to prove it. A few years ago the abandonment 
of Ismalia as headquarters of the Suez Canal was 
seriously considered on account of the general sick- 
ness of the European residents. Among 2,000 of 
these there were 1,400 cases of malarial fever an- 
nually, many of which resulted in death. In 1902 
the mosquitoes were extirpated and their breeding 
places destroyed. The number of cases of malaria 
since has been 214 in 1903, 90 in 1904, and, during 
ten months of 1905, 46, without a death in the whole 



HEAVY MORTALITY. 27R 

period. Those who have had malaria subsequent to 
the sanitating of the place had been chronic sufferers 
from the disease previously. 

The inhabitants of Panama are immune to yellow 
fever, but until recently the disease has never been 
absent from the Isthmus when there have been any 
non-immunes to contract it. During the twenty-five 
years since the inception of the French enterprise 
there has, on several occasions, been an influx of 
non-immune persons, and on each such occasion there 
was a large increase in the mortality from yellow 
fever. The rule held good continuously until full 
effect was had from the sanitary measures taken by 
the United States authorities in the Canal Zone. The 
records of the Panama cemetery are cited by our 
health officers as furnishing evidence of their declara- 
tion that it is not only possible but feasible to banish 
yellow fever from the Isthmus and to maintain the 
whole force of employees in a good state of health. 

THE DEATH ROLL UNDER FRENCH MANAGEMENT. 

Work on the Canal was commenced in 1881. In 
1882 the force numbered fewer than 2,000, and in 
1884 the average number employed was 17,615. The 
aggregate of the numbers of those reported yearly as 
employed in the whole period of eight yeai's is 86,- 
812, or an average of 10,881 per year. The total 
number treated for sickness was 52,814. The num- 



276 PANAMA. 

ber of deaths of employees in the same period was 
5,627, showing a rate of mortality among the sick 
of 10.62 and among the employed of 6.48 per cent. 

The popular clamour to see " the dirt fly " induced 
the first Isthmian Canal Commission to attack the 
task of excavation before the essential one of prepara- 
tion had been accomplished. The consequence was 
a sudden excess of mortality and sickness, resulting 
in panic and disorganization. The present Commis- 
sion wisely determined to defer digging until such 
time as the Zone shall be rendered thoroughly sani- 
tary, the organization and equipment adequate, the 
laborers properly housed and sufficiently fed. The 
work will then proceed to a rapid and successful con- 
clusion without interruption. 

Disease, gTaft, and mismanagement were the three 
great factors in the failure of the French. 'Not the 
least of these was disease, which on two occasions 
necessitated a cessation of the operations. Business 
policy, as well as humane considerations, demanded 
the sanitation of the Zone by us. Had we neglected 
this duty the work of construction must have been 
greatly retarded and very much enhanced in cost. 
Not only that, but the completed Canal, if in an un- 
healthy region, will be shunned by the commerce it 
is designed to attract 

The treaty between the United States and Panama 
conveyed to the former a strip of territory ten miles 
in width, extending forty-two miles from sea to aea. 



:^ANAMA ANi) COLON '277 

Its boundaries embrace twenty-five towns and a num- 
ber of camps besides the cities of Panama and Colon. 
These last, although topographically Avithin the Canal 
Zone, were not included in the concession, but the 
terms of the convention specifically permit us to 
exercise discretionary control over them in matters 
of sanitation and order. The agreement provides for 
the repayment to the United States by the Panama 
Republic, of all expenses incurred by the former in 
these respects. 

FOBMEE CONDITION OF PANAMA AND COLON. 

When we took over the Canal the entire Zone was 
covered with rank vegetation and stagnant pools in 
which the anopheles, the malaria mosquito, bred un- 
disturbed. The City of Panama had neitber sewer 
nor drainage system. Its streets were paved with 
cobble-stones and lined with gutters through which 
the refuse of the dwellings trickled slowly, and in 
places stood for days and weeks at a time. The in- 
habitants depended for their water supply upon rain, 
which was stored in open cisterns or barrels. These 
receptacles were the most fertile breeding places of 
the stegomyia, or yellow-fever mosquito. 

The low, sandy island on which Colon is built is 
nowhere more than four feet above mean sea level, 
and high tides cover considerable portions of it. Of 
course no adequate drainage system could exist under 



278 PANAMA. 

such circumstances, and the city was devoid of sewers. 
The small section that contained the dwellings of 
canal officials and employees of the railroad company 
was supplied with water of an indifferent quality 
from a reservoir near Mount Hope. The remainder 
of the population depended, like the people of Pan- 
ama, upon rain water. The streets of Colon were in 
a wretched condition and the whole place in great 
disorder when it came into our hands. Its small 
population of about 6,000 has, however, rendered the 
task of sanitation comparatively easy. In view of 
the probable ultimate abandonment of Colon as the 
entrepot of the canal it would be an extravagant ex- 
penditure of time and money on the part of the 
Commission to fill in and grade the island, and par- 
ticularly so as a very small proportion of the in- 
habitants are in the American service. 

The plan of Colonel Gorgas, the chief sanitary 
officer, consisted mainly of the destruction of the 
mosquitoes and their breeding places and the treat- 
ment by the medical staff of all cases of sickness. 
This plan when applied to the entire Zone entailed an 
enormous amount of labor, and its execution was 
made possible only by the most constant and pains- 
taking energy. The Panamans — who can afford to 
treat yellow fever lightly — tell funny stories of 
Gorgas's men chasing a single mosquito for hours, 
and after the capture solemnly executing it with a 
machete. Though this be a fanciful picture it is strict- 



SANITARY WORK. 2fI9 

ly true that when a case of yellow fever is discovered 
the health officers trace it with sleuth-like persistency 
to its origin, without missing a link. The ingenuity 
and care exercised in these searches is illustrated in 
the following case, by no means an exceptional one. 

SANITAET DETECTIVE WORK. 

On his daily tour of inspection of one of the hotels 
in Panama a health inspector learned that a lodger 
had been taken ill. A search for the man proved 
that he had left the house. The next day he was 
found on the street drunk and was taken to the hos- 
pital. It was a case of yellow fever and resulted in 
death. Investigation showed that the hotel contained 
none but non-immunes, so that the deceased had evi- 
dently contracted the disease elsewhere. IsTo one 
knew him or anything of his movements previous to 
his sickness. The enquiry was transferred to a cer- 
tain cafe which was known to be a favorite haunt 
of men of the same nationality as the deceased. 
Here, after much questioning it was learnt that he 
had been seen in the company of an Italian. The 
inspectors set out to interrogate eveiy Italian in the 
city, and at length found one who declared that he 
had seen the dead man with the bartender of the 
theatre. The bartender could not be found at his 
usual place of business, but diligent search discov- 
ered him in a secluded lodging, in bed and sick with 



280 PANAMA. 

yellow fever. He said that the former victim, whilst 
registered at the hotel, had been sleeping with him 
in a room at the theatre. From this it appeared 
that the playhouse was the centre of infection and it 
was accordingly fumigated. The discovery of a third 
case in which the infection was traceable to the same 
source satisfied the health oflBcers of the correctness 
of their conclusion, which was further confirmed by 
the fact that the outbreak was limited to the cases 
that have been mentioned. Under the old conditions 
it would probably have spread unchecked throughout 
the non-immune population of the city, creating a 
new focus of infection with each fresh case. 

EXTENSIVE WORK OF THE SANITARY DEPARTMENT. 

To quote Colonel Gorgas : " When one considers 
the five hundred square miles of fever-ridden jungle 
which confronted us ; when one remembers that the 
mortality among the laboi-ers under the French re- 
gime rose at times to the enormous figure of six hun- 
dred to the thousand annually, some idea may be 
gained of the magnitude of the undertaking." 

In the campaign of extermination that has been 
vigorously waged against the mosquitoes an amount 
of work has been done along the line of the canal of 
which only a partial conception can be derived from 
the following statements: two million square yards 
of brush and grass have been cut and burnt; more 






td 




FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES. 281 

than one million square yards of swamp have been 
drained or filled in ; upwards of one hundred and 
fifty thousand feet of ditch have been put in effective 
condition ; three million cubic feet of house area 
have been fumigated. This the sanitary department 
describes as " only a beginning." It is a very fine 
beginning and one that has already borne fruit be- 
yond any expectations that were entertained two 
years ago. 

In addition to the sanitation of the Zone, the pre- 
paratory work of the Commission has been directed 
toward the establishment of permanent and sufficient 
food and water supplies, the erection of suitable 
dwellings, the installation of an adequate mechanical 
plant, the proper equipment of the Panama Railroad 
and the organization of an efficient staff of em- 
ployees. 

There are within the Canal Zone, exclusive of the 
cities of Panama and Colon, about twenty-five towns 
and a number of temporary camps. The water sup- 
ply of each of these centres has been improved and 
before the close ^f the year 1906 pure water in abun- 
dant quantity will be readily available to every hu- 
man being within the limits of the territory and in 
the terminal ports. Comfortable houses have been 
erected on carefully selected sites and are under the 
constant supervision of the sanitary inspectors. 
Emergency hospitals, schools, churches and police 
courts have been established along the line. The 



282 PANAMA. 

regulation of the saloon trafSc under a high license 
has produced marked results in the abatement of 
drunkenness. 

THE QUESTION 0¥ FOOD SUPPLY. 

Food supply is one of the many vexing questions 
with which the Commission has successfully dealt. 
It was found that the local markets could not be de- 
pended upon to any considerable extent. Not only 
have the requirements increased by reason of the 
employment of a greater number of laborers, but the 
local supply has been concurrently curtailed owing 
to the fact that the high wages paid on the Canal are 
constantly attracting the natives and inducing the-m 
to abandon the cultivation of their fields. The 
Commission is meeting the diflBculty by establishing 
commissary stores at convenient points where the 
silver employees may secure good food at low prices 
and on credit. In connection with these depots a sys- 
tem of cold storage plants will be operated and the 
bulk of the supplies will be imported, thus, not only 
insuring a constant sufficiency, but also minimizing 
the danger of infection from this source. 

EXTIIAORDINAIIY TREATMENT OF THE LABOEEKS. 

All statements to the contrary notwithstanding, it 
is true that the laborers in the employ of the Com- 



THE JAMAICAN NEGRO. S8S 

mission are receiving better treatment than they 
ever experienced before: indeed, it is safe to go far- 
ther and say that similar care and attention has 
never been bestowed on a large body of common 
laborers anywhere. As a matter of fact the negro on 
the Canal is too well treated. He is pampered and 
his natural inefficiency is consequently increasing. 
He lives in a model tenement which is a palace in 
comparison with his Jamaican shack. He has good 
food and excellent medical attendance. He works 
when he thinks fit, and loafs when he pleases. Every 
few months he goes jauntily back to Jamaica to spend 
his savings, but he seldom fails to return to the 
Isthmus. If we could substitute even a fairly good 
grade of labor for the present supply, the completion 
of the Canal might be accelerated by two or three 
years and its ultimate cost decreased by several mil- 
lions. 

During the summer of 1906, every house in Pan- 
ama and Colon, without a single exception, was 
fumigated. So far as the authority of the Commis- 
sion can be reasonably exerted, every building in those 
cities is now screened and every dwelling, hotel and 
lodging-house is subjected to daily inspection. It 
should be said to the credit of the citizens of Panama, 
who are immune to yellow fever, that they have 
cheerfully submitted to the inconvenience and dis- 
comfort entailed by these measures of sanitation. 
The Panaman is shrewd and intelligent. He is not 



284 PANAMA. 

slow to appreciate the prospective advantages to be 
eoijoyed by his country in consequence of our im- 
provements. One of the most immediate results must 
be a great enhancement in real estate values in Pan- 
ama, La Boca and Colon. Such a movement will 
redound to the benefit of the United States, which, 
as the owner of the Panama Railroad, has title to a 
great deal of property in those cities. 

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CITY OF PANAMA. 

The city of Panama is far advanced in the process 
of transformation that will convert it into an at- 
tractive and healthful place. A considerable por- 
tion, of the city was supplied with pure water eight 
months ago and before these lines are in print the 
system will be complete. It is very extensive, de- 
signed not only to afford a practically unlimited sup- 
ply to the present inhabitants, but also to meet the 
requirements of considerable expansion. The people 
of Panama know for the first time what modem 
sewerage is and they are beginning to appreciate 
good pavement as the work of laying the thorough- 
fares with vitrified brick progresses. 

A similar change is taking place in La Boca. One- 
half of the town is owned by the United States. In 
that section the old-time ramshackle buildings have 
given place to new or remodelled houses, freshly 
painted, lighted by electricity, supplied with good 



CONDITIONS IN COLON. 285 

water and sewers. The streets have been improved, 
and the wharving facilities have been greatly in- 
creased. The action of the Commission in its quar- 
ter of La Boca must force private owners of prop- 
erty to follow suit as soon as the requisite workmen 
are available. 

During the year 1905 two separate outbreaks of 
bubonic plague occurred in La Boca and by the ener- 
getic measures of the health department each was 
confined to the original case. This is an achieve- 
ment to be proud of, for the disease is probably the 
most virulent and quick-spreading known. 

CONDITIONS IN THE CITY OF COLON. 

The residents of Colon smile at the hysterical va- 
porings of recent writers who have been moved to 
tearful protest against the condition of the place. 
Since the French operations began the Canal em- 
ployee who was stationed at Cristobal or Colon — 
they are in reality one — has considered himself for- 
tunate in the place of his abode and would not will- 
ingly change it for any other on the Isthmus. It 
will readily be imagined from what has already been 
said with respect to it, that Colon is not pleasing to 
the eye, with a swamp on one side and an invading 
tide upon the other, but these are conditions which 
until quite recently were markedly pronounced at 
Atlantic City, said to be the most salubrious spot in 



288 PANAMA. 

the United States. The Colonite ■will tell you that 
he is not especially concerned about appearances, but 
that it is very gratifying to know that his city has a 
health record forty per cent better than tliat of 
Panama. 

Colon cannot be effectively drained until the swamp 
is filled in and that is a task which must necessarily 
wait upon excavation elsewhere, if, indeed, it is found 
advisable to undertake it at all. Meanwhile the 
streets are being rapidly graded and finished with 
Telford pavement. A canal is in process of con- 
struction tbrough the town. This will give continu- 
ous passage to fresh sea water and will receive sur- 
face drainage. The section inhabited by the Canal 
employees has had the advantage of a complete do- 
mestic system of sewerage for some time. In the 
near future the entire city will be sewered for house 
drainage into a large cesspool, the contents of which 
will be pumped far out to sea. Colon has an ample 
supply of water from two permanent standpipes with 
an aggregate capacity of nearly one million gallons. 

THEl OPINIONS OF AN EXPEiBT. 

The popular impression of the work of the Com- 
mission upon the Isthmus has been derived generally 
from unreliable sources. We have had the stories of 
scared " quitters " and disgruntled incompetents, who 
have either been wanting in courage or capacity, but 



MR. HUNTER'S OPINION. 287 

there has been little apparent effort to secure the tes- 
timony of men whose experience entitles them to 
speak with authority. 

In a letter dated February 13, 1906, and ad- 
dressed to the writer, Mr. W. Henry Hunter, the 
Chief Engineer of the Manchester Ship Canal, made 
the following remarks : 

" During my recent visit to the Isthmus of Pan- 
ama I had, together with the other members of the 
Board of Consulting Engineers, opportunity for some- 
what close observations of the conditions which now 
exist in the portion of the Isthmus which is subject 
to the control of the Isthmian Canal Commission. 

" The days of compulsory labor have, happily, long 
since passed away; if therefore the construction of 
the Panama Canal is to proceed with economy and 
despatch, it is essential that labor, both of a skilled 
and of an unskilled sort, should be attracted to the 
Isthmus, and consequently essential that the condi- 
tions in the Canal Zone should be made such as will 
prove attractive to reasonable and intelligent men. 

" The initial work required for this purpose was 
naturally divided into two great heads: 1. Sanita- 
tion. 2. Housing of employees. 

" 1. The work of sanitation, i. e., that required 
to render the Isthmus a safe place of habitation, has, 
since the American Grovernment obtained possession 
of the Isthmus, been taken in hand in the vigorous, 
efficient and workmanlike manner which those who 



288 PANAMA. 

know Colonel Gorgas expected from him, and from 
those working under his direction. 

" The work which has already been accomplished 
has proved entirely successful, and I have no doubt 
but that Colonel Gorgas and his staff will effectually 
stamp out the peril of yellow fever, and will reduce 
to a minimum the more subtle, though less apparent, 
dangers from malaria. 

" 2. The work of housing, i. e., that required to 
make the Canal Zone a comfortable place of residence, 
is being proceeded with in the same vigorous and 
effective manner. 

" Quarters are being provided for all classes of 
labor, in which workmen may dwell under conditions 
which will compare favorably, both in respect of 
health and of comfort, with many workmen's habita- 
tions in large cities both in America and in Europe. 

MR. HUNTER IS FAVORABLY IMPEES&EiD WITH CONDI- 
TIOITSw 

" Taken all together I was favorably impressed 
with the conditions which exist in the Canal Zone. 

" It appeared to me that when the provision of the 
necessary plant and the construction of the transpor- 
tation railroads have been completed, no obstacle in 
the way of putting forth of strenuous and energetic 
effort for the removal of the excavation from the 
Canal prism will remain. 



THE NATIVES ARE SATISFIED. 269 

" This plant, so far as the work in the dry is con- 
cerned, is being provided and delivered on the ground 
and the roads are being laid in, so that I see no rea- 
son why the dry excavation work should not be com- 
menced almost immediately." 

Mr. John IST. Popham, a native of Virginia, has 
been engaged in railroad building and other enter- 
prises on the Isthmus for many years past. Upon 
the occasion of a recent visit to the United States he 
made the following statement: 

"Prior to last May (i. e., May, 1905) the con- 
ditions on the Isthmus may have been open to just 
and intelligent criticism, caused by the delay in im- 
proving the physical condition of the Panama Rail- 
road, purchase of necessary rolling stock, and im- 
proving the terminal facilities. But those condi- 
tions are forgotten history. The fair-minded resi- 
dents of the Isthmus appreciate the magnificent ef- 
forts and splendid results accomplished since that 
time. 

THE PANAMAJSrS AEB SATISFIED WITH THE SITUATION. 

" The statement made by Mr. Poultney Bigelow 
is so far from being fair, the views so distorted, and 
the inference so frail, that it is only laughed at on 
the Isthmus, and it was so fully covered at home by 
that part of the President's communication to Con- 
gress the 8th instant, under the heading of ' Scandal- 
19 



290 PANAMA. 

mongers,' tliat there is little left for a self-respecting 
American resident of the Isthmus to add. The peo- 
ple of Panama are intelligent, capable people. They 
appreciate the results accomplished : they have been 
and are anxious and willing to continue to help our 
people in the great enterprise that means so much 
to the whole world. 

THE LABOEEES AEE WELL TREATBIX 

" After sixteen years experience on and in the 
vicinity of the Isthmus and knowing, as I do, the 
homes of the West India laborers in the great banana- 
producing districts near Colon, and having for many 
years employed from 400 to 700 Jamaicans daily at 
our mines, thirty-five miles from Colon, I feel compe- 
tent to judge and to tell you that the West India 
laborer has never known and in his most pleasant 
dreams has never hoped for, the splendid care and 
liberal treatment he is receiving from our government 
on the Isthmus of Panama. 

" My knowledge of the affairs of the Canal com- 
pany only enables me to speak of conditions on the 
Isthmus and the work in progress there. But in 
every department of the Canal work during the past 
seven months on the Isthmus the people of this coun- 
try can rest assured that the investigation to be made 
by the Senat-e committee will confirm the following 
lines found in the President's communication to Con- 



HEAVY EXPENDITURES. 201 

gress : ^ The work on the Isthmus is being admirably 
done, and great progress has been made.' " 

The cost of the operations on the Isthmus has af- 
forded subject for facetious articles and comic car- 
toons in the public press. Let us look at some of the 
items of expenditure and we shall thereby improve 
our conception of the greatness of the enterprise, and 
of the complexity of its details. 

In June, 1902, Congress appropriated $10,000,000 
for the use of the Canal Commission and all expenses 
up to the close of the year 1905 were paid out of that 
amount. The purchases range over the greatest va- 
riety and degrees of magnitude, from steamships to 
handcuffs. Four million dollars has been paid for 
general supplies, including fuel, explosives, lumber, 
machinery, roofing, paving and plumbing material, 
medical and sanitary supplies, garbage carts, laundry 
equipment, steel vaults, scientific instruments, and 
other innumerable and diversified items. Dnring 
1905, upwards of one million dollars was laid out on 
steel flat cars, half a million on steam shovels and 
three times as much on locomotives. 

A CL.EAI!f AND WELL-DIEECTED MANAGEMENT. 

The Commission has observed strict business prin- 
ciples in all these purchases. There has been no op- 
portunity for graft and hence without doubt has 
ajisen a great deal of the dissatisfaction expressed 
with its management. 



292 PANAMA. 

The conduct of the enterprise so far should be a 
source of pride to Americans. There have been mis- 
takes, of course, but no blunders. Errors of judg- 
ment and miscalculations have been quickly recog- 
nized and rectified, 'Not a justifiable suspicion of 
graft has been connected with the operation since it 
came into American hands. Influence and favorit- 
ism have been singularly absent from the appoint- 
ments. The men at the head of affairs have nothing 
but reputation to gain from the undertaking and it 
is not their purpose to allow incompetents to hazard 
their prospects in that respect. As the conditions 
of life on the Isthmus become more healthful and 
comfortable greater pressure will doubtless be ex- 
erted by the drones who attach to the skirts of Con- 
gressmen and oflScials, but it is safe to predict that as 
long as the present Executive Committee of the Com- 
mission retain their positions such efforts will be 
unavailing. 

THE OOMMOIS" SENSE OF THE SITUATION. 

We approach the construction stage of the under- 
taking with the management of the enterprise in 
thoroughly capable hands, supported by an experi- 
enced and efficient staff. The organization is admir- 
ably calculated to work harmoniously, for the heads 
of departments have been at pains to secure the ser- 
vices of men who had been associated with them in 



COMMON SENSE ATTITUDE. 293 

former important works and with whose characters 
and capabilities they are familiar. In many cases 
these men are making sacrifices in thus accepting 
service under their old chiefs, for the salaries are not 
such as to attract first-class men under the circum- 
stances that surround life on the Isthmus at its best. 
The Commission deserves the support of the Amer- 
ican people and press. Common sense demands that 
we refrain from the puerile nagging and fault-finding 
which has hitherto been our only reward for honest, 
energetic and patriotic work. The present Congres- 
sional investigation will prove that we have been act- 
ing a very ungrateful part. At the close of it we 
should open a new chapter in the history of the 
Canal. There should be a cessation of slander and 
obstruction and a disposition toward truth and fair 
play. 



XII. 

PANAMA. 

THE LAST STAGE. 

Opening of the Canal — The French Work — Early American 
Activities — Value of the Preliminary Work — The Military 
Board — The Investigating Board — The Plan of the Canal 
— Gatun Dam — The Locks — Change in Location of the 
Locks — Changes in Dimensions — Cost of the Canal — 
Success of the Military Management — The Panama Rail- 
road — The Labor Problem — Health Conditions — Field for 
Investments. 

Four centuries of exploration, fifty years of theo- 
retical consideration, and three decades of practical 
construction, will shortly reach a splendid culmina- 
tion in the completion of a waterway connecting the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans. 

OPENING OF THE CANAL. 

All along the line of the Panama Canal work is in 
the final stage. Henceforth, there can be no essential 
changes in the plan and, after making liberal allow- 
ances for the various obstructions and setbacks which 
are to be expected, the engineers responsible for the 
undertaking appear to be justified in estimating the 
date of the fulfilment of their task as July 1, 1914. 

(294) 



THE FRENCH WORK. 295 

For some months thereafter it is proposed to permit 
only a limited use of the Canal, until every portion 
of it and its accessory mechanism has been thoroughly 
tested and reduced to smooth working order, when the 
formal and general opening will ensue, probably on 
the first day of January, 1915. 

It is the writer's good fortune to have been for 
many years familiar with the scene of this greatest 
feat of engineering in the history of the world and 
to have enjoyed exceptional opportunities for observ- 
ing the work of construction in its progress through 
the futile essay of the French and the epic effort of 
his owh countrymen. He witnessed the expiring 
struggle of the original French company, when the 
unbridled optimism of De Lesseps had given place to 
reckless desperation and the lagging operations pre- 
saged the approaching end. He has seen the line 
throbbing with new life, infused into it by men who 
set their faces to the task with a determination that 
insured success, and who brought to their aid re- 
sources of a scientific and material nature that had 
been denied to their predecessors. 

THE FRENCH WORK. 

During the past twenty years a wondrous trans- 
formation has taken place in the narrow strip across 
the Isthmus over which the United States holds do- 
minion, but most of this change has been wrought 
since the x\merican occupation began. The French 
did a gTeat deal of work, but it was mainly of the pio- 



296 PANAMA. 

neer sort that makes little appeal to the eye and is 
fully appreciated only by the technician. Their sur- 
veys were of incalculable value to our engineers. The 
buildings and machinery which they left saved us 
much trouble and expense. They dug a ditch for a 
few miles inland from the Atlantic and took an enor- 
mous mass of material out of Culebra, but the one 
was as a scratch in the ground, and the other as a 
notch in the hill, compared with the full extent of the 
necessary excavation. 

EAELY AMERICAN ACTIVITIES. 

At the time that the foregoing portion of this 
volume was written little advance in construction 
had been made beyond the point where the French 
abandoned the enterprise. The earlier period of the 
American tenancy was wisely devoted to preliminary 
measures of the utmost importance, but unimpressive 
in their immediate results. Plans were carefully 
considered in detail. Organization was effected. 
The railroad was reconstructed, machinery and meth- 
ods were tested. Civil government was installed. 
And, most important of all, the field of action was 
made sanitary and the task thereby rendered possible. 

When the army engineers assumed charge of the 
operation, the period of preparation had just closed. 
The type of the waterway and its main features had 
been finally decided upon. The labor supply was 
assured and life on the Isthmus involved no unusual 
menace to the health of the white man. 



THE MILITARY BOARD. 297 

VALUE OF PEELIMINAKY WORK. 

The existence of these conditions enabled the pres- 
ent Commission and the force under its control to 
achieve the splendid results of the past four years. 
They were confronted, not by a great problem, as had 
been the earlier Commissions, but by a clearly defined 
undertaking. This has involved decisions upon many 
doubtful questions and solutions to many difficult 
propositions, but in its main features the work en- 
trusted to them has always presented a definite ob- 
jective, toward which they have driven with persist- 
ent energy, encouraged by the confidence and support 
of the ultimate authorities. As a consequence, the 
army engineers have made such progress in the ac- 
tual construction of the Canal that the site of it would 
be hardly recognizable to-day to the man who had 
seen it in 1907, and not since. 

The preceding portions of this volume bring the 
story of the Canal down to the close of the year 
1906. The present chapter is added for the purpose 
of tracing the developments which have taken place 
during the succeeding four years. 

THE MILITARY BOARD. 

In April, 1907, Mr. John F. Stevens resigned 
from the position of Chief Engineer. President 
Roosevelt, with the hearty approval of Mr. Taft, who 
was then Secretary of War, immediately installed a 
military organization, in accordance with an idea 
that had been entertained for some time previous. A 



298 PANAMA. 

new Commission was created, with Colonel George 
W. Goethals, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., as Chair- 
man and Chief Engineer. The other members were 
Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Hodges, IT. S. A., Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel William L. Sibert, U, S. A., Lieutenant- 
Colonel D. D. Gaillard, U. S. A., Civil Engineer LI. 
H. Eousseau, U. S. IST., Colonel W. C. Gorgas, LT. S. 
A., and Honorable J. C. S. Blackburn. Mr. J. B. 
Bishop was retained in the position of Secretary to 
the Commission. The only change in the composi- 
tion of the membership was occasioned by the retire- 
ment of Senator Blackburn at the close of his third 
year's service. The vacancy was filled by the appoint- 
ment of Mr. M. H. Thatcher to the head of the De- 
partment of Administration. 

When Colonel Goethals and his aides came into 
control of the Canal, the lock plan, as advocated by 
the minority of the Board of Consulting Engineers, 
and described on pages 214 et seq., had been author- 
ized by Congress and accepted by the people of the 
United States as representing the form which the 
waterway would ultimately take. The advocates of 
the sea level type were ready, however, to take ad- 
vantage of any opportunity for reviving the ques- 
tion. Such an occasion arose about two years after 
the inception of the military organization. A trivial 
slide in the material with which the construction of 
the Gatun Dam had been commenced afforded to a 
local newspaper correspondent of the "peimy-a-liner" 
type the basis for a recklessly untrue and sensational 
report. Incredibly silly as was the story, it reap- 



THE INVESTIGATING BOARD. 299 

peared, shorn of its most absurd features, in all the 
leading papers of the country, with the result that 
public, confidence in the adopted plan was seriously 
shaken. 

THE INVESTIGATING BOAKD. 

In February, 1909, the President ordered Secre- 
tary Taft and a board of experts, especially appointed 
for the purpose, to make an inspection of the work 
upon the Canal, with particular reference to the 
Gatun Dam. In the resultant report the commis- 
sioners expressed the opinion that the site of the struc- 
ture met all the requirements of safety and that ex- 
cess of precaution characterized the design and meas- 
ures for its execution. They recommended a reduc- 
tion in the height of the dam and also suggested some 
modifications of other parts of the Canal plan. 

The changes which were adopted in 1909, and a 
few that had been previously determined upon, are 
the last of any consequence that can be effected, for all 
the essential parts of the waterway are now in the 
final stage of construction. The present visitor may 
readily discern, in the outline of the accomplished 
work, the foi*m which the completed waterway Avill 
assume. The channel throughout is Avithin measur- 
able distance of the stipulated dimensions. The cut in 
Culebra has penetrated to the basic rock. At Gatun, 
the dam has been completed, and the lake site has 
been prepared for its water content. The locks every- 
where are rapidly rising in their concrete shapes. In 
short, the Canal has been transferred from paper to 



300 PANAMA. 

the land. It is a tangible, visible thing. To quote 
the rash vaunt of De Lesseps, "Le Canal est un fait 
accompli." 

The chief departures from the plan as previously 
described are the removal of the terminal locks at the 
Pacific end from Sosa to Miraflores, and the conse- 
quent elimination of the proposed lake between the 
divide and the Pacific Ocean, certain increases in the 
dimensions of the channel ; enlargement of the lock 
capacities ; decrease in the height of the Gatun Dam, 
and the construction of breakwaters at Colon and 
Panama. 

THE PLAN OF THE CANAL. 

The present plan of the Canal, and that which will 
without doubt control its ultimate construction, fol- 
lows: 

The total length of the Canal, along the channel 
extending into the ocean at either end, is fifty and 
one-half miles ; the land length is ten miles less. 

Approaching from the Atlantic, a vessel will enter 
Limon Bay by a channel 500 feet wide at bottom, 
and follow this for about seven miles to Gatun. Here 
a flight of three locks will raise it to the summit level 
at an elevation of 85 feet. The vessel may traverse 
the twenty-four mile stretch of Gatun Lake at high 
speed in a channel varying from 1,000 to 500 feet in 
width. Culebra Cut will be entered at Bas Obispo 
and the passage of nine miles will be made through 
a channel having a bottom width of 300 feet. At 
Pedro Miguel, where the summit level ends, a lock 



GATUN DAM. 301 

will lower the vessel to a small lake, with surface at 
about 55 feet above the level of the sea. At a dis- 
tance of about one and one-half miles beyond, the 
two-flight locks of Miraflores mil be encountered. 
Through them the vessel will descend to tide-water 
and continue its way to the Pacific by way of a chan- 
nel eight and one-half miles in length and 500 feet in 
bottom width. The depth of the Canal throughout 
will be forty-five feet at least, except for the approach 
channel on the Atlantic side, where the bottom will 
lie forty-one feet under water at mean tide. 

GATUN DAM. 

The approximate measurements of the Gatun Dam 
are : one and one-half miles in length along the crest ; 
one-half mile wide at the base ; 400 feet wide at the 
water surface; 100 feet wide at the top, and its crest 
at an elevation of 115 feet, or 30 feet above the nor- 
mal level of the lake. The dam will be formed by the 
flanking hills and two rock walls, enclosing a mixture 
of sand and clay. The top and upstream slopes will 
be heavily riprapped. 

The spillway is a concrete-lined opening, 1,200 
feet long and 300 feet wide, cut through a hill in the 
center of the dam, the bottom of the opening being 
ten feet above sea level. During the construction 
of the dam, all the water discharged from the Chagres 
River and its tributaries is carried through this open- 
ing. When construction has sufficiently advanced to 
permit the lake to be formed, the spillway will be 



302 PANAMA. 

closed with a concrete dam, fitted with gates and ma- 
chinery for regulating the water level of the lake. 

The water level of Gatun Lake, extending through 
the Culebra Cut, will be maintained at the south end 
by an earth dam connecting the locks at Pedro Mi- 
guel with the high ground to the westward, about 
1,700 feet long, with its crest at an elevation 105 
feet above mean tide. 

The small lake between the locks at Pedro Migniel 
and Miraflores will be formed by dams connecting the 
walls of the locks at the latter point with the high 
ground on either side. The dam to the westward will 
be of earth, about 2,700 feet long, having its crest 
about 15 feet above the surface of Miraflores Lake, 
The east dam will be of concrete, about 500 feet in 
length, and will form a spillway for the lake, with 
crest gates similar to those of the Gatun Dam. 

Lake Gatun will cover an area of 164 square miles, 
with a depth in the ship channel varying from 85 to 
45 feet. The channel through the lake for the first 
16 miles from Gatun will be 1,000 feet in width; 
for the next four miles it will be 800 feet, and for the 
remainder of the distance 500 feet wide. The sum- 
mit level of the lake will extend through the cut and 
to the Pedro Miguel Locks. 

THE LOCKS. 

There will be twelve locks in the Canal, all in dupli- 
cate ; three pairs in flight at Gatun, with a combined 
lift of 85 feet ; one pair at Pedro Miguel, with a lift 



THE LOCKS. 303 

of 30% feet ; and two pairs at Miraflores, with a total 
lift of 54% feet at mean tide. The dimensions of 
all are the same — a usable length of 1,000 feet, and 
a usable breadth of 110 feet. Each lock will be a 
chamber, with walls and floor of concrete, and water- 
tight gates at each end. 

The side walls will be 45 to 50 feet thick at the 
surface of the floor ; they will be perpendicular on 
the face, and will narrow from a point 24^/3 feet 
above the floor, until they are eight feet wide at the 
top. The middle wall will be 60 feet thick and 81 
feet high, with vertical faces. At a point 421/0 feet 
above the surface of the floor, and 15 feet above the 
top of the middle culvert, this wall will divide into 
two parts, leaving a U-shaped space down the center, 
Avhich will be 19 feet broad at the bottom and 44 feet 
broad at the top. In this space will be a tunnel, di- 
vided into three stories or galleries. The lowest of 
these divisions will be for drainage; the middle for 
the wires that will carry the electric current to oper- 
ate the gate and valve machinery, which will be in- 
stalled in the central wall, and the upper division will 
form a passage-way for the operators. The lock 
chambers will be filled and emptied through lateral 
culverts in the floors, connecting with main culverts, 
18 feet in diameter in the walls, the water flowing in 
and out by gravity. 

The lock gates will be steel structures, seven feet 
thick, 65 feet long, and from 47 to 82 feet high. 
They will weigh from 300 to 600 tons each. ISTinety- 
two leaves will be required for the several locks, the 



304 PANAMA. 

total weigliing 57,000 tons. Intermediate gates will 
be used, in order to save water and time, and will per- 
mit of the division of each lock into two chambers, 
respectively, 600 and 400 feet long. In the construc- 
tion of the locks there will be used 4,500,000 cubic 
yards of concrete, requiring about the same number 
of barrels of cement. 

Every precaution has been taken to insure safety 
to vessels passing through the locks. The funda- 
mental principle has been followed that there shall be 
not less than two barriers separating a high level 
from that next below. In carrying out this principle 
there are two gates at the upper and two gates at the 
lower end of the upper lock. The double gates will 
be operated simultaneously. Another safety device 
is a chain stretched across the lock near the surface 
of the water and passed round fixed capstans on the 
walls. The device is so designed that by the applica- 
tion of frictional resistance at the proper varying 
rate it will arrest a 10,000-ton vessel moving at a 
speed of six miles an hour. When not in use it will 
lie in a groove in the lock floor. Serious mishaps to 
the gates and locks are guarded against by movable 
dams above the upper gates. Each dam consists of a 
swing drawbridge from which wicket girders can be 
lowered one at a time, the upper ends being sup- 
ported by the bridge and the lower ends by a sill in 
the bottom of the entrance. These wicket girders 
being lowered in horizontal tiers one at a time grad- 
ually diminish the area of the waterway. This dam 
is so designed that the flow of water through the 



CHANGE IN LOCATION OF LOCKS. 305 

locks, with the gates once opened, could be checked 
in less than an hour. The safety devices mentioned, 
namely, twin locks, duplicate gates, cable protection, 
and movable emergency dams, have all been success- 
fully tested on different locks in this country and 
abroad, but never before have all of them been in- 
stalled in the same work. 

In addition, a further safeguard will be adopted 
to minimize the chances of accident. Practically all 
recorded mishaps in the operation of locks during 
recent years have occurred through mistaking of sig- 
nals between the pilot house and the engine room 
while the vessel has been passing through the lock 
under its own steam. To obviate this source of dan- 
ger, it is proposed to provide on the walls of the locks 
electric locomotives, which, under proper control, will 
tow all vessels through, none being permitted to use 
their own power. 

Similar considerations have prompted a recent ad- 
dition to the design of the locks, in the forai of an 
approach wall in prolongation of the wall separating 
the twin locks. To this structure vessels will be re- 
quired to moor, instead of to the wing walls of the 
locks, as it had formerly been intended that they 
should. 

CHANGE IN LOCATION OF LOCKS. 

A brief explanatory review of the changes referred 
to may facilitate a clear understanding of the pres- 
ent plan. 

It has been asserted that the abandonment of the 

20 



306 PANAMA. 

Sosa site was in response to a new idea acted upon 
without due consideration. The facts in the matter 
are these: In 1905, the present chief engineer vis- 
ited the Isthmus in the capacity of a member of the 
Board of ISTational Defenses. In a relevant report, 
he made the following statement: 

"The gTeat objection to the locks at Sosa Hill is 
the possibility of their destruction by the fire from 
an enemy's ship. If, as has been suggested to me 
by officers of this department entitled to speak with 
authority on the subject, these locks can be located 
against and behind Sosa Hill in such a way as to use 
the hill as a protection against such fire, then economy 
would lead to the retention of the lake. . . . 
If, however, Sosa Hill will not afford a site with 
such protection, then it seems to me wiser to place 
the locks at Miraflores." 

Mature study of the question led to the conclusion 
that locks at Sosa would not be sufficiently secure and 
it was further evident that their transfer to Mira- 
flores would be accompanied by a saving in cost. The 
latter point, it should be remembered, was that de- 
cided upon by the Walker Commission for the site 
of the tide lock at the Pacific end. So that it appears 
that this, like all the other features of the plan, has 
been the subject of the most exhaustive investigation 
and thought. 

CHANGES IN DIMENSIONS. 

The increase of channel width through one-half 
the length of Culebra Cut was not made on the rec- 



CHANGES IN DIMENSIONS. 307 

ommendation of the Commission, but by executive 
order. 

The breakwaters at Colon Harbor are designed to 
render that roadstead safe for vessels at all times. 
Formerly, on the occasion of a severe storm, ships in 
the port were obliged to put out from shore. The 
structures will run out from Manzanillo Island and 
Toro Point, across the mouth of the harbor. 

A breakwater will be built at the Pacific end, from 
Balboa to the Island of l^aos. This is not necessary 
as a protection from storms, but is intended to pre- 
vent the washing of silt into the channel by the cross 
current that runs along the coast. 

The usable dimensions of the locks have been 
changed at the instigation of the President and on the 
recommendation of the General Board of the I^avy 
from 900 feet and 95 feet, to 1,000 feet and 110 feet. 

On this point Colonel Goethals has said: "It is 
objected that the size of the locks limits the Canal to 
vessels which can use them. This is true. The pres- 
ent lock designs provide intermediate gates dividing 
the locks into lengths of 600 and 400 feet. About 
98 per cent of all ships, including the largest battle- 
ships now building, can be passed through the 600- 
foot leng-ths, and the total lock length will accommo- 
date the largest commercial vessels now building, 
which, I believe, are 1,000 feet long and 88 feet beam. 
It is true that ships may increase in size so as to make 
the present locks obsolete, but the largest ships now 
afloat can not navigate the Suez Canal, nor the pro- 
posed sea level canal at Panama. It must also be re- 



a08 PANAMA. 

membered that the commerce of the world is carried 
by the medium-sized vessels, the length of only one of 
the many ships using the Suez Canal being greater 
than 600 feet." 

The height of the Gatun Dam has been decreased, 
so that its crest will stand 30 feet, instead of 50 feet, 
above the normal level of the lake, which is 85 feet. 

This change was made because, with the progress of 
time and more thorough knowledge of the foundation 
material, it became quite evident that the larger di- 
mensions were unnecessary, and to build in accord- 
ance with them would be a wasteful expenditure of 
time and money. The reduced weight is sufficient 
to meet the utmost demands of stability, and the re- 
duced height is ample for the complete retention of 
the lake, which can never, under any conceivable 
circumstances, rise to 100 feet above sea level. 

COST OF THE CANAl,. 

The present estimated cost of the Canal, which 
it is improbable that any future conditions will mate- 
rially affect, is $375,201,000. No unknown factors, 
nor hypothetical calculations entered into the prepara- 
tion of these figures. This estimate is largely in ex- 
cess of that which formed part of the report of the 
Board of Consulting Engineers, but which was based 
on data much less complete than that since rendered 
available. Since 1906 there has been an increase in 
the wage scale and in the cost of material. Wages 
on the Isthmus exceed those in the United States from 



SUCCESS OF MILITARY MANAGEMENT. 309 

• 40 to 80 per cent for the same class of labor. The 
original estimates were based on a ten-hour day, but 
Congress has since imposed upon the Commission the 
obsei*vance of an eight-hour day. The various changes 
already noted, and others of a minor character, but 
considerable in the aggregate, have increased the 
quantity of the work to be done by 50 per cent. De- 
spite all this, the unit costs have increased no more 
than 20 per cent. Furthermore, no such system of 
housing and caring for the employees as has been 
maintained was anticipated by the Board. 

In addition, municipal improvements in Panama 
and Colon, together with advances to the Panama 
Railroad, have approximated $15,000,000, a sum 
which will eventually be returned to the Treasury of 
the United States. 

SUCCESS OF THE MILITARY MANAGEMENT. 

The writer confesses to having been one of the 
sceptics who viewed with misgiving the transfer of 
the Canal operation to military management, and he 
acknowledges with pleasure that in eveiy important 
respect the results have been contrary to his predic- 
tions. The work could not have been in better hands. 
It has been carried on without any hitch or subsi- 
dence, and the progress made has excited the admira- 
tion and astonishment of engineers throughout the 
world. 

An excellent organization has been established and 
a strong esprit de corps maintained. Health condi- 



310 PANAMA. 

tions have steadily improved and a gradual increase 
in the eiSciency of labor has been effected. All classes 
of employees are imbued with confidence and courage 
by the knowledge that their chiefs are moving along 
clearly cut lines, with well-defined purposes in view. 
For the first time since the enterprise was entered 
upon, the responsible heads of it are in complete ac- 
cord with the controlling authorities at Washington. 

The plan of organization of the Engineering De- 
partment divides all construction work into three top- 
ographical districts, each under the charge of an 
Assistant Engineer with full control and responsi- 
bility. These divisions are: The Atlantic Division, 
extending from deep water to Gatun Lake, and in- 
cluding the Gatun Dam and locks. The Central 
Division, extending from Gatun to Pedro Miguel, 
and including the Culebra Cut. The Pacific Divi- 
sion, extending from Pedro Miguel to deep water 
in the Pacific, and including the dams and locks at 
the former point and at Miraflores. 

Of the entire work more than sixty per cent con- 
sists of excavation, 10 per cent of it to be done by 
dredges, and the remainder by steam shovels. The 
construction of locks, dams, spillways, etc., represents 
about 40 per cent of the task. 

At the close of 1910, the excavation remaining to 
be done in the Culebra Cut, where the heaviest por- 
tion of the work lies, was hardly more than a two 
years' task gauged by the prevailing rate of progress. 
It is necessary, however, to take into account the 
greater difficulties that arise as the end is approached. 



THE PANAjVIA RAILROAD. 311 

Future excavation must be in rock, all of which needs 
to be blasted before it can be taken up bj the shovels. 
Furthennore, the lower the cut goes, the fewer the 
machines that can be applied to its sides. Neverthe- 
less, it is safe to say that the channel through Culebra 
will have been completely dug out and made ready 
for its concrete reinforcement by the close of 1913. 
The erection of the lock gates will be practically the 
last step in the construction of the Canal. The con- 
tract for these gates calls for the placement of the last 
of them not later than January 1, 1914. 

THE PANAMA KAILKOAD. 

The Canal plan necessitated the removal of the 
Panama Railroad, which ran through the site of 
Gatun Lake. It has been almost entirely rebuilt upon 
higher ground to the east of the Canal line. In its 
new location the road is in better and more permanent 
condition than before. There is every reason to 
believe that after the opening of the Canal the rail- 
way will continue to enjoy a large traffic. Undoubt- 
edly considerable local freight will be constantly mov- 
ing between Panama and Colon and reshipments of 
through freight will often call for a transfer from 
one end of the Canal to the other by rail. 

At present the Panama Railroad is relatively the 
busiest line in the world. Dui*ing 1910 the freight 
movement over its fifty miles of roadbed approxi- 
mated 300,000,000 tons. Whilst the commercial traffic 
is considerable, it accounts for but a fractional part 



312 PANAMA. 

of tlie whole. The great bulk of the material carried 
consists of spoil from the works, and supplies for the 
Commission. The engineering department of the 
Canal operates about 300 miles of construction track- 
age and the Panama Railroad acts as a clearing house 
for its traffic. It receives the dirt trains loaded and 
returns them empty. From TOO to 800 dirt trains 
a day are handled, each composed of a locomotive 
and 18 flat cars, the full load being 500 tons. 

The passenger traffic on this little railroad is also 
extraordinarily great. All day long employees are 
journeying between the many towns that are strung 
along the line. During the last fiscal year about 
1,500,000 passengers were carried. In the mornings 
and evenings closely packed laborers' trains of a spe- 
cial type are run. 

The Panama Railroad has added to its fleet two 
large vessels, the Ancon, and the Cristobal, for the 
express purpose of carrying the immense shipments 
of cement needed in the present stage of construction. 

THE LABOR PROBLEM. 

The labor problem has been solved, in so far as a 
solution is possible. For some time past the supply 
has been in excess of the demand, and a constantly 
increasing degree of efficiency has been secured. The 
latter condition has been brought about in part by 
improvement in sanitation and better housing, but 
probably the most potent factor in producing more 
satisfactory work from the V7est Indians is the regu- 



THE LABOR PROBLEM. 313 

lation requiriug them to draw a liberal daily ration. 
Previous to its enforcement the majority of this class 
of laborers bought improper and insufficient food for 
themselves. 

Roughly stated, the force upon the Isthmus con- 
sists of 5,000 white men on the "gold roll," and 
40,000 common laborers, of whom 5,000 are Span- 
iards. The number of the latter class employed fluc- 
tuates from day to day, as the West Indian is not a 
steady workman under the best of circumstances. 

The average salary received by Americans in the 
Zone is about $150 a month. In addition, they are 
provided with free quarters, electric light, furniture, 
cooking coal, distilled water and medical services. 
They may purchase food and all necessities from the 
Commission's stores at practically wholesale prices. 
They are allowed thirty days' sick leave, thirty days' 
injury leave, and, in the case of monthly employees, 
six weeks' annual leave in each year, and in every 
instance with full pay. 

The West Indian laborer is paid ninety cents a 
day for nine hours' work, and is furnished three 
meals for thirty cents. The European laborer re- 
ceives $1.50 for nine hours' work, and is charged 
forty cents per day for three meals. He is also fur- 
nished with quarters free. 

The standard pay for American mechanics is sixty- 
five cents an hour. By an act of Congi'ess the eight- 
hour day is rigidly adhered to, a supplemental act 
exempting aliens from its operation. 

Ample recreation is afforded to the Americans by 



314 PANAMA, 

the various Y. M. C. A. clubhouses and somewhat 
similar organizations scattered along the line. There 
are about 1,500 American women and a like number 
of children in the Zone. 

At each of the towns, or settlements, there is a 
hotel maintained by the Subsistence Department for 
the benefit of the "gold" employees. Here they may 
obtain good meals at 30 cents each. The European 
laborers are fed in what are called "messes," and the 
negroes in "kitchens." 

In the cities of Colon and Panama the work of im- 
provement has been maintained and the plans for its 
continuance extend well into the future. Both cen- 
ters now enjoy all the public comforts and couA^e- 
niences that would be found in the average American 
city of the same size. The business of Panama con- 
tinues to increase and its future is constantly assum- 
ing a more roseate hue. 

HEALTH CONDITIONS. 

The Canal Zone is at the present day more health- 
ful to the white man than many parts of the United 
States. There has been an absence of yellow fever 
during the past four years and it is safe to say that 
no epidemic of that disease will ever again occur upon 
the Isthmus. Malaria is being rapidly reduced and 
its source eradicated by the persistent labors of the 
Sanitary Department. The general health of Canal 
employees, both white and colored, is better than that 
of the several communities from which they were 



riELD FOR INVESTMENT. 315 

drawn, but, with regard to the former, it must be 
considered that they are picked men in the prime of 
life, and that those among them who succumb to cli- 
mate or disease are quickly weeded out and sent home. 

In 1907-8, there were 185 deaths among an aver- 
age force of 12,058 white employees, or 15,34 per 
thousand; in 1908-9, there were 14T deaths among 
12,299, or 11.95 ; in 1909-10, there were 108 deaths 
among 11,954; or 9.03. The figures for the black 
force show in 190Y-8, 604 deaths among 30,999, or 
19.48 per thousand; in 1908-9, 383 deaths among 
31,963, or 11.98; in 1909-10, 440 deaths among 
38,581, or 11.40. The combined populations of Pan- 
ama and Colon present evidence of a similar de- 
crease in mortality from 27.67 to 18.91 per thousand. 

No adequate commentary upon such a splendid 
record is possible. 

The occupation by the United States of the Canal 
Zone has attracted widespread attention to a territory 
comparable in many respects to Cuba. The Isthmus 
is only about two-thirds the size of that island, but 
resembles it in physical conformation and climate. 
The population of the former is no more than one- 
seventh of that of Cuba, but the resources of the 
little-known region will prove on development to be 
equally as great as those of the much exploited re- 
public. 

FIELD FOR INVESTMENT 

Capital in considerable quantities has been at- 
tracted to Panama in recent years and a variet.y of 



316 PANAMA. 

enterprises have been projected by American and 
British corporations. It is, as yet, too early to record 
results, and these pioneer efforts may not all meet 
with success. In any case, the fact remains that the 
interior of Panama, and especially the Province of 
Chiriqui, presents to-day one of the most promising 
fields for the investment of capital to be found in the 
world. The time is not distant when the large tracts 
of valuable timber, lying within comparatively easy 
distance of the Canal, will be worked. The railroad, 
now under construction, from the City of Panama 
to David, the capital of Chiriqui, will hasten the cul- 
tivation and settlement of the marvelously fertile 
lands of that province. With the removal of trans- 
portation difficulties, cattle raising, sugar planting, 
rubber growing, and a score of other profitable indus- 
tries, to which the conditions lend exceptional facil- 
ities, must flourish and bring to the youngest of re- 
publics a prosperity transcending the fondest dreams 
of her founders. 



APPENDIX 
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD. 
THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PANAMA. 



APPENDIX. 
GREAT CANALS OF THE WORLD.* 

The Suez Canal — The Cronstadt and St. Petersburg Canal — 
The Corinth Canal — The Manchester Ship Canal — The 
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal — The Elbe and Trave Canal — Ca- 
nals Projected in Prussia — Ship Canals Connecting the 
Great Lakes of North America — The Welland Canal — The 
Sault Ste. Marie Canals — Lake Borgne Canal — The Chi- 
cago Sanitary and Ship Canal — Other Canals — Canals 
of the United Kingdom — Canals of the United States — 
The Economic Effects of Ship Canals — Canals of Holland 

— Manchester Ship Canal — Effect of Suez Canal on Ship- 
ping — Traffic of Suez and St. Mary's Canals Compared — 
Changes in the Lakes Shipping — Effect of " Soo " Canal 
on Iron Business — Enormous Wheat Traffic of the Lakes — 
Influences of St. Mary's and Suez Canals — Canals in China 

— The Canal System of India. 

Ship canals connecting gi'eat bodies of water, and 
of sufficient dimensions to accommodate the great 
modern vessels plying upon such waters, are of com- 
paratively recent production and few in number. 
The one great example of works of tliis character 
which has been a sufficient length of time in exist- 
ence and operation to supply satisfactory data as to 
cost of maintenance and operation and practical value 

* The following matter is extracted from the monograph 
under this title issued by the Department of Commerce and 
Labor, Washington, D. C. 

319 



320 PANAMA. 

to the commerce of the world is the Suez Canal, and 
for this the available statistics begin with the year 
1870, while its new and enlarged dimensions onlj 
date from the year 1896. For the Sault Ste. Marie 
Canal, connecting Lake Superior with Lake Huron, 
statistics date from 1855. Statistics of the Welland 
Canal date from 1867, but for the canal in its pres- 
ent enlarged form cover but four years of operation. 
The other great ship canals of the world are of much 
more recent construction, and data regarding their 
operation therefore cover a comparatively brief term, 
and in some cases are scarcely at present available in 
detail. 

The artificial waterways which may properly be 
termed ship canals are nine in number, viz. : 

(1) The Suez Canal, begun in 1859 and completed 
in 1869. 

(2) The Cronstadt and St. Petersburg Canal, be- 
gun in 1877 and completed in 1890. 

(3) The Corinth Canal, begun in 1884- and com- 
pleted in 1893. 

(4) The Manchester Ship Canal, completed in 
1894. 

(5) The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, connecting the 
Baltic and ]^orth Seas, completed in 1895. 

(6) The Elbe and Trave Canal, connecting the 
North Sea and Baltic, opened in 1900. 

(7) The Welland Canal, connecting Lake Erie 
with Lake Ontario. 



THE SUEZ CANAL. 321 

(8 and 9) The two canals, United States and Cana- 
dian, respectively, connecting Lake Superior with 
Lake Huron. 

THE SUEZ CAISTAI.. 

The Suez Canal is usually considered the most im- 
portant example of ship canals, though the number 
of vessels passing through it annually does not equal 
that passing through the canals connecting Lake 
Superior with the chain of Great Lakes at the south. 
In length, however, it exceeds any of the other great 
ship canals, its total length being 90 miles, of which 
about two-thirds is through shallow lakes. The ma- 
terial excavated was usually sand, though in some 
cases strata of solid rock from 2 to 3 feet in thick- 
ness were encountered. The total excavation was 
about 80,000,000 cubic yards under the original 
plan, which gave a depth of 25 feet. In 1895 the 
canal was so enlarged as to give a depth of 31 feet, 
a vddth at the bottom of 108 feet and at the surface 
of 420 feet. The original cost was $95,000,000, 
and for the canal in its present form slightly in ex- 
cess of $100,000,000. 

The revenue of the canal is apparently large 
in proportion to its cost, the latest report of the com- 
pany for 1903 giving the net profits for that year at 
65,579,347 francs, and the total amount distributed 
among the shareholders 64,565,634 francs, or over 

21 



322 PANAMA. 

12 per cent of the estimated cost of $100,000,000. 
Tlie canal is without locks, being at sea level the en- 
tire distance. The length of time occupied in pass- 
ing through the canal averages about eighteen hours. 
By the use of electric lights throughout the entire 
length of the canal passages are made with nearly 
equal facility by night or day. The tolls charged 
are 8.50 francs per ton net register, " Danube meas- 
urement," which amounts to about $2 per ton United 
States net measurement. Steam vessels passing 
through the canal are propelled by their own power. 
The canal has accommodated the following traffic 
since its opening: 

Gross> 
Vessels. Tonnage,. 

1870 486 654,915 

1875 , 1,494 2,940,708 

1880 2,026 4,344,519 

1890 3,389 9,749,129 

1895 3,434 11,833,637 

1900 3,441 13,699,237 

1903 3,761 16,615,309 

THE CEONSTADT AND ST. PETEESBUEG CANAL. 

The canal connecting the Bay of Cronstadt with 
St Petersburg is described as a work of great strate- 
gic and commercial importance to Russia. The ca- 
nal and sailing course in the Bay of Cronstadt are 
about 16 miles long, the canal proper being about 6 



THE CORINTH CANAL. 323 

miles and the bay channel about 10 miles, and they 
together extend from Cronstadt, on the Gulf of Fin- 
land, to St. Petersburg. The canal was opened in 
1890 with a navigable depth of 201^! feet, the orig- 
inal depth having been about 9 feet ; the width ranges 
from 220 to 350 feet. The total cost is estimated 
at about $10,000,000. 

THE, CORINTH CANAIi. 

The next of the great ship canals connecting bod- 
ies of salt water in the order of date of construction 
is the Corinth Canal, which connects the Gulf of 
Corinth with the Gulf of ^gina. The canal reduces 
the distance from Adriatic ports about 1Y5 miles and 
from Mediterranean ports about 100 miles. Its 
length is about 4 miles, a part of which was cut 
through granite soft rock and the remainder through 
soil. There are no locks, as is also the case in both 
the Suez and Cronstadt canals, already described. 
The width of the canal is Y2 feet at bottom and the 
depth 261/4 feet. The work was begim in 1884 and 
completed in 1893 at a cost of about $5,000,000. 
The average tolls are 18 cents per ton and 20 cents 
per passenger. 

THE MANCHESTER SHIP CANAIi. 

The Manchester Ship Canal, which connects Man- 



324 PANAMA. 

Chester, England, with the Mersey River, Liverpool, 
and the Atlantic Ocean, was opened for traffic Janu- 
ary 1, 1894. The length of the canal is 351/2 miles, 
the total rise from the water level to Manchester being 
60 feet, which is divided between four sets of locks, 
giving an average to each of 15 feet. The minimum 
width is 120 feet at the bottom and average 175 feet 
at the water level, though in places the width is ex- 
tended to 230 feet; the minimum depth 26 feet, 
and the time required for navigating the canal from 
five to eight hours. The total amount of excavation 
in the canal' and docks was about 45,000,000 cubic 
yards, of which about one-fourth was sandstone rock. 
The lock gates are operated by hydraulic power ; rail- 
ways and bridges crossing the route of the canal have 
been raised to give a height of 75 feet to vessels trav- 
ersing the canal, and an ordinary canal whose route 
it crosses is carried over it by a springing aqueduct 
composed of an iron caisson resting upon a pivot pier. 
The total cost of the canal is given at $75,000,000. 
The revenue in 1902, according to the Statesman's 
Yearbook, was £358,491, and the working expenses, 
£217,537. 

THE KAISEE. WILHELM CANAL. 

Two canals connect the Baltic and I^orth seas 
through Germany, the first, known as the Kaiser 
^ilhelra Caual, having been completed in 1895 and 



ELBE AND TRAVE CANAL. 325 

constructed largely for military and naval purposes, 
but proving also of great value to general mercantile 
traffic. Work upon the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal was 
begun in 1887, and completed, as above indicated, in 
1895. The length of the canal is 61 miles, the 
terminus in the Baltic Sea being at the harbor of 
Kiel. The depth is 291/2 feet, the width at the bot- 
tom 72 feet, and the minimum width at the surface 
190 feet. The route lies chiefly through marshes and 
shallow lakes and along river valleys. The total ex- 
cavation amounted to about 100,000,000 cubic yards, 
and the cost to about $40,000,000. The number of 
vessels passing through the canal in 1903-4 was 
32,038, with a tonnage of 4,990,287, and the dues 
collected amounted to 2,414,499 marks. 

THE ELBE AND TEAVE CANAL. 

A smaller canal, with a length of about 41 miles 
and a depth of about 10 feet, was opened in 1900, 
known as the Elbe and Trave Canal, and is described 
by the International Yearbook, 1900, as follows : 

" The Elbe and Trave Canal, in Germany, was 
opened by the Emperor of Germany on June 16, 
1900. It has been under construction for five years, 
and has cost about $5,831,000, of which Prussia con- 
tributed $1,785,000 and the old Hanse to^vn of Lu- 
beck $4,046,000. The length of the new canal is 
about 41 miles, and is the second to join the !N"orth 



326 PANAMA. 

Sea and the Baltic, following the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Canal (or Kiel Canal), built about five years ago at a 
cost of $37,128,000. The breadtli of the new canal 
is 72 feet; breadth of the locks, 46 feet; length of 
locks, 261 feet; depth of locks, 8 feet 2 inches. It is 
crossed by 29 bridges, erected at a cost of $1,000,000. 
There are seven locks, five being between Lubeck and 
the Mollner See (the summit point of the canal) and 
two between Mollner See and Fauenberg^on-the-Elbe. 
At this point it may be noted that the Germans began 
experiments during 1900 with electric towing on the 
Know Canal between Berlin and Stettin. A track 
of 1-meter gauge was laid along the bank of the canal, 
having one 9-pound and one 18-pound rail laid partly 
on cross-ties and partly on concrete blocks. The 
larger rail serves for the return current, and has 
bolted to it a rack which gears with a spur wheel on 
the locomotive. The locomotive is 6 feet 10 inches by 
4 feet 10 inches, mounted on four wheels, with a 
wheel base of 3 feet 6 inches, and weighing 2 tons. 
It is fitted vnth a 12-horsepower motor, current for 
which is furnished by a 9-kilowatt dynamo, driven by 
a 15-horsepower engine. The current is 500 volts, 
and is transmitted by a wire carried on wooden poles 
23 feet high and about 120 feet apart. The boats 
are about 132 feet long and 15 feet 6 inches beam, 
and carry from 150 to 175 tons on a draft of 4 feet 9 
inches. During 1900 the Stettin-Swinemund Canal, 
■with a length of 35 miles, has been dredged through- 



PROJECTED PRUSSIAN CANALS. '^'2.7 

out, and is now open to steamers drawing 22 feet of 
water. Swinemund is on the Baltic Sea. 

" Among the various projects for European canals 
may be mentioned one connecting the Danube a little 
below Vienna, Austria, with the Adriatic Sea at Tri- 
este, a distance of about 319 miles. The construc- 
tion will cost some $120,000,000. Late in 1900 a 
canal from Liege to Antwerp, in Belgium, was being 
seriously discussed, in order to connect the prosper- 
ous city of Liege with the sea, and make it, like the 
city of Manchester, England, a seaport. The pro- 
moters propose a canal 84 miles long, 200 feet wide, 
and 23 feet deep from Antwerp to Liege, with locks 
at Liege, Hasselt, Herenthals, and Antwerp. The 
difference in level to be overcome by locks would be 
175 feet, and it is thought that thirteen single locks 
and one double lock would be sufficient. The total 
estimated cost of the work is $25,200,000." 

CAISTALS PROJECTED IIST PRUSSIA. 

According to a recent report of United States Con- 
6ul-General Guenther, of Frankfort, Germany, the 
committee on canals of the Prussian Diet has re- 
ported, with a favorable recommendation, a bill pro- 
viding for the following construction : 

1. A navigable canal between the rivers Rhine 
and Weser, with a connection to Hanover, and the 
canalization of the Eiver Lippe : 



328 PANAMA. 

(a) A navigable canal from the Ehine in the vi- 
cinity of Ruhrort, or from a more northern point, to 
the D'ortmund-Ems Canal or the vicinity of Heme 
(Rhine-Herne Canal) inclusive of a branch canal 
from Datteln to Hamm; estimated cost, 74,500,000 
marks ($17,731,000). 

(6) Several additional works on the Dortmund- 
Ems Canal between Dortmund and Bevergern; esti- 
mated cost, 6,150,000 marks ($1,463,700). 

(c) A navigable canal from the Dortmund-Ems 
Canal in the vicinity of Bevergern to the River 
Weser, connecting with Hanover; branch canals to 
Osnabriick, Minden, and Linden, construction of 
reservoirs in the upper parts of the River Weser and 
some regulation works of the Weser below Hameln; 
estimated cost, 120,500,000 marks ($28,679,000). 

(d) Canalization of the River Lippe or construc- 
tion of branch canals of the Lippe from Weser to the 
Dortmund-Ems Canal, near Datteln, and from 
Hamm to Lippstadt; estimated cost, 44,600,000 
marks ($10,614,800). 

(e) Improvement of the cultivation of the soil in 
connection with the works under items a to d, and 
the completed Dortmund-Ems Canal ; estimated cost, 
5,000,000 marks ($1,190,000). 

The total estimated cost of the work, items a to e, 
is placed at 250,750,000 marks ($59,678,500). 
2. The construction of a deep waterway between 



NORTH AMERiCx\N CANALS. 32'.) 

Berlin and Stettin ; estimated cost, 43,000,000 marks 
($10,234,000). 

3. Improvement of the waterway between the 
rivers Oder and Weichsel, also of the river Warthe 
from the mouth of the river N^etze to the city of 
Posen; estimated cost 21,175,000 marks ($5,039,- 
650). 

4. The canalization of the river Oder from the 
mouth of the river Glatzer Neisse to the city of 
Breslau, experimental works on the line between 
Breslau and Fiirstenberg and the Oder, construction 
of one or of several reservoirs; estimated cost, 19,- 
650,000 marks ($4,676,700). 

The entire cost of the projects named is placed at 
334,575,000 marks ($79,628,850). 

SHIP CAlSTAiS CONNECTING THE GREAT IA.KES OF 
NORTH AMERICA. 

Three ship canals intended to give continuous pas- 
sage to vessels from the head of Lake Superior to 
Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River are the 
Welland Canal, originally constructed in 1833 and 
enlarged in 1871 and 1900; the St. Marys Falls 
Canal at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., opened in 1855 
and enlarged in 1881 and 1896, and the Canadian 
Canal at St. Marys River, opened in 1895, In point 
of importance, measured at least by their present use, 
the canals at the St. Marys River by far surpass that 



330 PANAMA. 

of the Welland Canal, the number of vessels passing 
through the canals at the St. Marys Eiver being 
eight times as great as the number passing through 
the Welland, and the tonnage of the former nearly 
forty times as great as that of the latter. One of 
the important products of the Lake Superior region, 
iron ore, is chiefly used in the section contiguous to 
Lake Erie, and a large proportion of the grain com- 
ing from Lake Superior passes from Buffalo to the 
Atlantic coast by way of the Erie Canal and railroads 
centering at Buffalo. The most important article in 
the westward shipments through the Sault Ste. Marie 
canals, coal, originates in the territory contiguous to 
Lake Erie. These conditions largely account for the 
fact that the number and tonnage of vessels passing 
the St. Marys River canals so greatly exceed those 
of the Welland Canal. 

THE WELLAND CAJSTAL. 

The Welland Canal connects Lake Ontario and 
Lake Erie on the Canadian side of the river. It 
was constructed in 1833 and enlarged in 1871 and 
again in 1900. The length of the canal is 27 miles, 
the number of locks 25, the total rise of lockage 327 
feet, and the total cost about $25,000,000. The an- 
nual collection of tolls on freight, passeng-ers, and ves- 
sels averages about $225,000 and the canal is open 
on an average about 240 days in a year. By order 



SAULT STE. MARIE CANALS. 331 

in council dated April 27, 1903, the levy of tolls for 
passage through Dominion canals has been abolished 
for a period of two seasons of navigation. 

THE SAULT STE. MAKIE CANALS. 

The canals at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., and On- 
tario are located adjacent to the falls of the St. Marys 
River, which connects Lake Superior with Lake 
Huron, and lower or raise vessels from one level to 
the other, a height of 17 to 20 feet. The canal be- 
longing to the United States was begun in 1853 by the 
State of Michigan and opened in 1855, the length of 
the canal being 5,674 feet, and provided with two 
tandem locks, each being 350 feet in length and 70 
feet wide, and allowing passage of vessels drawing 12 
feet, the original cost being $il,000,000. The United 
States Government, by consent of the State, began in 
1870 to enlarge the canal, and by 1881 had increased 
its length to 1.6 miles, its width to an average of 160 
feet, and its depth to 16 feet; also had built a single 
lock 515 feet long and 80 feet wide, with a depth of 
17 feet on the sills, which was located 100 feet south 
of the State locks. The State relinquished all control 
of the canal in March, 1882. In 1887 the State 
locks were torn down and replaced by a single lock 
800 feet long, 100 feet wide, with a depth of 22 feet 
of water on the sills. This lock was put in commis- 
sion in 1896. The canal was also deepened to 25 



332 MANAMA. 

feet The Canadian canal, 1% miles long, 150 feet 
wide, and 22 feet deep, with lock 900 feet long, 60 
feet wide, with 22 feet on the miter sills, was built 
on the north side of the river during the years 1888 
to 1895. In 1900 the number of vessels passing 
through the United States canal was 16,144, and 
through the Canadian canal, 3,003, showing an in- 
crease of 1,350 in the number of vessels passing 
through the Canadian canal, and a decrease of 
1,901 in the number through the United States 
canal, the increase in the number passing through 
the Canadian canal having been due to the de- 
velopment of the Michipocoten district. The ton- 
nage passing through the United States canal in 1903 
was: Registered tonnage, 22,998,864 tons, against 
19,901,463 in the year 1900; the freight tonnage in 
1903 was 29,172,252 tons, against 23,251,539 tons 
in 1900. The Canadian canal shows: Registered 
tonnage in 1903, 4,737,580 tons, against 2,160,490 in 
1900; and freight tonnage in 1903, 5,502,185 tons, 
against 2,018,999 in 1900. A marked contrast be- 
tween the business of the St. Marys Falls and Wel- 
land canals is found in a comparison of their figures 
for a term of years. The number of vessels passing 
through the Welland Canal in 1873 was 6,425, and 
in 1902, 1,568, a reduction of over 75 per cent in 
the number of vessels. The number of vessels pass- 
ing through the St. Marys Falls Canal in 1873 was 



POE AND WEITZEL LOCKS. 3:?3 

2,517, and in 1903, through the American and Ca- 
nadian canals, 18,596. 

The following, supplied by the office of the Chief 
of Engineers, War Department, shows the details of 
the Sault Ste. Marie and Welland canals : 

The total cost of the St. Marys Falls Canal, Mich- 
igan, and of the locks now in service is $6,033,533, 
made up as follows : 

Dollars. 

Canal , 2,250,786 

Weitzel lock 983,355 

Poe lock 2,799,392 

The length of the canal is 1.6 miles, depth 25 feet, 
and width varying from 110 to 1,000 feet. The size 
of the locks is as follows: 

Weitzel loch: Feet. 

Depth of water at mean stage 17 

Length between gates . 515 

Width of chamber. 80 

Width at gates 60 

Poe loch: 

Length between gates 800 

Depth of water at mean stage 22 

Width 100 

The lift of both locks varies from 16 to 20 feet. 
The Canadian lock at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, 
Canada, has a length between gates of 000 feet and 



334 PANAMA. 

a width of 60 feet ; the depth of water over miter sill 
of lock and in canal is 22 feet at mean stage (20 
feet 3 inches at lowest known water level). The 
total amount expended on construction to June 30, 
1900, was $3,770,621. 

The Welland Canal is 26.75 miles long and 100 
feet wide; it has 25 lift locks and one guard lock; 
the locks are 270 feet long, 45 feet wide, and have 
a depth of water of 14 feet; the total lift is 326.75 
feet. The total amount expended on construction to 
June 30, 1900, was $24,293,587. 

According to the International Yearbook, 1900, 
the most notable occurrence of the year 1899 in 
canal construction was the opening of the Soulanges 
Canal by which the Canadian Government completes 
the last link in its long-projected 14-foot waterway 
from the head of Lake Superior to the mouth of the 
St. Liawrence Eiver. 

I^KE BOEGNE CANAIi. 

The Lake Blorgne, Louisiana, Canal was formally 
opened in August of 1901. It opens continuous 
water communication with lakes Maurepas, Pont- 
chartrain, and Borgne, the Mississippi Sound, Mo- 
bile, and the Alabama and Warrior rivers, and the 
entire Mississippi River system, and has an impor- 
tant bearing as a regulator of freight rates between 
these sections. The effects of the canals may be 



LAKE BORGNE CANAL. 335 

briefly summed up as: Shortening the distance be- 
tween ISTew Orleans and the Gulf points east of the 
Mississippi ; bringing shipments from the Gulf coast 
direct to the levees at New Orleans ; saving the trans- 
shipment of through freights, with a consequent re- 
duction in freight rates ; enabling sea-going vessels, 
drawing 10 to 12 feet of water, to come within 20 
miles of 'New Orleans, saving all such craft the cost 
of tonnage and shortening, by 60 miles, direct water 
communication between ISTew Orleans and the deep 
water of the Gulf. In addition to these effects may 
be enumerated the cheapening of coal for consump- 
tion at New Orleans. Coal has hitherto been floated 
down the rivers from Pittsburg, a distance of 2,100 
miles. The canal opens up the coal fields in the in- 
terior of Alabama for I^ew Orleans consumption and 
reduces coal prices considerably, giving an additional 
advantage to domestic industries and to steamers 
purchasing bunker coal. The canal is 7 miles long 
and from 150 to 200 feet in width. Bayou Dupre 
forms a portion of the canal. The lock chamber is 
200 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 25 feet deep, and 
connects the canal with the Mississippi River. 

THE CHICAGO SANITARY Al^D SHIP CANAL. 

The Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal connects 
Lake Michigan at Chicago with the Illinois River at 
Lockport, a distance of 34 miles. The canal was 



336 PANAMA. 

cut for the purpose of giving to the city of Chicago 
proper drainage facilities by reversing the movement 
of w^ater, which formerly flowed into Lake Michi- 
gan through the Chicago River and turning a current 
from Lake Michigan through the Chicago Eiver to 
the Illinois River at Lockport and thence down the 
Illinois River to the Mississippi. The minimum 
depth of the canal is 22 feet, its width at bottom 160 
feet, and the width at the top from 162 to 290 feet, 
according to the class of material through which it 
is cut. The work was begun September 3, 1892, 
and completed and the water turned into the channel 
January 2, 1900. The flow of water from Lake 
Michigan toward the Gulf is now at the rate of 360,- 
000 cubic feet per minute, and the channel is esti- 
mated to be capable of carrying nearly twice that 
amount. The total excavation in its construction in- 
cluded 28,500,000 cubic yards of glacial drift and 
12,910,000 cubic yards of solid rock, an aggregate 
of 41,410,000 cubic yards. In addition to this the 
construction of a new channel for the Desplaines 
River became necessary in order to permit the canal 
to follow the bed of that river, and the material ex- 
cavated in that work amounted to 2,068,659 cubic 
yards, making a grand total displacement in the work 
of 43,478,659 cubic yards of material which, accord- 
ing to a statement issued by the trustees of the sani- 
tary district of Chicago, would, if deposited in Lake 
Michigan in 40 feet of water, form an island 1 mile 



LAKE-GULF WATERWAY. 337 

square with its surface 12 feet above the water line. 
All bridges along the canal are movable structures. 
The total cost of construction, including interest ac- 
count, aggregated $34,000,000, of which $21,379,675 
was for excavation and about $3,000,000 for rights 
of way and $4,000,000 for building railroad and 
highway bridges over the canal. The city and State 
authorities by whom the canal was constructed are 
now proposing to Congress to make this canal a com- 
mercial highway in case Congress will increase the 
depth of the Illinois and Mississippi rivers to 
14 feet, with locks for fleets of barges from Lock- 
port, the terminus of the drainage canal, to St. Louis. 
This, it is argued, would give through-water trans- 
portation from Lake Michigan to the Gulf by way of 
the drainage canal, the Illinois River, and the Mis- 
sissippi River, and would enable the United States in 
case of war to quickly transport light-draft war ves- 
sels from the Gulf to the lakes. This work of deep- 
ening the Illinois River would also give through- 
water connection from Rock Island, on the Upper 
Mississippi River, to Lake Michigan via the Illinois 
and Mississippi Canal, elsewhere described, which 
extends from Rock Island, on the Mississippi River, 
to Hennepin, on the Illinois River. The estimate 
of the Chicago sanitary district trustees of the cost 
of deepening the Illinois and Mississippi rivers from 
the terminus of the ship canal to St. Louii? to n doptli 

22 



S38 1>AKAMA. 

of 14 feet is $25,000,000, including five locks and 
dams. 

OTHER CANAIS. 

In addition to the above ship canals, there is a 
number of other important waterways worthy of men- 
tion. The great ISTorth Holland Canal, cut in 1845 
from Amsterdam to Helder, a distance of 51 miles, 
to avoid the shoals of the Zuyder Zee, has a depth of 
20 feet, a width of 125 feet at the surface, and car- 
ries vessels of 1,300 tons burden, and is described 
as " the chief cause of thei great prosperity of Ams- 
terdam." 

The Caledonian Canal, which connects the Atlan- 
tic Ocean and l^orth Sea through the north of Scot- 
land, is IT feet in depth, 50 feet in width at the 
bottom, and 120 feet at the surface, with a surface 
elevation at the highest point of 94 feet above sea 
level. The canal proper is 250 miles long, and the 
distance between the terminals over 300 miles. The 
cost has been stated at $7,000,000, including repairs. 

The Canal du Midi, cut through France from 
Toulouse, on the Garonne River, to Cette, on the 
Mediterranean, a distance of 150 miles, is 60 feet 
wide, 61/2 fest deep, has 114 locks, and is, at its high- 
est point, 600 feet above the level of the sea. Its 
cost was $3,500,000, and it is navigable for vessels 
of 100 tons. 



CANiUDA'S CANALS. 339 

A ship canal to supply passage of seagoing vessels 
from Antwerp to Brussels, Belgium, a distance of 
about 30 miles, is under contemplation. 

The Illinois and Mississippi Canal, which is to 
furnish a navigable waterway from the Mississippi 
River, at the mouth of the Rock River in Illinois, to 
the Illinois River, at Hennepin, 111., and thence by 
river and canal to Lake Michigan, was begun in 1892, 
and the section between Rock Island and Hennepin 
is now nearing completion. The canal is about 80 
feet wide, 7 feet deep, and is supplied \vith locks 150 
feet long and 35 feet wide, capablie of passing barges 
carrying 600 tons of freight. 

The canal systems of European countries and of 
Canada differ from those of the United States in that 
they are operated in conjunction with, and made 
complemental to, the railway systems of those coun- 
tries. Canada's six great systems of government 
canals afford, with the St. Lawrence River connec- 
tions, important inland communications. The total 
length of the canals in operation is 262 miles, but the 
aggregate length of continuous inland navigation ren- 
dered available by them is nearly 3,000 miles. The 
receipts in 1903 were $230,213, and the working ex- 
penses, including repairs, $581,976. The amount 
expended in the construction and maintenance of 
these canals, including the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, 
to June 30, 1903, is $85,300,000. In India the 



340 PANAMA 

canals constructed primarily for irrigation purposes, 
at a cost of about $15,000,000, are utilized to a con- 
siderable extent for inland navigation. In Germany 
the canals, aside from the Kaiser Wilbelm, are 1,511 
miles in length, and the canalized rivers 1,452 miles. 
In France the length of the canals in operation is 
3,021 miles. 

CANAI^ OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 

In the United Kingdom the length of canals be- 
longing to railways is 1,139 miles, and that of canals 
not belonging to railways 2,768 miles. The traffic 
of canals belonging to the railways amounted in 1898 
to 6,009,820 tons; of those not belonging to railways 
33,348,573 tons. The total revenue of both classes 
of canals was, in the same year, £2,408,534, and the 
expenditure £1,764,037. The tonnage figures do not 
include the 1,142,477 tons carried on the Manchester 
Ship Canal. The London Daily Mail Yearbook for 
1902 says of the canal system of England: '' There 
are 3,520 miles of inland navigation in England and 
Wales, of which 1,234 miles are under the control of 
the railways, the London and Northwestern and 
Great Western railways owning nearly 700 miles be- 
tween them. The paid-up capital (from all sources) 
of the independent canals (excluding the Manches- 
ter Ship Canal) falls little short of £20,000,000, ac- 



CANALS OF THE UNITED STATES. ^^41 

cording to the board of trade returns. Including 
railway-owned canals, this amount will probably ex- 
ceed £30,000,000. The annual traffic nins about 
37,000,000 tons, comparing unfavorably with a prob- 
able 320,000,000 tons carried by the railways. The 
improvement and development of these internal 
waterways is regarded by the chamber of commerce 
as a matter of urgent necessity, and they are formu- 
lating proposals with regard to the subject to put be- 
fore the Government." 

CAWALS OF THE ITNITED STATES. 

The canals of the United States still used for com- 
mercial purposes are stated by the JSTew York World 
Almanac for 1905 as being 37 in number, with an 
aggregate length of 2,443 miles, the total cost of their 
construction being about $180,000,000. The most 
important of these, aside from that connecting the 
Great Lakes, of course, is the Erie Canal, 387 miles 
in length, with 72 locks and a depth of 7 feet. Next 
in length is the Ohio Canal from Cleveland, Ohio, to 
Portsmouth, Ohio, 317 miles in length, with 150 
locks and a depth of 4 feet Next in length is the 
Miami and Erie Canal, from Cincinnati to Toledo, 
274 miles in length, with 93 locks and a depth of 
6Y2 feet. The Pennsylvania Canal, from Colum- 
bia to Huntingdon, Pa., is 193 miles in length, with 
71 locks and a depth of 6 feet. The Chesapeake and 



342 PANAMA. 

Ohio Canal, from Cumberland, Md., to Washington, 
jy. C, is 184 miles in length, with 73 locks and a 
depth of 6 feet The Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company's Canal, from Coalport to Easton, Pa., is 
108 miles in length, with 57 locks and a depth of 6 
feet. The Morris Canal, from Easton, Pa., to Jer- 
sey City, ]Sr. J., is 103 miles in length, with 33 locks 
and a depth of 5 feet The Illinois and Michigan 
Canal, from Chicago, 111., to La Salle, is 102 miles 
in length, with 15 locks and a depth of 6 feet, and 
the Champlain Canal, from Whitehall, N. Y., to 
West Troy, is 81 miles in length, with 32 locks and a 
depth of 6 feet. 

COST OF MAINTEINAJSrCB AND OPERATION OF CANALS. 

In order to form an estimate of the cost of main- 
taining and operating the Isthmian Canal, the Isth- 
mian Canal Commission obtained data bearing on 
this point from the Suez, Manchester, Kiel, and St. 
Marys Falls canals, as follows : 

There are no locks on the Suez Canal, but the 
channel is through drifting sand for a great part of 
its length. The entrance to the harbor of Port Said 
on the Mediterranean intercepts the drift of sand dis- 
charged from the ^i\e and cari'ied along the coast by 
the easterly current. The maintenance of the Suez 
Canal therefore requires a large amount of dredging 
and consists mainly of this class of work. The oper- 



COSTS OF MAINTENANCE. 343 

ating expenses are also large, the great traffic iiivolv- 
ing heavy costs for pilotage. The general expenses 
for administration have necessarily been greater for 
the Suez Canal than for the Kiel or Manchester 
canals, on account of the distance of the work from 
the point of central control, a disadvantage vs'hich 
would also attend the operation of the Isthmian 
Canal. The annual cost of .maintenance and oper- 
ation of the Suez Canal is about $1,300,000, or about 
$13,000 per mile. 

The annual cost of maintenance and operation of 
the Kiel Canal is $8,600 per mile. The cost of 
maintenance only of the Manchester Canal is $9,500 
per mile. These canals have locks and other me- 
chanical structures, and therefore might be expected 
to have a higher cost of maintenance than the Suez 
Canal, which has none, but this appears to be more 
than offset by reduced cost of maintaining the prism 
and more economical central control. The traffic be- 
ing light on these canals, the cost of pilotage and port 
service is small. The mechanical structures are now 
nearly new, and will soon require larger annual out- 
lays for maintenance, while, with the increase of 
traffic, operating expenses will become larger. 

The St. Marys Falls Canal, when compared with 
those just mentioned, is remarkable by reason of its 
short leng-th, large proportion of mechanical struc- 
tures, and immense traffic. Its length is about II/2 
miles. Its annual traffic, limited by the severity of 



344 PANAMA. 

the winter to a period of about eiglit months, is nearly 
three times that of the Suez Canal, eight times that 
of the Kiel Canal, and ten times that of the Manches- 
ter Canal. Both maintenance and operating expen- 
ses are therefore very large, amounting to from $70,- 
000 to $90,000 per year, or $46,000 to $60,000 per 
mile. The annual cost per mile of maintenance and 
operation, however, for comparison with other canals, 
should be determined by considering the 18^-^ miles 
of dredged channel ways in St. Marys River as part 
of the canal. Then for the 20 miles of canal and 
canalized river the expenses per mile would be from 
$3,000 to $5,000 annually. 

Tolls were collected by the State from 1855-1881. 
Since its ownership by the Government no tolls have 
been charged. 

THE OANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA. 

In a few of the colonies of the world, notably India 
and Ceylon, irrigation works of great value have been 
constructed by the colonial governments. While these 
have been costly, the expense has been entirely borne 
from colonial funds or from loans which are borne 
by the colonial government, and the cost has been 
many times repaid by the increased production of the 
irrigated areas. It has been estimated that the value 
of a single year's crop produced in the irrigated sec- 
tions of India in excess of that which would have been 



CANAL SYSTEM OF INDIA. 345 

produced without irrigation more than equals the en- 
tire cost of the irrigation system. 

Sir John Strachey, in his " India," put the cost of 
the Indian irrigation works up to that time at 320,- 
000,000 rupees (present exchange value of rupee 
about 33 cents), and adds that the estimated value of 
the produce of the lands irrigated by works con- 
tructed by the government was in 1892 more than 
550,000,000 rupees. These works after their con- 
struction are not only self-supporting through the 
charges made for the water distributed, but produce in 
addition to the annual expenditures a net return of 
about 5 1/2 per cent on their costu In Ceylon the co- 
lonial government has recently taken up the w^ork of 
reconstruction of ancient irrigation tanks and the 
construction of new irrigation works, and by this pro- 
cess it is expected that large additions will be made 
to the productive area of the island. The irrigating 
system of India is described by Sir John Strachey as 
follows : 

THE IMPORTANCE OF OANALS. IN INDIA. 

" In India the very existence of the people depends 
upon the regular occurrence of the periodical rains, 
and when they fail through a wide tract of country, 
and, still worse, when they fail in successive years^ 
the consequences are terrible. The greater part, of 
India is liable periodically to this danger, but the 



346 PANAMA. 

country is so vast that it never happens that all parts 
of it suffer at the same time. Improvements in the 
economic condition of the people, and especially more 
diversity of occupation, can alone bring complete 
safeguards and render general famine, in its extrem- 
est form, through a great tract of country impossible. 
But this must be a long and gradual process. Mean- 
while it has been found by experience that although 
the entire prevention of famines, the most destructive 
of all calamities, is beyond the power of any govern- 
ment, we can do much to mitigate them by removing 
obstacles which hinder commercial intercourse and 
which diminish the productiveness of the land. The 
instruments by which we can do this are roads, rail- 
ways, and canals. ... 

IRRIGATION CONSTANTLY ItEQUIEED IN PAETS OF INDIA. 

" In northern India, even in good seasons, artificial 
irrigation is a necessity for the successful cultivation 
of many of the more valuable crops, and when there 
is a general failure of the periodical rains there is no 
other means by which drought and scarcity can be 
prevented. A large portion of northern India is now 
protected by canals of greater magnitude than exist 
in any other country of the world, . . . 

" Little of the old irrigation works of our predeces- 
sors is retained in the existing canals. Practically 
all of these have been made by ourselves, and the 



INDIAN IRRIGATION SYSTEM. •^47 

often-repeated statement, prompted, I believe, by that 
strange inclination to depreciate their oavii achieve- 
ments which often besets Englishmen, that the old 
canals have been more profitable than those con- 
structed by ourselves has not the least foundation of 
truth. 

lEBIGATION SYSTEM UNBER ENGLISH RULEw 

" The most important of these works in the north- 
western provinces are those which distribute the 
waters of the Ganges and Jumna. In the winter and 
spring, before the Ganges has been swollen by the 
melting of snow in the Himalayas and when water is 
urgently required for agricultural operations, nearly 
the whole visible stream of the great river at Hard- 
war, where it leaves the mountains, is thrown into an 
artificial channel. The works on the first 20 miles 
of its course are in a high degree remarkable, for the 
canal intercepts the drainage of the Lower Himalayas 
and has to be carried across rivers which often become 
furious torrents, bringing down enormous floods. 
These obstacles have been overcome by various meth- 
ods with a skill of which our Indian engineers may 
well be proud. One torrent flows harmlessly in a 
broad artificial bed over the canal which runs below ; 
over another, still more formidable, with a bed more 
than 2 miles wide, the canal, which is virtually the 
whole Ganges, is carried by an aqueduct. Some 200 



348 PANAMA. 

miles farther down, the Ganges has again become a 
large river, and nearly all its water is again diverted 
into a second canal. The two canals together are 
capable of discharging nearly 10,000 cubic feet of 
water per second ; the ordinary supply of each is more 
than double the volume of the Thames at Teddington 
in average weather, and this great body of water is 
distributed over the country by a number of smaller 
channels for the irrigation of the land. The length 
of the main channels exceeds 1,000 miles, and there 
are more than 5,000 miles of distributaries. 

" Three canals of smaller dimensions, but which in 
any other country would be looked upon as works of 
great magnitude, distribute in a similar way nearly 
the whole of the water brought by the Jumna from 
the Himalayas. In Bahar, the border province of the 
Bengal lieutenant-governorship, which in its physical 
character closely resembles the adjoining provinces of 
the northwest, another great canal is taken from the 
river Son. 

" There are other important irrigation canals in 
Orissa and in Bengal ; but in the latter province irri- 
gation is not ordinarily so essential as in countries 
farther north, where the climate is drier and the sea- 
sons are more precarious. 

GREAT ECONOMICS IN CANAL OPERATION. 

" The following facts, which I take from the report 



PROFITS IN IRRIGATION. 340 

of the Indian famine commissioners, will give some 
idea of the value of the irrigation works of the north- 
western provinces : 

" ' Up to the end of 1877-78 the capital outlay on 
completed canals had been £4,346,000. The area ir- 
rigated in that year was 1,461,000 acres, the value of 
the crops raised on which was estimated at £6,020,- 
000. Half the irrigated area was occupied by au- 
tumn crops, which but for irrigation must have been 
wholly lost, and it may be said that the wealth of 
these provinces was consequently increased by £3,- 
000,000 ; so that three-fourths of the entire first cost 
of the works was thus repaid to the country in that 
single year. 

" ' In 1891-92 the area irrigated by canals in the 
northwestern provinces exceeded 2,000,000 acres.' 

" In tlie Punjab works of equal importance have 
been constructed to utilize the waters of the Sutlej, 
the Ravi, and other rivers, and their value has been as 
great as in the northwestern provinces. 

" ' During the droughts of 1877-78,' Sir Henry 
Cunningham tells us, ' their benefits were extended to 
1,333,000 acres, the greater portion of which but for 
canal irrigation would have been absolutely barren. 
During this period the land irrigated by the two prin- 
cipal canals produced food grain to the amount of 
300,000 tons, worth £2,000,000, and enough to keep 
1,800,000 people for a year ; while the non-food crops 
— sugar, dyes, spices, etc. — were reckoned to be 



350 PANAMA. 

worth another £1,000,000. In other words, the value 
of the crops saved by the two canals in a single season 
was more than equal to the entire cost (£2,260,000) 
of the completed system.' 

" The benefits described by Sir Henry Cunning- 
ham have become far greater since this passage was 
written. The Sirhind Canal, which distributes the 
water of the Sutlej throughout not only our own ter- 
ritories but through the native State of Patiala, 
!N^abha, and Jhind, is a work of greater magnitude 
than either of the canals from the Ganges. It is ca- 
pable of discharging more than 6,000 cubic feet of 
water per second; the length of its main channel is 
540 miles, and that of its distributaries 4,700 miles, 
and it can irrigate 1,200,000 acres. Its cost has ex- 
ceeded 40,530,000 rupees, and the direct returns to 
the State in 1890-91 amounted to about 4.6 per cent 
on the capital invested. 

" Different systems of irrigation prevail in other 
parts of India. In central and southern India large 
tracts of country are dependent for their supply of 
water on lakes and reservoirs, known by the not very 
appropriate name of tanks. These are in some cases 
natural lakes, but oftener they have been formed by 
the construction of dams of masonry or earth across 
the outlets of valleys in the hills, and they are fed 
sometimes by rivers and sometimes by the rainfall of 
a more or less extensive area. They vary in size 
from ponds irrigating a few acres to lakes of several 



GREAT TANKS OF INDIA. 351 

miles in circumference. Some of them are works 
constructed in the times of which we have no histor- 
ical record. 

GKEAT TAJ!TKS OF SOUTHERN INDIA. 

" These are not the only means of irrigation in 
southern India. Work hardly inferior in importance 
to those of the northwestern provinces and Punjab, 
but on a different system, have been carried out by the 
British Government in the Madras Presidency for 
utilizing the waters of the Godaveri and Kistna riv- 
ers. At the head of each of the deltas which they 
form before they reach the sea a great weir, or, as it is 
locally called, an ' anicut,' is thrown across the river, 
which is diverted into irrigation canals and distrib- 
uting channels, some of which are also used for nav- 
igation. A large area, with a population of nearly 
2,000,000, thus obtains complete protection against 
failure of rain, and these works have not only been 
in the highest degree beneficial to the people, but 
very profitable to the State. In the famine of 1 876-- 
77 these irrigated tracts produced rice to the value of 
50,000,000 rupees, a large part of which was avail- 
able for the relief of the suffering districts. Without 
canal in-igation there would have been no crops at all, 
and the value of the produce in a single year was four 
times as great as the whole capital expended on the 
canal works by the Government. Farther south, in 



352 PANAMA. 

Tanjore, works of a similar kind provide the means 
of utilizing through a large tract of country, in the 
delta of the Kaveri, almost the entire water supply of 
that river. In northern India the ordinary rental of 
land is doubled by irrigation, and it is often more 
than quadrupled in Madras. 

" In the province of Sind another system prevails. 
Little rain falls there, and without irrigation there 
would be no cultivation. In the same way that ag- 
riculture in Egypt depends upon the inundation of 
the Nile, it depends in Sind on the floods brought 
down by the Indus in the season of the periodical 
rains. There is great room for further improvement, 
but the existing irrigation renders the province fairly 
prosperous, and gives the means of subsistence to 
sorde 2,400,000 people. 

EXTENT, VALUE, AND COST OF lESIGATINO SYSTEM. 

" Altogether there are in India, under the man- 
agement or supervision of the British Government, 
some 36,000 miles of canals and other works, irrigat- 
ing nearly 14,000,000 acres, or more than 21,000 
square miles. Although some of the canals have 
been financially unsuccessful and others were incom- 
plete, the irrigation works of India, taken as a whole, 
yielded in 1891-2 a net return of 5^2 per cent on 
their cost, which amounted to about 320,300,000 
rupees. It is a remarkable illustration of their great 



CHINA'S CANAL SYSTEM. ••5-'>-'' 

utility that this sum falls far short of the annual value 
of the crops tliej protect. In the single year of 
1891-92 the estimated value of the produce of the 
land irrigated by works constructed by the Govern- 
ment was more than 550,000,000 rupees. 

" No similar works in other countries approach 
them in magnitude, and it is certain that no public 
works of nobler utility have ever been undertaken in 
the world." 

CAJS^ALS IlSr CHINA.* 

There are several features of the canal system of 
China, especially of the Imperial or Grand Canal, 
which can be studied -with profit by the people of the 
United States. One of these is the use of the canal 
for the production of food in addition to its uses as a 
means of transportation. Allied to this is the use of 
the muck which gathers at the bottom of the water- 
way for fertilization. Another is the use of every 
particle of plant life growing in and around the canal 
for various purposes. 

The Chinese secure a vast quantity of food of one 
sort or another from their canals. To appreciate the 
exact situation with respect to the waterways, it must 
be realized that the canals of China cover the plain 
country with a network of water. Leading from the 

* Report of United States Consul Anderson, Hangchau, 

China. 

23 



S54 PANAMA. 

Orand Canal in each direction are smaller canals, and 
from these lead still smaller canals, until there is 
hardly a single tract of 40 acres which is not reached 
by some sort of ditch, generally capable of carrying 
good-sized boats. The first reason for this great net- 
work is the needs of rice cultivation. During prac- 
tically all of the growing season for rice the fields are 
flooded. Wherever a natural waterway can be made 
to irrigate the rice fields it is used, but, of course, 
from these to the canals or larger rivers there must be 
waterways. Where natural streams can not thus 
be adapted the Chinese lead water in canals or ditches 
to the edge of their fields and raise it to the fields of 
rice by the foot-power carriers which have been de- 
scribed so often by tourist writers. However the 
water is supplied to the rice, it is evident that there 
must be a waterway leading to the field and back to 
a principal stream, which is generally a branch canal. 
These waterways naturally take up a considerable 
portion of the land, and the Chinese make as profit- 
able use of them as of the land itself. 

The first use of the waterways is for fishing. The 
quantity of fish taken from the canals of China an- 
nually is immense. The Chinese have no artificial 
fish hatcheries, but the supply of fish is maintained at 
a high point by the fact that the flooded rice fields act 
as hatcheries and as hiding places for the young fish 
until they are large enough to look out for themselves. 
In the United States this fish-propagation annex to 



VARIOUS UTILITIES OF CANALS. 355 

the canals is probably neither possible nor needful in 
view of the work done by the State and National 
bureaus, but in China it is nothing less than provi- 
dential. 

CHINESE CANAXS SUPTPLY FEUTILIZER. 

Along the canals in China at any time may be 
found boatmen gathering muck from the bottom of 
the canal. This muck is taken in much the same 
manner that oysters are taken by hand on the Atlantic 
coast. In place of tongs are large bag-like devices on 
crossed bamboo poles which take in a large quantity 
of the ooze at once. This is emptied into the boat, 
and the process is repeated until the boatman has a 
load, when he will proceed to some neighboring farm 
and empty the muck, either directly on the fields — 
especially around the mulberry trees, which are raised 
for the silkworms — or in a pool, where it is taken 
later to the fields. From this muck the Chinese 
farmer will generally secure enough shellfish to pay 
him for his work, and the fertilizer is clear gain. 
The fertilizer thus secured is valuable. It is rich in 
nitrogen and potash and has abundant humus ele- 
ments. This dredging of the canals for fertilizers 
is the only way by which the Chinese have kept their 
canals in reasonably good condition for centuries. 
The fertilizer has paid for itself both ways. Re- 
cently there were complaints filed at Peking that the 



356 PANAMA. 

ashes from the steam launclies plying on the canal 
were injuring the muck for fertilizing purposes, and 
the problem has been considered a serious one by the 
Chinese Government. 

In addition to securing fertilizers from the canals, 
and thus keeping the canals in condition, the farmers' 
help keep them purified by gathering all floating 
weeds, grass, and other vegetable debris that they can 
find upon them. Boatmen will secure great loads of 
water plants and grasses by skimming along the 
surface of the canal. The reeds growing along the 
canals are used for weaving baskets of several grades, 
and for fuel. In short, no plant life about the canal 
goes to waste. 

UTiiiizATioasr of swamp land. 

Where there are so many canals there is more or 
less swamp ground. In China this is utilized for the 
raising of lotus roots, from which commercial arrow- 
root is largely obtained. There is no reason why 
much of the waste swamp land in the southern portion 
of the United States should not be used for a similar 
purpose, and the commercial returns from a venture 
of this sort in that part of the country ought to be sat- 
isfactory. Where the canals of China widen, by 
reason of natural waterways or for other reasons, the 
expanse of water not needed for actual navigation is 
made use of in the raising of water nuts of several 



DUCK FAKMS IN CHINA. 357 

varieties, especially what are known as water chest- 
nuts. These nuts are raised in immense quantities. 
They are, strictly speaking, bulbs rather than nuts. 
They are rich in arrow-root and are prolific, an acre 
of shallow water producing far more than an acre of 
well-cultivated soil planted in ordinary grain or sim- 
ilar crops. These nuts, also, could be produced to ad- 
vantage in the United States where there is land in- 
undated for the growing season to a depth which will 
give ordinary water plants a chance to thrive and 
which is not capable of being drained for the time be- 
ing. The nuts or bulbs are toothsome when roasted, 
and are wholesome, but probably would be more val- 
uable in the United States for the manufactured pro- 
ducts which can be secured from them. 

There are duck farms all along the canals in China. 
These are profitable. Chinese canals, as a rule, con- 
sidering the population upon them and their varied 
uses, are cleaner than canals in the United States. 
There are few if any factories to contaminate thera. 
The Chinese use of certain sewage for fertilization 
also prevents contamination to a great extent. The 
canal water is used for laundry, bath, and culinary 
purposes indiscriminately. A canal in the United 
States could never be what it is in China, but the 
Chinese have a number of clever devices and ideas in 
connection with canals which can be adopted in the 
United States with profit. 



358 PANAMA. 

THBi A-NCIEiNT GKA^B CAJiJ^AI. OF CHINA. 

The Gfrand Canal system in China has existed in 
almost its present shape since about the time Colum- 
bus discovered America. The Grand Canal itself, ex- 
tending from Hangchau to Peking, is about a thou- 
sand miles long. Much of it is banked witli stone, 
and all of it is in such condition that with the ex- 
penditure of a little money the system could he put 
upon a modem and effective basis. As it is, the 
canal handles practically all the internal trade of 
Cbina, and this trade is far greater than its foreign 
trade. The coming of railroads will affect the canals 
somewhat, but not so much as may be imagined, for 
the railroads will very largely build up a trade of 
their own, A little money will make China's canal 
system in the future what it has been in the past, the 
greatest on earth.* 

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIP CANALS.I" 

Much has been written concerning the ship canals 
of the world as great works of engineering; much, 
too, on their political and military importance; but 
of the part they have played in the great economic 

*Mr. Anderson's closing statement is open to question when 
the canal system of India is considered. 

f J. A. Fairlie, in Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, January, 1898. 



ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CANALS. :55!) 

dianges, tJie result of the marvelous development of 
transport industries during this last half century, it 
is not so easy to find definite or satisfactory accounts. 
At the same time vague and indefinite statements fre- 
quently made indicate that their economic import- 
ance has been significant; and, in fact, it is only as 
they are influential in this way that they become com- 
mercially profitable undertakings. The attempt is 
made in this paper to trace with some degree of pre- 
cision these economic effects, showing how, in conse- 
quence of the canals, important changes have been 
made in business machinery, in business methods, in 
producing and marketing commodities, and in gen- 
eral economic development 

The ship canals do not form a connected part of 
the world's transportation system, and in consequence 
the economic results of each are, in the main, inde- 
pendent of all other canals. Furthermore, the eco- 
nomic importance of the different canals presents the 
widest variations. Each opens the way for the crea- 
tion of many and extensive carrying routes ; but, while 
the influence of some has been merely local, the con- 
sequences of others have been felt throughout the com- 
mercial and industrial world. These conditions sug- 
gest the natural method of treatment to be a consid- 
eration of each canal separately, tracing so far as 
possible the economic effects that have resulted from 
its existence. 

The Amsterdam and Manchester canals, each con- 



360 PANAMA. 

stnicted to serve tlie needs of a single port, do not 
present the possibilities of any large and general 
economic results. The Welland, Corinth, and Kiel 
canals have a larger field of possibilities, but their 
actual consequences have as yet been small. The re- 
sults of these less important canals are therefore but 
briefly considered in this paper. The examination 
of the vastly more important and significant results 
of the Suez and St. Marys Falls canals will comprise 
the larger part of this study. 

CANALS OF HOLLAND. 

In a country as well supplied with smaller canals 
as Holland is, it was natural that the idea of a ship 
canal should present itself to Amsterdam, when the 
shallowness of the Zuyder Zee and other difficulties 
of approach were causing her to lose trade to her 
rival, Rotterdam. The idea soon took practical form, 
and in 1826 the Helder Canal, with an 18-foot chan- 
nel, offered an easier approach to the Dutch port. 
With the development of the shipping industry the 
dimensions of this canal became inadequate after a 
few decades, while its length (50 miles) and the diffi- 
cult entrance in the passes of the Texel proved ad- 
ditional disadvantages. To maintain the commercial 
position of Amsterdam the construction of a new 
and larger canal, built by the shortest line to the sea, 
was decided on, and in 18 76 the l^orth Sea Canal, 



MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL. 301 

I5I/0 miles in length and 23 feet in depth, was 
opened for use. 

The effect of the new canal on the commerce of 
Amsterdam was instantaneous. For twenty years 
the tonnage statistics for shipping at that port had 
shown an almost complete stagTiation, while at Rot- 
terdam the shipping had trebled. In six years after 
the new canal was opened the tonnage entering and 
clearing at Amsterdam had more than doubled, ris- 
ing from 802,000 tons in 1876 to 1,734,000 tons in 
1882. In the former year the Amsterdam shipping 
was but little over one-quarter that of Rotterdam ; 
in the latter year it was almost a half. Since 1882, 
however, the increase has been at a much slower rate, 
while the continued rapid upward movement of the 
Rotterdam figures shows that there is no falling off 
in the general trade. Evidently the larger and deep- 
er draft vessels now constructed find the 23-foot chan- 
nel too shallow, and an enlargement of the canal wall 
be necessary to enable Amsterdam to retain even her 
existing position. 

MANCHESTEK SHIP CANAI^ 

The Manchester Ship Canal resembles the Amster- 
dam Canal in connecting a large city with the open 
sea, and in being constructed with a view to its effects 
on the city at its inland terminus. There is the dif- 
ference, however, that the promoters of tlie English 



362 PANAMA. 

canal aim. not simply at retaining and developing- an 
already existing trade, but at creating a new port. 
The expectation of the promoters and of the corpora- 
tion of Manchester, which has bonded itself heavily 
to secure the completion of the canal, is that the raw 
materials for Manchester manufactures will be 
brought via the canal, this route saving the heavy 
expenses connected with the transfer to the railroad 
at Liverpool. It is perhaps too early to say whether 
these expectations will be realized ; although the esti- 
mate of a traffic of 3,000,000 tons within two years 
of opening has not been fulfilled, a large trade has 
been developed. The canal was opened on January 
1, 1894, and during the first year 1,280 seagoing ves- 
sels and 1,660 boats for coast traffic came up to Man- 
chester. For the nine months ending September, 
1896, the traffic was 1,300,000 tons, an increase of 
350,000 tons over the corresponding period of the 
year before.* This development within three years 
of a trade approaching that of Amsterdam in volume 
is not without significance, and with a continued in- 
crease Manchester in a few years will become an im- 
portant shipping port.t 

Like the Manchester Canal, the Corinth and Kiel 

* In 1900 it exceeded 3,000,000 tons and has steadily in- 
creased since. 

t From the investor's point of view, the results of the Man- 
chester Canal are more discouraging because of the heavy 
expense of construction, it being almost equal to the cost 
of the Suez Canal, 



THE QUESTION OF PROFIT. 303 

canals have not produced immediate effects equal to 
the anticipations of their promoters. The Corintli 
Canal was opened in October, 1893, and the total 
traffic at the end of December, 1895 (twenty-six 
months), had been but 4,589 ships, with a tonnage 
of 596,000 tons. The first year's operation of the 
Kiel Canal between the Baltic and North seas showed 
a record of 7,500 steamers and 9,300 sailing vessels, 
but these were mostly small vessels, and the receipts 
from tolls were under 900,000 marks, against an es- 
timate of 5,000,000 marks. 

It is evident, however, that these canals have been 
in operation too short a time for a full development 
of their possibilities. The future may demonstrate 
that these routes offer a net advantage to shipping 
on account of the saving in distances and the greater 
safety from shipwreck; and a considerable traffic 
may develop with important economic results. The 
Welland Canal does not seem at first sight to offer 
this hopeful outlook. The present 14-foot channel 
has been in use since 1887, yet the traffic does not 
exceed 1,000,000 tons a year. But a deepening of 
the channel and the enlargement of the locks, so as 
to reduce the number, might result in a considerable 
increase in the traffic. 

There may be latent possibilities in the traffic of 
each of these canals we have been considering, but 
thus far the great bulk of the trade they were in- 
tended to get remains undiverted from old routes, 



364 . PANAMA. 

little new trade has been developed, and no impor- 
tant economic results have appeared. This, how- 
ever, is not the case with the Suez and St. Marys 
canals. 

THE SUEZ CAN-AU 

In December, 1858, a company was found to un- 
dertake M. de Lesseps' audacious scheme of connect- 
ing the Mediterranean and Red seas; in the follow- 
ing spring work was commenced, and in 1869 the 
Suez Canal opened a new water route to the East. 

It takes but a glance at the statistics of traffic to 
notice the enormous difference between the trade that 
has developed through the Suez Canal and that of the 
canals already considered. Beginning in 1870, with 
486 vessels, having a tonnage of 436,000 tons, there 
was a steady increase until 1875, when it had reached 
nearly 1,500 ships and over 2,000,000 tons. After 
a few years of quiescence came a second period of 
rapid increase, from 1880 to 1883, in the latter year 
the figures of 3,300 ships and 5,800,000 tons being 
reached. Since then there has been a slowly in- 
creasing tonnage, reaching the maximum figure of 
8,700,000 tons in 1891, but falling off somewhat 
since that year. In 1896 the figures were 3,409 
ships with a tonnage of 8,594,307.* 



* The tonnage for the year 190G will probably exceed 
18,000,000. 



EFFECT OF SUEZ CANAL ON SHIPPING. 36f> 

The importance of these figures may be made clear- 
er by recalling the fact that the foreign tonnage en- 
tering at the port of ITew York has rarely exceeded 
7,500,000 tons in any year, and that the foreign ton- 
nage for all the ports of the United States, both en- 
tering and clearing, is about 35,000,000 tons; that is, 
the traffic through the Suez Canal, measured by vol- 
ume, is almost a quarter of the total foreign trade of 
the United States. But if measured by value, the 
importance of the canal traffic is seen to be much 
greater. The imports and exports of India, via the 
Suez Canal, are equal in value to $360,000,000, 
vt'hich is nearly one-quarter of the value of the for- 
eign trade of the United States. As the Indian trade 
constitutes rather less than one-half the total traffic 
of the Suez Canal, the value of the whole of that 
traffic must be not far from a half of the foreign 
trade of the United States. 

EFFECT OF SUEZ CANAL ON SHIPPING, 

The development of a trade of such an extent and 
value by a new route within the space of twenty-five 
years could not but have an important and far-reach- 
ing influence on the economic interests of the world. 
Perhaps the most striking results of the opening of 
the canal route to the East were those on the machin- 
ery of trade — meaning by this term both the ma- 
terial appliances and the business organization of 



see PANAMA. ' 

trade. One effect might have been in part antici- 
pated. The new route saved nearly 3,000 marine 
leagues on the voyage from the ports of western 
Europe to the East, or almost half the distance to 
Bombay. The obvious result of the use of the new 
route would be that half of the vessels engaged in 
the Eastern trade would be out of employment. In 
fact, however, the change came more indirectly. 
Sailing vessels did not find it advantageous to use 
the canal, and continued on the old route around the 
Cape of Good Hope. But the canal, by making prac- 
ticable the use of steamships in the oriental trade, 
brought about an even greater revolution in the 
character of the shipping business to the East. By 
the Cape route coaling places were few, and the 
facilities for coaling expensive. The consequence 
was that the enormous, expense of coaling at these out- 
of-the-way places, with the loss of freight room for 
the extra space needed for coal, made tlie use of 
steamers unprofitable. But by the canal route a 
steamer could coal at Gibraltar, Malta, Port Said, 
and Aden, where coal could be furnished at moder- 
ate rates, while the space saved from coal could be 
used to carry a larger cargo. Accordingly, a large 
number of new iron screw steamers were soon con- 
structed for the trade with the East, and replaced 
a large percentage of the sailing vessels. It has been 
estimated that 2,000,000 tons of vessels were thus 
thrown out of employment, and the effect of this can 



ORIENTAL STEAMSHIP COMPANIES. 307 

be seen in the immediate reduction in the tonnage of 
sailing vessels. In 1869 the sailing tonnage in the 
British foreign trade was 3,600,000 tons ; in 1876 it 
was but 3,230,000 tons. 

GREAT ORIENTAX. STEAMSHIP COMPANIES. 

In the construction of the new steamers for the 
canal trade two lines already in existence — the Pen- 
insular and Oriental Steamship Company and the 
Messageries Compagnie — took prominent parts. 
But new companies also were rapidly organized, 
which built steamers and established new lines to the 
East, among which may be noted the British India 
Steam IN^avigation Company, the Clan Line, the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Lloyds Company, the Italian Steam 
iN'avigation Company, and the Eubbotino Company, 
of Genoa. It is not possible to get at the amount of 
shipbuilding made necessary by the change in the 
kind of ships used in the Eastern trade, but some 
idea of the importance of the change may be seen by 
noting the fact that the total steam tonnage in the 
British foreign trade increased from 650,000 tons 
in 1869 to 1,500,000 tons in 1876. It would, of 
course, be possible to learn the number and tonnage 
of ships now engaged in the trade between Europe 
and the East, but to account for all of this by the 
Suez Canal would be to exaggerate its effects". '^'^^- 
provements in marine engines and in the constructkn. 



368 1PANAMA. 

of steamers make much longer steamer voyages pos- 
sible to-day than were possible in 1870, as is shown 
by the lines to Australia and across the Pacific Ocean. 
It is, therefore, certain that if no Suez Canal had 
been built, there would have been by this time steam- 
ers in the Eastern trade ; but the change would have 
come at a much later period, and sailing vessels 
would continue to carry a large, perhaps a dominant, 
share of the traffic. The effect of the Suez Canal 
was to make the transition from sail to steam sharp 
and decisive, and to bring it about in the decade 
1870-1880. 

AlSr ANTICIPATED EFFECT NOT EEALIZED. 

One change in the shipping industry that was ex- 
pected from the construction of the Suez Canal has 
not been realized. It was predicted that the geo- 
graphical advantage given to the Mediterranean ports 
by the new route would soon enable them to regain 
the position they had held in the Middle Ages as the 
carriers of Eastern produce to the markets of Europe. 
In England it was felt that the canal would seriously 
threaten British maritime supremacy, but the results 
have been otherwise. It was only in England that 
the capital was at hand to build the large screw 
steamers which alone could profitably use the canal, 
and from the start three-fourths of the vessels using 
the canal have been British. Of late years there has 



CHANGE IN SHIPPING TRADE. 369 

been a slight decline in the percentage of British ves- 
sels, but this has been due not to an increase in the 
ships of southern European nations, but to an in- 
crease in German, Dutch, and Belgian vessels. 

But while the carrying trade is still in British ves- 
sels a much larger and a growing share of the traffic 
is carried from the East directly to the Continent, 
and England has declined in relative importance as 
a warehousing and distributing point for Eastern 
goods. Under the old regime of sailing vessels 
around the Cape, when voyages from India took a 
good part of a year, and the time of arrival could not 
be calculated on within a month or two, it v^ras neces- 
sary that large stocks of goods should be kept on 
hand to enable dealers to meet the varying demand 
for their goods. Steamers by way of the Suez Canal 
make the voyage in thirty days and the time of their 
arrival can be regulated within a day. Shorter voy- 
ages and punctuality of arrivals make it possible for 
local dealers both in England and on the Continent 
to order directly from the East and the change in the 
method of this business rendered useless to a large 
extent the immense warehouses at London, Liver- 
pool, and other English ports. A few statistics will 
show the extent to which direct trade between the 
East and the Continent has taken the place of trade 
via England. In 1870 the value of exports from 
India to the United Kingdom was nearly $70,000,000, 

to the rest of Europe $13,000,000; in 1893-94 the 

24 



370 PANAMA. 

value of Indian exports to the United Kingdom was 
$93,000,000, to other European countries ^85,000,- 
000. In other words, while the total export trade of 
India and the total exports to Europe have doubled 
in value within twenty-three years, and the exports 
to European countries other than Great Britain have 
multiplied sixfold, the exports from India to the 
United Kingdom have increased but 40 per cent. 
The proportion of Indian exports to Europe, that 
are landed first in the United Kingdom, declined 
from 83 to 53 per cent. 

DIRECT EKPOtRTS FROM INBIA TO EHUEOPB. 

This change in the direction of trade has not been 
simply the transfer of the distributing points from 
England to the Mediterranean ports of southern 
Europe. The towns of Italy, Greece, and southern 
France have been almost as greatly disappointed in 
their expectations of becoming trade centers as in 
their hopes of controlling the shipping trade to the 
East through the operation of the Suez Canal. To 
be sure there has been a heavy increase in Indian ex- 
ports to Italy, Austria, and Russia; and the Mediter- 
ranean ports, notably Genoa, have increased in im- 
portance. But the most striking feature of the 
change in the direction of Indian exports lies in the 
increased trafiic to France, Holland, Belgium, and, 
above all, to Germany. The statistics of Indian ex- 



WAREHOUSK DISTlJiJiLTION SYSTFll. '571 

fKjrts to theee countriefl show that there ia no longer 
any one country pre-eminent as a distributing point 
for Eastern prrxluce, but that all Europe trades di- 
rectly with the East. Nevertheless, with this great 
change in the character of the Indian export trade 
the imports of European goods to India continue, as 
in the days before the canal, to come almost entirely 
from England. 

The termination of the warehouse distribution sj»- 
tew. of England was one of the forces which led t/j 
the disappearance of the class of merchant princes 
who had hitherto monopolized tiie Eastern trade. 
The system of bank discounts and commercial loans, 
by enabling men of ability to secure capital at low 
rates of interest, also played a large part in driving 
out of trade the old houses doing business on their 
own capital, from which they expe'^rtied large rates of 
interest. But as long as large stocks of goods had 
to be kept on hand for six months or more at a time, 
it was difficult for the nerw business man to get the 
credit that would enable him to supplant the old- 
established houses in the eastern trade. When, how- 
ever, the new route by the Suez Canal, by bringing 
steamers into use, enabled a cargo to be sold and de- 
livered wiliiin a month after the order had been sent 
the advantage? on the side of the man working with 
borrowed capital were decisive. 

As a result of the opening of tiic Suez Canal sail- 
ing vessels, warehouses, merchant princes, dealers in 



372 PANAMA. 

six montlis' bills found their old occupations slipping 
away. The old modes and channels of business were 
altered and new adjustments had to be made. In the 
meantime the confusion and disturbances in the busi- 
ness world were so great that the London Economist 
has said that they constituted one great general cause 
for the universal commercial and industrial depres- 
sion and disturbance of 1873. 

The effect of the opening of the Suez Canal and 
the new route to the East on the production and mar- 
keting of Eastern produce is by no means so easy to 
trace as the effects on the machinery of trade. If 
all the necessary statistical material were at hand it 
would be an almost endless task to disentangle from 
the complex results of complicated causes the exact 
changes that have been due to the canal. It is pos- 
sible, however, to see the effects produced by the 
canal in the ease of a few leading commodities, and 
in other respects the general tendency of the new 
route can be recognized. 

EFFECT OliT CERTAIN COMMODITIES. 

A few commodities will serve to show that not 
every article in the Eastern trade has been affected 
by the new route and the new methods of business 
brought about by it. The exports of Indian cotton 
have remained at about the same figure since the 
opening of the canal, showing that for that article 



TEA AND RICE TRADES. 37n 

the sailing vessel and tlie Cape route provided aa 
cheap a road as the canal route. The exports of In- 
dian wool and of spices have increased to some ex- 
tent, but with nothing to indicate that the increase is 
greater than would have taken place in the ordinary 
development of trade. The exports of tea from 
India show an astonishing increase from 11,000,000 
pounds in 18Y0 to 120,000,000 in 1893-94. But 
with an article of such high value the direct effects of 
the canal through cheaper freight rates can have had 
little influence here, though indirectly the increased 
Indian production may be due in part to the easier 
communication with the West that was made pos- 
sible by the canal. In the earlier arrival of the new 
season's teas the influence of the canal in shortening 
the time from India to England is clearly evident. 
Tea imports to England in July, 1870, were 711,000 
pounds; in July, 1871, 4,000,000 pounds; in July, 
1872, 23,000,000 pounds — the enormous increase 
being the direct result of the use of steamers via the 
canal in place of sailing vessels and the long Cape 
voyage. 

Rice is a commodity the trade in which has been 
subject to important changes as a direct result of the 
use of the canal route to the East. Rice is a staple 
Italian cereal and a leading article of Italian export. 
It had formerly been imported into European coun- 
tries by the Cape route, but by the canal route East- 
ern rice was enabled to reach markets in southern 



374 PANAMA. 

Europe formerly inaccessible, and even to be sold in 
Italy itself, much to the displeasure of the Italian 
producers. In the six years following the opening 
of the Suez Canal the export of Indian rice doubled 
and has continued to increase since. It constitutes 
the largest single item in the export trade of India. 

INDIA AS A WHEAT-ESPOBTING COUNTKT. 

The creation of the wheat export trade of India 
is due directly to the opening of the Suez Canal route 
to Europe. Efforts had been made to carry wheat 
around the Cape, but the liability to heat during the 
long voyage and the loss from weevil in the cargo 
made all such attempts unsuccessful. The possibili- 
ty of carrying wheat by the new and shorter route 
was soon demonstrated, and a trade was established 
that has grown until India has become the second 
wheat-exporting country in the world. In 1870 the 
wheat exports of India were 130,000 bushels; in 
1876, over 4,000,000 bushels; in 1883, 35,000,000 
bushels; in 1891, 50,000,000 bushels. 

Since the last date there has been a considerable 
decline in the extent of the export owing to poor 
crops, but under ordinary conditions the Indian pro- 
duct is an important item in the wheat market of the 
world. It will be observed that the great increase 
in this Indian export trade did not begin until after 
th© year 1876. The extension at that time came 



INDIAN IMPORT TRADE. 375 

about through the reduction in freight rates made 
possible bj improved steamers. It is nevertheless 
true that the establishment of the wheat export trade 
of India and the possibility of any such trade exist- 
ing at all is to be ascribed to the Suez Canal. 

Of the imports into India the direct influence of 
the Suez Canal seems to be striking in the case of but 
one commodity — petroleum from the Russian oil 
fields at Batoum. Before the discovery of these 
fields the imports of oil into India were insignificant. 
The value of such imports in 1869 was about $110,- 
000 and in 18Y6 had risen only to $175,000. But 
when the Batoum oil fields were discovered an exten- 
sive trade to India, via the Suez Canal, immediately 
developed. In 1880 the imports of oil into India 
were 6,500,000 gallons, valued at $1,360,000; in 
1885 this had risen to 26,300,000 gallons; in 1890, 
to 51,800,000 gallons, and in 1893, to 86,600,000 
gallons. For a considerable period the Indian de- 
mand absorbed more than half the total product of 
the Russian oil wells, and to-day it takes more than 
a quarter of their output As the distance from Ba- 
toum to India around Africa is as great as that from 
the American oil fields, it does not seem possible that 
any of this Russian oil would have found its way to 
India by the Cape route. Some trade might have 
arisen by the overland route to India, which, when 
railroad connections from the Caspian Sea to India 
are complete, would have become important, but the 



376 PANAMA. 

oil imports of India as ihej stand to-day are made 
possible only by the existence of the canal route. 

It may be well while dealing wi^ particular com- 
modities to note that nearly 1,000,000 tons of coal 
are annually brought to Port Said for the steamers 
passing through the canal. This coal makes a con- 
siderable item in the Mediterranean trade due to the 
Suez Canal. 

If the question be asked, What is the total signifi- 
cance of the Suez Canal on the production and mar- 
keting of commodities ? the answer can be given only 
in general terms. A superficial observer might base 
an estimate on the increase in Indian trade with 
Europe from $280,000,000 in 1870 to $700,000,- 
000 in 1894. If, however, it is borne in mind that 
this increase has been at a less proportionate rate 
than that from 1850 to 1870 without the canal, and 
if the large extensions of the foreign trade of Aus- 
tralia, South Africa, Argentina, and the United 
States within the last twenty years are also remem- 
bered, it must be evident that other and more general 
causes than the opening of the canal have affected the 
development of India. On the other hand, to limit 
the effects of the canal to those results which can be 
directly traced, such as the development of the trade 
in rice, wheat, and petroleum, is to err by under- 
statement. The greater ease of communication by 
the canal route has brought much more Western life 
into personal contact with the East, and this has had 



INFLUENCE OF SUEZ CANAL. -T: 

muct to do with tlie development not only of the 
foreign trade of the Eastern countries, but also of 
their internal resources. One phase of this general 
development in which the canal has had an indirect 
share may be seen in the tonnage statistics of some 
of the Eastern countries. From 1870 to 1894 the total 
foreign tonnage of India rose from 4,000,000 tons to 
7,660,000 ; of Ceylon from 1,420,000 tons to 6,360,- 
000 tons; of the Straits Settlements from 1,650,000 
tons to 10,000,000 tons ; of Hongkong from 2,640,- 
000 tons to 10,460,000 tons. How much of this in- 
crease is to be ascribed to the canal and how much 
to other causes can not be calculated or even roughly 
estimated. We must remain content, in this part of 
our inquiry, witli recognizing that the canal is one of 
the factors in the great economic development of 
southern Asia. 

To recapitulate : The construction of the Suez 
Canal has led to the immediate and rapid develop- 
ment of the use of steamers in the Eastern trade, has 
brought about the disuse of most sailing vessels in 
that trade, has caused the decline of the warehouse 
distribution system of England, and the rise of a di- 
rect trade between the East and the consuming coun- 
tries of Europe. The shorter and more direct route 
has also made possible the wheat export trade of In- 
dia, and the trade in oil from Batoum to India, and 
has doubled the rice exports of the latter country. 
The canal has also been one of the many factors in 



378 PANAMA. 

other important economic changes, among which may 
be mentioned the crisis of 1873 and the general de- 
velopment of trade and industry in the East. 

THE ST. MAKTS FALLS CANAI« 

There has been a canal around the falls in St. 
Marys River between Lake Superior and Lake Mich- 
igan, available for vessels drawing not more than 12 
feet of water, from 1855 on, but fifteen years later 
the average annual increase of 21 per cent, of each 
year's freight traffic over that of the preceding year 
made it so evident the canal would soon be inade- 
quate for the increasing commerce that the United 
States Government began improvements, and by 1881 
had completed a 17-foot channel between the lakes, 
and provided a 515-foot lock, with a single lift of 20 
feet, for carrying vessels from the level of one lake to 
that of the other. The continued growth of the traf- 
fic led to an improved 20-foot channel, provided with 
an 800-foot lock in 1896. Following the example 
of the United States the Dominion Government built 
a canal around the Canadian side of the falls in 
1895. 

TRAFFIC OF STJEZ AND BT. MABt's CANAXS 
COMPARED. 

The volume of traffic through this canal far ex- 



SUEZ AND ST. MARY'S COMrARED. 379 

ceeds that through the Suez Canal. In 1881 the 
traffic of the old St. Marys Tails Canal was 1,560,- 
000 tons, as against 4,130,000 tons through the Suez 
Canal; but with the enlargement of the American 
canal a rapid increase in traffic immediately de- 
veloped. By 1889 it equaled that of the Suez Canal 
(about 7,000,000 tons in each) ; in 1895 a tonnage 
of 15,000,000 tons went through the St. Marys Falls 
Canal, as compared with 8,500,000 tons through the 
Suez Canal; and in 1901 the figures for the St. 
Marys Falls Canal were 28,403,065 tons.* The 
present traffic through the American canal exceeds the 
total foreign trade of the port of New York and is 
equal to nearly half the total volume of the foreign 
trade of the United States. In value the traffic 
through St. Marys Falls Canal presents less impos- 
ing figures, though even in this respect it is by no 
means insignificant. The value of the freight pass- 
ing through the canal in 1896 is estimated at $195,- 
000,000, and in 1901 at $290,000,000.t The Indian 
traffic alone through the Suez Canal in 1896 is valued 
'at $360,000,000. ITevertheless, a trade increasing 



* In 1905 they were 36,617,699. 

f The discovery and utilization of the mineral wealth of the 
Great Lakes region, supplemented by timely appropriations 
by Congress for the improvement of navigation, have brought 
about a maritime growth in that portion of our country 
which is without parallel in maritime history. Our lake fleet 
alone is greater than the fleet of any foreign nation except 
Great Britain or Germany. 



380 PANAMA. 

nearly $100,000,000 a year witlim a period of five 
years, may, prima facie, be expected to have had im- 
portant economic effects. 

As in the case of the Suez Canal the most striking 
results have been on the machinery of trade, the in- 
fluence of the St. Marys Canal on the shipping in- 
dustry of the Great Lakes being especially marked. 
It is not too much to say that the development of the 
carrying trade on the Great Lakes both in the num- 
ber and kind of vessels used is due almost wholly to 
the " Soo " Canal. From 1881 to 1895 the volume of 
commerce through the Detroit River increased from 
17,500,000 tons to 29,000,000 tons. During the 
same period the volume of commerce through the St. 
Marys Falls Canal increased by 13,500,000 tons, and 
as the larger share of the canal traffic goes through 
the Detroit River to Lake Erie ports, the increase in 
the traffic through the Detroit River is seen to have 
been mainly in the traffic from Lake Superior made 
possible by the existence of the canal and locks at 
Sault Ste. Marie. This increase in traffic has meant 
a corresponding increase in the number of vessels in 
the lake-carrying trade, and probably half of the 
3,230 vessels on the lakes are employed in business 
depending on the canal. Between 1883 and 1897 
the total tonnage on the lakes increased from 720,000 
to 1,410,000 tons, the increase being more than the 
total increase in the American merchant marine dur- 
ing this time. Further, while in 1883 the lake ton- 



CHANGES IN LAKE SHIPPING. 381 

nage was but a sixth of the total American mercHaniB 
marine, in 1897 it was nearly two-sevenths of that 
total. 

CHANGES iW THE LAKES SHIPPING. 

l^ot only has there been this increase in traffic and 
shipping due to the canal, but within the last ten 
years there has been a rapid and striking change in 
the material and structure of the ships on the Great 
Lakes, which could hardly have taken place had it not 
been for the canal. There has not been any sudden 
displacement of the old vessels such as was occasioned 
by the Suez Canal, but the new ships built for the in- 
creased traffic and to replace those that were out are 
not sailing vessels of wood, but large steel and iron 
steamships with double bottoms, water-tight compartr 
ments, triple-expansion engines, and modern electri- 
cal appliances. In 1870 there were 1,699 sailing 
vessels and but 642 steamers on the lakes; in 1897 
there were 993 sailing vessels and 1775 steamers. 
In 1870 the average tonnage of vessels on the lakes 
was 175 tons; in 1897 it was 440 tons. In 1880 a 
1,000-ton vessel was a rarity. In 1895 there were 
five lines owning together 60 steamships of from 
1,750 to 3,000 tons, and in 1901 over 100 steamers 
and sailing vessels from 5,000 to 8,000 tons, and 10 
over 8,000 tons. 

The " Soo " Canal is connected in two ways with 



382 PANAMA. 

these changes in the lake shipping. In the first place, 
the increase in lake traffic, which has necessitated 
large numbers of new ships and thus hastened the in- 
troduction of larger and modem ships, has been, as 
we have seen, mainly in the traffic from and to Lake 
Superior, made possible by the canal; in the second 
place, the iron ore from which the iron and steel ships 
are constructed comes from the iron mines of north- 
ern Michigan and Wisconsin, which have been made 
available by the canal route from the mines to the 
ports in the southern lakes. 

EFFECT OF " SOO " CANAL ON" lEON BUSINESS. 

The mention of these iron ores brings up the second 
phase of the economic effects of the " Soo " Canal — 
those on the production and marketing of commodi- 
ties. The case of iron and steel may well be given 
the first place as the largest item in the traffic through 
the canal. The most striking features in the iron 
and steel industries since 1880 have been the decline 
in the importance of the Pennyslvania mines, the de- 
velopment of the Lake Superior region, and the trans- 
fer of the manufacture of pig iron and steel from the 
east to the west of the Alleghenies. Several factors 
have served to bring about this remarkable shift. 
The Superior ores are of the quality available for 
making steel by the Bessemer process ; the large de- 
posits have made profitable the use of labor-saving 



TRADE OF THE ORE REGION. -^^^ 

machinery in mining and the construction of special 
terminals for loading and unloading the ore. But 
an equally important factor is the low rates of freight 
from the mines to the manufacturing points in Ohio, 
western Pennsylvania, and Illinois by the water 
route through the canal. In 1895 the rate from the 
mines to Erie ports was 80 cents per ton, equal to 
nine-tenths of a mill per ton-mile. The lowest rail- 
road rate per ton-mile would equal a charge of $2.59 
a ton from Duluth to Cleveland; and as the price 
of red hematite ore of Bessemer quality at Cleveland 
in 1895 was $2.80 a ton, the dependence of Lake 
Superior ore on the water route may be easily seen. 

An interesting case of interacting causes is to be 
seen in the relation between the Lake Superior iron 
mines and the shipping on the Great Lakes. It was 
the developemnt of the iron mines which furnished 
the trade of the large steel steamships, and also the 
material for constructing them, while the use of the 
larger and better ships has lowered freight rates and 
still further developed the iron industry. 

The development of the Lake Superior iron mines 
has been an important factor in causing the great re- 
duction in the price of Bessemer steel during the last 
sixteen years, and it is this reduction that has made 
possible the largely increased use of steel in ship- 
building, in bridges ; in heavier rails, and in the tall 
buildings of our large cities. Indirectly, then, all 
these improvements have depended to a large degree 



384 PANAMA. 

i 

on the existence of the St. Marys Falls Canal. The 
extent of this relation may be indicated in some de- 
gree by the statistics of the iron-ore movement 
through the canal. From 1860 to 1881 the amount 
of iron ore passing through the canal increased from 
100,000 tons to 750,000 tons per year, but since the 
construction of the larger lock the increase has been at 
a much greater rate. In 1887, 2,500,000 tons went 
through the canal; and for each of the years 1895, 
1896, 8,000,000 tons; and in 1901, 18,000,000 tons. 
Throughout the period since 1881 the traffic in iron 
ore has formed about one-half the total tonnage pass- 
ing through the canal. The figures for 1895 and 
1896 are equal to four-fifths of the total production 
of the Lake Superior mines, which in turn constitutes 
two-thirds of the total iron-ore output of the United 
States. 

ENORMOUS WHEAT TEAFFTC OF THE LAKES. 

The most important part of the traffic through the 
" Soo " Canal, however, is not iron ore, but wheat 
and flour and other grains. The value of these 
items in the canal traffic is one and a half times that 
of the iron ore, and equal to $84,000,000, or nearly 
a third of the valuation of the total commerce 
through the canal. In volume the traffic has grown 
from 3,500,000 bushels of wheat and 600,000 bar- 
rels of flour in 1881 to 63,250,000 bushels of wheat 



EFFECT OF CANALS ON WHEAT TRADE. 385 

and nearly 9,000,000 barrels of flour in 1896. Tte 
last figures account for a large fraction of the 467,- 
000,000 bushels of wheat raised in the United States 
in 1896, being in fact almost equal to that portion 
of the crop exported. The movement of wheat 
through the canal just about equals the total receipts 
at Buffalo and Erie. 

It is not, however, possible to give the canal alone 
the credit for having developed this wheat trade. 
The production of the wheat was only made pos- 
sible by the construction of railroads through Min- 
nesota and the Dakotas, and these same railroads 
provide a means of getting the wheat to market via 
Chicago. But if all-rail rates had to be paid, Min- 
nesota and Dakota wheat and flour could not com- 
pete so well with that from the country near the 
eastern markets as it does by having water rates from 
Duluth to Buffalo. It should also be borne in mind 
that railroad building in Dakota and Minnesota be- 
gan on a large scale only after the enlargement of 
the canal, when it was seen that they could connect 
with a through direct water route to Buffalo. The 
canal has therefore been an important factor in de- 
veloping wheat production in the countiy west of 
Lake Superior. 

Besides wheat there has been a considerable traffic 

in other grain, but this first assumed large dimensions 

in the year 1896, when 27,000,000 bushels of gi-ain 

other than wheat went through the canal, as against 

25 



386 PAJ!^AMA. 

8,000,000 bushels in the previous year. As yet this 
is a less important item than that of wheat, but the 
relations between the canal and the development of 
the traffic are the same in both cases. 

DEVELOPMENT OF LUMBER TEADE, 

The same relations can also be traced in the de- 
velopment of the lumber traffic. This grew from 
82,000,000 feet in 1881 to 685,000,000 feet in 1896. 
As in the case of wheat, a considerable increase would 
have resulted from the construction of railroads, but 
the construction of railroads has been hastened and 
increased by the existence of the Avater route to the 
East through the canal, and it is only by cheap water 
rates that such a huge traffic has been developed. 
If, however, the cutting down of forests is the true 
explanation of the destructive spring floods in the 
Mississippi Valley, the encouragement given to the 
lumber traffic by the canal may not, after all, have 
been of economic advantage to the country as a whole. 

The other important item in the south-bound traffic 
through the canal does not seem to have been depend- 
ent on the canal. The amount of copper going by 
this route increased from 29,000 tons in 1881 to 
116,000 tons in 1896 ; but the cheaper freights made 
possible by the canal can have had little effect in pro- 
moting the production of an article valued at $200 
a ton. 



INCREASES OF POPULATION. 387 

Of the nortli-bonnd traffic the only item of large 
dimensions is that of coal. In 1881, 295,000 tons 
of coal passed through the canal ; in 1896, over 3,- 
000,000 tons. The whole of this traffic may be said 
to have been created by the canal. The lowest rail- 
road rates wonld be too high to allow any coal to be 
carried to the country around Lake Superior, but the 
lake steamers, going back empty for their cargoes of 
iron ore and wheat, can afford to carry coal at rates 
which seem incredible. In 1890 the average freight 
rate on coal from Buffalo to Duluth was 45 cents a 
ton. It is through such rates that the northward 
movement of coal and the consequent development 
of a large iron manufacturing industry near the ore 
mines are made possible. 

INCREASES OF POPtTLATIOlSr DUE TO THE CAITAL. 

The geographical changes in production that have 
resulted from the operation of the St. Marys Falls 
Canal have been accompanied by important move- 
ments of population. A definite connection can be 
shown between the canal and certain particular popu- 
lation movements, but with other changes the canal 
has been only one of several factors. The increase of 
population around the shores of Lake Superior may 
fairly be ascribed to the development which has been 
given to that country by the canal. Taking the coim- 
ties bordering on Lake Superior, we find that from 



388 PANAMA. 

1880 to 1890 the population of the Michigan coun- 
ties increased from 61,750 to 116,600; of the Wis- 
consin counties, from 8,000 to 41,000, and of the 
Minnesota counties, from 6,400 to 54,700. The 
total increase is not a startling figure in the United 
States, but compared with the percentage increase in 
these same States as a whole the result is striking. 
During the decade the population of Michigan and 
Wisconsin increased in each case about 27 per cent, 
and of Minnesota about 70 per cent; in the Lake 
Superior counties the percentage of increase was, in 
Michigan 90 per cent, in Wisconsin 400 per cent, and 
in Minnesota 800 per cent. The only explanation of 
the difference is that new lines of industry have been 
opened up by the larger "" Soo " Canal. One con- 
spicuous feature of this increase of population in the 
Lake Superior region is the development of cities. 
Of the total increase of 136,000, 72,000 occurs in 
the six cities of Duluth, Superior, Ishpeming, Ash- 
land, Marquette, and Iron Mountain. Duluth, from 
a town of 3,500 in 1880, had become a city of 33,000 
in 1890, and six years later had a population of 60,- 
000. Ishpeming increased during the ten years from 
6,000 to 11,000; Superior, from 4,700 to 9,000, 
while the other three places were not in existence in 
1880, but had populations between 8,500 and 12,- 
000 in 1890. 

Among the movements of population where the ef- 
fects of the " Soo " Canal have been greater but are 



COMPARATIVE REVIEW. 389 

not so exactly calculable, may be mentioned the settle- 
ment of the Red River Valley and the increase in the 
cities on and near the southern shores of Lake Erie. 
The first of these is connected directly with the de- 
velopment of wheat production in that region, in 
which, as has been seen, the canal had a most impor- 
tant influence. The second is due, in large part, to 
the development of the iron and steel manufacturing 
industries, brought about by the use of iron ore from 
the Lake Superior region. 

INFLUENCES OF ST. MARy's AND SUEZ CANALS. 

A comparison of the influence of the St. Marys 
Falls Canal with that of the Suez Canal, shows that 
both have led to a rapid change in the material and 
character of ships used, that brought about by the 
Suez Canal being the most important, both in the ex- 
tent of new shipping and in the consequent disloca- 
tion of old forms of industry. Both canals, too, have 
led to important changes in the sources of production 
of several commodities, and the effects of the Ameri- 
can canal on iron and wheat production are greater 
than any effects traceable to the Suez Canal. In the 
case of the more general changes in which the extent 
of the influence of the canals can not be measured, no 
accurate comparison between the two is possible, but 
considering the gTeater area and population in Asia 



p 



390 MANAMA. 

affected by the Suez Canal, it is evident that its influ- 
ences on general development have been greater. 

Both canals have led to the production of wheat on 
a large scale in areas hitherto unused for that pur- 
pose, these districts constituting a large part of the 
total increase in the area devoted to wheat production. 
In consequence of this total increase of wheat-raising 
area during the last fifteen years, and the cheaper 
transportation to European markets, there has been 
a large reduction in the normal price of wheat. 
Cheaper food and less distress from famines and the 
fall in prices received by farmers in the old wheat- 
producing districts have been due in no small degree 
to the canals. 



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